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Abstract 
This thesis examines the effects on university teaching and research of recent 
changes to the method of funding universities. The effects of funding change are 
investigated through case studies of two universities, one an elite institution rated 
highly in all of the research assessment exercises and the other a non-elite 
institution rated low in the research assessment exercises. Within the universities 
a sample of staff was selected to fill in a questionnaire about their perceptions of 
change to teaching and research. In addition a small number of senior staff in 
each of the universities was interviewed. 
The analysis of the two sets of questionnaires revealed a remarkable degree of 
similarity between the two universities. For research, it appears that the time 
spent on research had fallen for most staff, that there had been a significant shift 
away from basic and toward more applied research and that the quality of research 
was perceived by most staff to have risen or remained the same. For teaching, 
there had been a large increase in all levels of teaching and a reduction in the level 
of support for students. There had also been a massive increase in the amount of 
administration required of staff. The interviews with senior staff supported these 
findings, but revealed subtler changes taking place too. For example, the non-
elite university was having to adopt different student recruitment policies, 
different staffing policies and different teaching arrangements to those found in 
the elite institution. It was also claimed that the funding exercise was changing 
the nature of the research process in the Humanities. The conclusion of the thesis 
is that funding changes are affecting the quality and type of research and teaching 
provided in universities, but universities with different backgrounds may be 
affected differently. 
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Introduction 
This thesis examines the effects on teaching and research of the university funding 
changes introduced in 1985, through a comparison of two contrasting universities. 
The need for research in this area stems from the funding changes introduced by 
the University Grants Committee (UGC) in 1985 when it made its first attempt to 
assess the quality of research undertaken in universities in what was then called the 
Research Selectivity Exercise, subsequently known as the Research Assessment 
Exercise (RAE). The exercise was introduced in response to pressure from the 
Government for universities to be more accountable for the public resources that 
they used and for the limited resources available to universities to be used in a way 
that ensured 'value for money'. There may also have been concern within the UGC 
itself about the way in which funds were disbursed to the universities. This 
concern was indicated in an advisory paper sent from the UGC to the Government 
in the Autumn of 1984. In this paper the UGC advocated greater selectivity in 
research funding. What is uncertain is the precise degree of agreement between the 
UGC and the Government as to this new policy, but some degree of consensus is 
indicated by Sir Peter Swinnerton-Dyer, the Chief Executive (CE) of the UGC at 
the time. He stated that 'the pressure [from the Government to introduce greater 
selectivity in research funding] is too strong to resist, even if we had wished to' 
(my italics) (quote in the THES, 14th Sept, 1984). So although this indicates 
compliance, it does not mean that the UGC and Government were agreed as to how 
the new policy was to be introduced or the proportion of university funds that were 
to be disbursed through this new mechanism. 
The RAE may be seen as the principal part of a fundamental change to the way in 
which universities were to be funded by the funding councils. From 1986 onwards 
there was far greater transparency in the way in which universities were to be 
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funded and concurrently there was also a greater separation of the funding of 
research and teaching. A number of reasons for this change were given by the 
funding council and the Government. They can be summarised in the words of the 
1987 White Paper: 
... the allocation of research grants 	
 was based on the Government's 
identification of need to increase efficiency and effectiveness in and between 
the higher education institutions, considering rationalisation of resources in 
order to achieve optimum distribution between the sectors 
(White Paper, 1.11 and 9.11v). 
It is of note that the requirement for greater efficiency coincided with a considerable 
reduction in funding, in real terms. The Government's intention was to concentrate 
research in a few centres of excellence and separate the funding of research from the 
funding of teaching for the first time. The previous resource allocation method, the 
`dual funding' model, was considered to spread resources too widely. In reality it 
may well have been part of a strategy to protect research centres of excellence from 
the results of the policy of reduction in public expenditure. The strategy of selective 
research funding also seems to be an attempt to save the best centres from the 
consequences of large cuts in grants to the higher education system. It may also 
have been the first stage in developing a hierarchical university system of the type 
proposed by the Advisory Board to the Research Councils (ABRC 1987). In the 
first selectivity exercise of 1985/86 15% of research funding was based on the 
results of the research assessment exercise. In 1989 this increased to 30% and in 
1992 to 100% (Miller, 1995). The financial constraints imposed on universities, 
together with selective funding, were claimed to have affected the universities 
seriously, for example by the Association of University Teachers (AUT). The AUT 
(1989) pointed out some consequences of the constraints on university resources. 
It argued that they resulted in disincentives to attracting good graduates towards an 
academic career, because the grants offered to postgraduates were smaller than the 
salaries offered to graduates in the labour market. The Government reduction in 
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grants also affected the contracts of researchers and the pay of lecturers. A career in 
academia was less attractive than elsewhere because of university staffs lower pay, 
and worse conditions, security and prospects in comparison with alternative jobs in 
the graduate labour market. (Report from Association of University Teachers, 
1989.) 
This negative view of the UGC reforms to university funding were not echoed in 
the 1987 White Paper. 
`The UGC - and any successor body (see paragraphs 4.38ff) - has a key 
role in promoting the efficiency of universities, both through its own 
programmes and actions and through the guidance it gives to institutions. It 
has carried out a root and branch review of the way in which it decides how 
much grant to allocate to each university for teaching and research. It has 
embarked on an ambitious programme of review and rationalisation of 
university departments in a wide range of subjects, in some cases in 
collaboration with the planning bodies for the other sectors of higher 
education'. 
(White Paper, 1987 p23) 
The White Paper also refers in admiring terms to another innovation at the same 
time: 
`The CVCP and the UGC have also adopted proposals, put forward by a 
joint working party on the use of performance indicators, for the regular 
publication from 1987 of a range of efficiency and effectiveness measures 
covering all universities. Initially, efficiency indicators will include 
student:staff ratios (SSRs) and a range of unit costs broken down by the 
main categories of expenditure. Effectiveness indicators will include income 
from research grants and contracts, the numbers of research and sponsored 
students, submission rates for research degrees, the first occupation of 
graduates and the institution's contribution to postgraduate and professional 
training'. 
(White Paper, 1987 p23). 
In addition to these changes there was the Jarratt Report on University efficiency 
and, earlier, the Merrison Report advocating among other things greater selectivity 
in research support within universities. (These reports are briefly described in 
Appendix 1). 
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Clearly important changes to universities were taking place in the mid-eighties, 
following the draconian cuts imposed by the Government in 1981. Both the UGC 
and the Government appear to consider the changes in funding method to be central 
to altering the behaviour of universities and the structure of the university system. 
As the THES reports, 'The intention [of the funding changes] is for the UGC to 
move from 'informal prejudice' to a more formula- based system of allocating its 
recurrent grant' (THES 11 Oct., 1985). As the Green Paper makes clear, the 
Government was prepared to see the shape of the university system transformed 
since it speculated that the change in funding method may mean 'the loss of research 
funding for departments or even entire universities' (Green Paper 1985 , p6). 
The 'new' funding formula with its transparent and explicit research assessment 
characteristics has been in operation long enough for it to be possible to investigate 
its effect on universities. That is the research question that this thesis addresses: 
How has the change in funding method introduced in 1985 affected university 
behaviour? Specifically, the thesis addresses the question by examining in two 
universities the effect of the funding changes on teaching and research - the two 
principal functions of universities and certainly those that the UGC and Government 
wanted to affect. This study is an exploratory attempt to open up this under-
researched area in higher education. 
The thesis is divided into three parts: the first part is concerned with setting the 
context for the research, the research question and the research design; the second 
part describes the data collected and presents the analysis of the data; and the final 
part summarises the findings and presents conclusions. The first two chapters of 
Part One of this thesis are concerned with the way in which economists and other 
social scientists have conceptualised and, in some cases, empirically examined 
educational institutions. One of the purposes of the funding changes is to increase 
`value for money'. Economists have developed techniques that are intended to shed 
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light on this issue and they have also developed models that purport to describe the 
way in which universities and individuals will respond to different funding 
mechanisms and different incentive systems. The way in which economists have 
approached these questions is the subject of chapter one and two. In Chapter 1 the 
use of education production functions (EPFs) is critically examined as a method of 
investigating changes to the input and output relationships in education. This 
technique is found to be fundamentally flawed and therefore not one appropriate to 
the research question. However, although we reject EPFs this does not mean that 
the results may not indicate something about whether institutions may be becoming 
more or less 'efficient' in the production of teaching and research. We therefore 
introduce at the end of this chapter different notions of 'efficiency' so that we can 
indicate whether the results suggest that 'efficiency' may have increased as a result 
of the funding changes. 
Chapter 2 introduces four models that have been used to 'understand' institutional 
and individual behaviour. These models are the utility maximising model, the 
human capital model, the Clark/Williams organisational model and the Garvin 
model of the university market. Each model is described and critically examined to 
discover if it has useful insights to offer into how the universities in this study 
might behave. Our conclusion is that none is entirely satisfactory and none provides 
any clear predictions as to how universities would behave in response to the 
funding changes we are examining. Nonetheless the results may indicate something 
about the value of the models in understanding behaviour and the reasons why there 
may be differences in the way in which institutions respond and position themselves 
in the university 'market'. 
In the next two chapters we describe the changes to funding that have taken place 
and examine the performance indicator, the RAE, that has been used by the 
university funding councils since 1985. Chapter 3 describes the funding changes 
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and the context in which they were introduced. Thus it considers the previous 
funding method and the other influences on universities at that time, the mid-
eighties, such as the Merrison Report and the Jarratt Report. The changes to the 
sources of finance to universities during that period are also presented. The chapter 
describes in detail the major innovation in the funding change, the introduction of a 
research assessment exercise. The use of the RAE as the principal basis for judging 
the performance of universities requires a more general discussion of performance 
indicators (PIs) as a means of assessing universities and this also is provided. There 
have been a number of critiques of the RAE that focus on its effect on particular 
disciplines and in Chapter 4 four of these are critically examined. 
The last chapter in Part I of the thesis presents and justifies the research method 
used. As a result of the paucity of research in this area we were faced with a choice 
of either a general broad brush survey of a number of selected universities or a 
sharper, more detailed study of the case study type. In a sense this is not a choice 
because the case study is a necessary preliminary to a large scale survey. Our case 
study is limited because of the constraints of resources, particularly of time, to two 
contrasting universities. From these case studies quantitative data was collected, 
principally through questionnaires to a sample of one in three staff, and qualitative 
data was collected through interviews of selected senior staff to provide us with an 
understanding of the responses to the questionnaires and to give insights into policy 
formation at the universities. 
In Part Two of the thesis we present and discuss our findings. Chapter 6 and 7 
present the details of the sample, and our main findings from the questionnaires. 
These include a detailed analysis of the relevance of gender, year of appointment, 
rank and department to differences both within and between the universities. 
Chapter 8 presents the qualitative data collected in the interviews and relates these 
findings to the quantitative data presented in the earlier chapters. 
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In Part Three the first chapter, chapter 9, summarises and evaluates our main 
findings. The final chapter, chapter 10, presents our conclusions with respect to the 
value of the economic models, as discussed in chapter 2, together with the 
implications of our findings for policy makers. The chapter ends by suggesting 
future research which might be undertaken into this issue. 
17 
Part I: Introduction 
This part of the thesis begins in Chapter 1 with a discussion of the technique most 
commonly used by economists to evaluate performance in education: the education 
production function. The technique as an instrument for evaluation of institutions is 
found to be fundamentally flawed on both conceptual and empirical grounds and we 
therefore argue that it is inappropriate to this research. However, the data that we 
generate on the effect of the funding changes on university teaching and research 
may enable us to make some tentative conclusions as to changes in efficiency, at 
least with respect to teaching and research. Thus the chapter ends by introducing 
efficiency concepts resting on somewhat less restrictive assumptions than those 
needed in education production function work. These will relate to our finding in 
the concluding section. The second chapter introduces and critically examines four 
models that have been used to 'explain' university and individual behaviour. The 
inadequacy of these models provides a justification for adopting the method that we 
use in this research. Nevertheless, our empirical evidence will enable us to 
comment further on the usefulness of the models in the concluding section. 
Chapter 3 introduces the changes that have taken place to university funding in the 
eighties and early nineties and examines the RAEs that have been used to judge the 
performance of universities. The chapter ends with a critical discussion of 
university PIs. Chapter 4 presents four discipline based critiques of the RAEs. 
When we present our findings we will comment on the extent to which they support 
these critiques. Part 1 ends with a chapter explaining and justifying the research 
method that we employ. 
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Chapter 1: Economists' Treatment of Education 
Production and Efficiency 
Introduction 
The economics of education as a significant branch of economic theory is of recent 
origin. Mark Blaug in his seminal work, the Economics of Education (1970), 
asserts that although earlier economists such as Adam Smith, Alfred Marshall and 
John Stuart Mill had considered education as a form of national investment, it was 
not until Schultz's address to the American Economics Association in 1961 
"Investment in Human Capital" that the subject was seriously developed as a branch 
of economics. Of even more recent origin has been the development of theories 
about education production and educational finance. To put into perspective the 
empirical work described in this thesis this chapter will provide a critical overview 
of the way in which economists have attempted to theorise and empirically study 
education production and efficiency. 
In this chapter we will consider in turn education production functions and 
education efficiency. The concern of economists with these subjects is readily 
understandable: all these developments are attempts to develop some measure of 
efficiency in education so that the best, most efficient, allocation of society's scarce 
educational resources can be made. As Hanushek (1987, p33) asserts "The concept 
of a production function is a powerful pedagogical tool and, in its basic form, 
appears applicable to a wide range of industries - from education to 
petrochemicals". Unfortunately, although the motives for economists undertaking 
this work are very worthy, to date, the record of economists working in this area 
has been, at best, somewhat patchy. Most of the work on education production 
functions has been concerned with schools, but the critique of their use applies as 
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well to other areas of education, including universities. 
Education Production 
Because this thesis is concerned with institutions and how they have responded to 
changes in funding we will confine our review of economists' work on education 
production at the micro or institutional, level. 
Education Production Functions (EPF) 
EPF and its use has developed from production functions used by economists to 
analyse firms. A production function describes the maximum output that can be 
obtained from a given set of inputs, given the state of technology. Typically, when 
applied to education the EPF relates measures of inputs into the educational process 
to educational outputs. An education production can be depicted in the following 
way. Assume that there are only two inputs it and 12 and that the way in which 
schools use these two inputs to produce an education output (some achievement test 
result perhaps) is shown in Figure la below. Only at point b is production 
efficient: isoquant AOAO is tangential to the input of isocurve ZZ. 
Figure la 
II 
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The problem arises when the idea of the EPF is operationalised. The production 
function is unknown and must be estimated using imperfect data, usually using 
multiple regression analysis. An example is given below: 
(1) 	 Ait= f (Bit, Pit, Sit, li) 
where for the ith student: 
Ait 	 = achievement at time t 
Bit 	 = vector of family background influences cumulative to time t 
Pit 	 = vector of influences of peers cumulative to time t 
Sit 	 = vector of school inputs cumulative to time t 
ii 	 = vector of innate ability 
There have been numerous examples of estimating education production function of 
which probably the best known is the Coleman Report of 1966. A number of 
problems arise, however, if the results of estimates of this type are used for policy 
making and these we consider below. 
Problems in the Application of Production Functions to Education 
The basic problem facing an economist attempting to apply a production function to 
education is deciding what inputs and outputs he wishes to measure and how he is 
to measure them. 
Education outputs: Standardised tests, such as the Stanford Achievement Test, 
are often used as the measure of output. Levin (1976, p184) accuses studies which 
make use of such single measures of output as being nothing more than 'black box' 
hypotheses, because they take no account of theories of development and learning. 
This line of reasoning leads to demands for a multi-disciplinary approach to 
developing a behavioural theory of schools. In taking this view Levin is rather 
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uncritical in his acceptance of the Bowles and Gintis (1976) argument that the 
principal function of schools is to reproduce the social relations of production. He 
uses this argument to justify the thought that "educational achievement is only one 
of many outputs of schooling, and is not necessarily the most important one" 
(Levin 1976, p163). Hanushek, though more critical of the Bowles and Gintis 
data, also recognises that: "cognitive skills, the chief measure of educational 
quality, may not be the only, let alone the most important, outcome of schooling in 
determining individuals' future success" (Hanushek 1979, p357). In later work 
Hanushek appears to take an even stronger line on tests and their meaning. 
"Many educational decisions are "micro" ones made by the actors 
themselves - mainly teachers. These are both difficult to observe and 
measure and, quite possibly, not easily reproduced. As a shorthand 
description, these factors will be referred to simply as "skill" differences. 
Once the possibility of skill differences is introduced, the language - if not 
the conceptual framework - of production functions begins to fail. It is even 
difficult to define just what "maximum possible output" might mean since it 
is difficult to specify what the "homogenous" inputs are". 
(Hanushek 1987) 
Schools produce multiple outputs. It is no easy task to translate standard 
production theory which considers varying quantities of a homogenous output into 
an educational equivalent. Hanushek (1979, p356) distinguishes between the 
effects of schooling on socialization - political awareness, citizenship, moral values, 
etc. The fact is that schools and other institutions such as universities are producing 
other outputs besides cognitive achievement. This greatly reduces the value of 
educational production function studies which consider educational achievement as 
the only output: "the obvious problems are either ignored or the assumption is 
made that all other outputs are produced as perfect joint products in exact proportion 
to achievement scores" (Levin 1976, p163). This criticism of educational 
production function literature reinforces Levin's argument for the development of a 
behavioural theory of schools. Hanushek, on the other hand, is much more 
prepared to persevere with educational production functions if, through the 
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collection of more data, the variables being measured can be made more specific, 
and if the degree of jointness of the outputs can be measured. For example, he 
argues that the potential problems of multiple outputs are likely to be smaller in the 
early years of schooling than in the later ones. 
Education inputs: The measurement of earnings differences is often used as a 
means of measuring educational outcomes, but earnings differences are the 
consequence of many inputs in addition to schooling. For example, in 1976 
Bowles and Gintis argues that earnings differences are chiefly the consequence of 
the existing social structure, and schools adjust to instead of determining 
subsequent outcomes. Jencks, in 1972, argued that luck and personal 
characteristics (inputs) unrelated to schooling were the most important determinants 
of earning difference. It is not the function of this chapter to become involved in a 
discussion of the impact of education upon earnings. Suffice to say that, whilst the 
conclusions of Bowles, Gentis, and Jencks may be challenged, all economists 
would accept the point that educational outputs, however they are measured, are 
significantly affected by non-school inputs such as socio-economic and family 
influences, peer group influences and innate ability. 
It is generally agreed that, of these variables, innate ability is the hardest to 
measure. Presumably the term relates to the inbuilt learning capacity of the 
individual student, but precisely what this means and how it should be measured 
remains uncertain. A failure to include a value for innate ability in the model is 
likely to bias upwards the estimated impact of family background on achievement. 
In 1972 Jencks went so far as to argue: "the characteristics of a school's output 
depend largely on a single input, namely the characteristics of the entering children. 
Everything else, the school budget, its policies, the characteristics of teachers - is 
either secondary or completely irrelevant". (Quoted by Psacharopoulos and 
Woodhall, 1985. They also give evidence which challenges Jencks, p217). 
23 
Even the measurement of school inputs, as opposed to non-school inputs, has its 
difficulties. The age of a school building, teacher age, experience and 
qualifications, the number of textbooks available, etc. may be measure relatively 
simply, but "there are aspects of the process which are difficult to disentangle from 
the characteristics of individual teachers" (Hanushek 1979, p367). Many decisions 
about what happens in education are made at what Hanushek refers to as the 
'micro' level that is to say by individual teachers in the classrooms rather than by 
school managers. To quote from Hanushek (1987, p38): 
"Perhaps the most important concern with standardised tests is the lack of 
external validation. These tests do discriminate among individuals; that is, 
they can divide the population into different groups. However, questions 
are generally selected by criteria internal to tests: (a) their ability to divide 
students (so that questions that can be answered by all or none of the 
relevant population are not useful), and (b) their consistency with other 
questions (i.e. whether individuals getting a given question right tend to get 
other questions on the test rights). Further, a given test should produce the 
same score if taken at different times by the same individual, and slightly 
different wordings of questions covering the same concept should yield the 
same results. None of these relates directly to whether or not tests cover 
material, knowledge, or skills valued by society." 
As mentioned earlier, Hanushek's answer to these problems is to call for greater 
'input specification': "There is little conceptual clarity, and the choice of inputs 
seems sometimes explicitly, to be guided more by the data available rather than any 
notions of conceptual clarity" (1976, p363). He argues, for example, that there is 
nothing to stop a model including the non-purchased as well as the purchased 
characteristics of teachers (1976, p193). In other words, despite the problems 
referred to above, applying conceptual models such as equations (i) to educational 
realities remains a feasible and valuable activity. 
However, Levin's argument against the use of educational production functions as 
policy making guides is chiefly concerned with a different point. He argues that the 
fundamental assumption of technical efficiency implicit in the use of production 
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functions (see later discussion) cannot be applied to educational institutions because 
they are not technically efficient. Put another way this means that, strictly 
speaking, education production functions are not production functions in the proper 
sense. The next three sections of this chapter will be concerned with this argument 
and its implications. 
Technical, Allocative and Social Welfare Efficiency in Educational 
Production 
In addition to the problems of specification and measurement of inputs and outputs 
there are other fundamental conceptual problems in education production functions 
work. Levin provides an excellent exposition of these problems (Levin 1976). The 
starting point of Levin's argument is that all studies of educational production 
functions assume that schools are technically efficient, that they are maximising 
their output given the input mix which they have selected. The implications of this 
are shown in Figure lb. 
Figure lb: Production Frontier for Schools (Universities) 
Input S 
Z1 
The production frontier is depicted by the line AoAol (a production isoquant). The 
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individual observations show schools using various combinations of the inputs S1 
and S2 to produce constant educational output Ao. Schools a, b, and c are on the 
frontier and are therefore technically efficient. All other schools d, e, f, etc., are to 
the north east of the frontier and must require higher levels of factor inputs to make 
the output Ao. They are technically inefficient. (Why such inefficiencies might 
arise is explained later.) Levin's point is that if there are a large number of 
technically inefficient schools then statistical estimates of the educational production 
function will not be on the frontier - though the literature shows that it is assumed 
they are on the frontier. Figure one also shows the line Z1Z, the iso-cost (relative 
price) line facing all schools for the two factors. School b is allocatively efficient 
because it is on the iso-cost line, but schools a and c are above the line. They are 
allocatively inefficient because they require a higher budget to achieve output Ao  
than is the case at point b. The underlying goal of production function studies is to 
determine where point b is (Levin 1976, p154). 
In Figure lb schools a, b and c are all technically efficient, but only one, school b, 
is also allocatively efficient. In other words it is possible to achieve technical 
efficiency without achieving allocative efficiency. We are using Levin's efficiency 
definition. Later we refer to allocative efficiency as price efficiency. It is also 
important to Levin's argument that it is possible to achieve technical and/or 
allocative efficiency without achieving social welfare efficiency. This is shown in 
Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Social Welfare and Choice of Output Combinations 
Output a 1 
0 
A 
	 Output a
2 
Figure 2 assumes that there are two outputs. AA1 
 represents a product 
transformation schedule between educational outputs al and a2. II and I0 represent 
social indifference curves for the two outputs such that II represents a higher level 
of satisfaction than 10. Given the production possibilities and community 
preferences, the highest level of welfare is El. Assume, however, that the output 
produced is Eo, which is being produced efficiently because it is on the frontier. 
However, the combination Eo gives the community less satisfaction than El, and in 
fact less than any combination in the shaded area (e.g. E2). In other words: "it 
may be better to produce inefficiently that which is highly desirable to the 
community than to produce with perfect efficiency that which is of low value" 
(Levin 1976, p155). 
So far there is little in Levin's argument with which exception can be taken. 
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Figures 1 and 2 give a useful diagrammatic representation of efficiency issues 
relating to educational production functions, and figure 2 raises the important issue 
of maximising social welfare. However, figure 1 does suggest that schools may be 
technically inefficient. Below, we consider Levin's arguments as to why this might 
happen. 
Are Education Institutions Technically Efficient? 
Levin (1976, p157) lists six conditions which economic theory uses to explain 
technical efficiency in firms operating in competitive, private industry: 
1. managerial knowledge of the technical production process; 
2. substantial managerial discretion over input mix; 
3. a basic competitive environment; 
4. managerial knowledge of prices for both inputs and outputs; 
5. an aim (e.g. profit maximization) which is consistent with maximising 
output; 
6. clear signals of success or failure (profit, loss, etc.). 
Having stated these as the conditions for technical efficiency in private, competitive 
industry, Levin then argues that none of the conditions apply to education. His 
argument, which is developed in some detail, may be summarised thus: 
1. Educational managers lack knowledge of the production set for particular 
outcomes; 
2. Substantial management discretion does not exist over which inputs are 
obtained and how they are organised in educational production; 
3. Little or no competition exists between schools; 
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4. Prices of inputs and outputs are not readily available to educational 
managers; 
5. Incentive/reward structures of schools seem to have little relation to the 
declared educational goals of those educational institutions; 
6. There are no clear signs of success/failure for schools comparable to firms 
operating in the competitive market. 
All of this leads Levin to the conclusion that, since schools do not act like 
competitive suppliers, it is a serious mistake to assume they are technically efficient. 
The mistake is multiplied by the fact that studies generally assume that schools are 
maximising a single output. They can not be operating at the frontier for one output 
because they produce multiple outputs: "it is reasonable to believe that the 
production of other outputs reduces the amount of cognitive learning that will be 
produced" (Levin 1976, 163). Thus there are many reasons for believing that there 
are substantial technical inefficiencies in schools. 
Levin's argument concerning technical inefficiency can be considered in two ways. 
The first, obviously, is to ask if it is correct. The second, which will be considered 
later in this chapter, is to ask whether it matters. With regard to the first of these 
two points, Levin has been attacked for being superficial and 'simpleminded' 
(Watts 1976, p197). It is certainly true that many firms in private, competitive 
industry would not fulfil the six conditions leading to technical efficiency. 
Nevertheless, it does seem reasonable to suppose that firms responding to market 
signals in a competitive situation are more likely to have incentives for achieving 
efficiency and maximising output than are institutions in the educational sector. 
Hanushek (1979, p370; 1976, p194) does not accept that Levin's arguments 
demonstrate there must be technical inefficiency. For example, the fact that an 
educational manager is not motivated by profit maximisation does not in itself prove 
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that he will fail to organise his institution so as to be on the production frontier. 
The fact that a headteacher is unlikely to be motivated by profit maximisation and 
may have little knowledge of the production set for particular outcomes does not 
preclude the maximisation of output. In such a situation the production frontier 
may be achieved, but not at lowest cost (as with firms a and c in figure 1). In other 
words, the problem would not be technical efficiency but allocative or economic 
inefficiency. 
However, none of the points in the previous two paragraphs remove the possibility 
that technical inefficiencies may exist. Hanushek is really suggesting that allocative 
efficiency/inefficiency deserves more attention than does concern about technical 
inefficiency, which brings us to the second point raised above. Does Levin's 
apparent discovery of technical inefficiencies in education really matter? He would 
argue that it does because of its implications for the use of education production 
functions as policy guides. The next sections are concerned with these issues. 
The Implications of Technical Inefficiencies in Education 
First of all, it is necessary to repeat the basic point to Levin's argument: attempts to 
estimate educational production functions use achievement as the single measure of 
output and are based on the tacit assumption that educational institutions are 
producing as much achievement as can be obtained with their resources; i.e. they 
are producing at the frontier. "But given the high probability of technical 
inefficiency, estimates of the production function on this output are likely to lead to 
biased co-efficients and misleading implications" (Levin 1976, p164). This 
situation is shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Frontier and Average Production Isoquants for Student 
Achievement 
Input S1 
0 
Input S2 
In Figure 3 S1 and S2 represent two different school inputs in the production of 
student achievement. Each observation represents that combination of the two 
inputs which a particular school is using to produce a given amount of output, Ao. 
The isoquant Aoi is a mapping of the most efficient points for producing the output 
Ao. In other words, it is the production frontier. All points to the north east of 
Ao1 are using higher input levels to produce the same level of achievement and are 
therefore technically inefficient. The isoquant Ao2 represents the average for all the 
observations - including efficient and inefficient schools. Clearly all points on Ao2 
are to the north east of Ao1, showing that the average production relationship is a 
less efficient one than the frontier relationship. 
On the face of it this is not much of an argument: some schools are more efficient 
than others, therefore the average production relationship is bound to be less 
efficient than the most efficient possible. However, Levin's point is that 
educational production function estimates have used data based upon the 
performance of all schools in a particular survey and not just the most efficient 
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ones. In other words the studies have related to Ao2 (the average) rather than to 
Ao 1 (the frontier). Therefore: "the existing statistical studies of educational 
production functions are not production functions in the frontier sense. Moreover 
their results might suggest erroneous conclusions about which combinations of 
inputs (programmes) maximises achievement for a given budget restraint" (Levin 
1976, p164). In fact policy recommendations based upon such misleading 
production functions can lead to a loss of allocative efficiency. How this might 
arise is best considered by contrasting the situations in figures 4 and 5. As will be 
clear from figure 3, Levin's discussion contrasts those schools operating at the 
frontier with the average for all schools. Whether or not a school is at the frontier 
or is just represented by the average it will achieve allocative efficiency if it selects 
that combination of inputs which equates the ratios of marginal products to prices. 
Figure 4 shows a situation where the ratio of marginal products to prices is the 
same for both frontier and average schools. In such a situation the existence of 
technical inefficiencies does not matter in the sense that it is neutral between inputs: 
Figure 4: Technical Inefficiency that is Neutral Between Inputs 
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In figure 4 Aoi is the production isoquant for Ao for all efficient schools and Ao2 
is the isoquant for the entire set of schools. B 1B2 and CiC2 are isocost or budget 
lines reflecting the various combinations of the inputs S1 and S2 available within 
two given cost restraints. Point E shows that combination of the two inputs which 
produces output Ao given budget restraint B132 and applies to the efficient or 
frontier schools. Point F shows that combination of the two inputs which will 
produce output Ao given restraint CiC2 and applies to the average. The line OM is 
a ray drawn from the origin which intersects both points E and F. This being so the 
same ratio of S 1/S2 is optimal (i.e. produces allocative efficiency) for both sets of 
schools. Consequently, it does not matter which group of schools is used to 
estimate the production function because the input ratio is the same in both cases. 
However, there is no particular reason why this particular situation should exist. 
Assuming that technical inefficiencies exist, it is likely that they will not be neutral 
between inputs. In other words, the inefficient school may be organised such that 
the relative inefficiency in the use of one output will be greater than for another. 
This is shown in figure 5. 
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Figure 5: Technical Inefficiency that is Biased Between Inputs 
Input S 1  
In Figure 5 a ray drawn from the origin representing a constant ratio of inputs does 
not pass through both points of tangency (E and F) as it did in figure 4. The 
optimal ratio for frontier schools remains at point E, but the ray OM does not 
intersect with the isoquant Ao2 at point F. Instead it intersects at point G which is a 
more costly combination than that represented by point F because it is outside the 
isocost line C 1 C2. This means that the optimal ratio of S 1/S2 will be different 
between the two groups of schools. Therefore if we seek to impose upon the non-
frontier schools the input ratio represented by the ray OM we shall be 
recommending that they choose an allocatively inefficient set of inputs. This is the 
crucial point of Levin's argument: 
The point to be emphasised is that even with estimates based upon perfectly 
specified systems of equations for educational achievement, "the input combination 
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that might be considered optimal for the industry will actually lead to a reduction in 
allocative efficiency for some educational firms" (Levin 1976, p168). Levin's 
conclusion may be summarised thus: if we implement policies based upon 
estimates of the production function for the industry as a whole we will actually 
contribute to increasing the inefficiencies of the industry. He acknowledges that 
this is difficult to test in practice, though the difficulties reinforce the argument that 
estimates of educational production functions will be unreliable: namely that the 
outputs are difficult to identify or measure, and the inputs are not properly 
specified. Despite these problems, Hanushek and Levin are both able to find many 
examples of estimated educational production functions being applied to policy 
making decisions. It seems reasonable to suppose, even after allowing for the 
doubts mentioned earlier, that estimated production functions for competitive 
industrial firms have fewer errors than estimates of educational production 
functions. Yet, as Hanushek says, "Few people would expect manufacturing firms 
to change their behaviour given estimated production functions for industries, and 
there is very little temptation to prescribe any public policies based upon the results. 
The same cannot be said for education" (Hanushek 1979, p354). For example, in 
1971 the US Senate Hearing on Equal Educational Opportunities made use of 
results, as did the 1972 Presidents Commission on 'Schools, People and Money'. 
Levin notes that the "penchant for standardising input proportions is reflected in the 
laws of many states that require very specific ratios of administrators to teachers 
and of teachers and other professional staff to students. It is reflected in the policy 
prescriptions of most educational reports" (Levin 1976, p173). 
The problems discussed above indicate that education production functions as 
presently used are unlikely to provide useful signals about the efficiency of 
educational institutions or of changes to their efficiency. Indeed, it may be added 
that because they do not take into account costs or the objectives of the policy 
makers, whether within the institution or at a national level, even if they were a 
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valid tool their value in decision making would be extremely limited. Despite these 
rather negative conclusions about economics and its value in the analysis of 
education it is possible to see that there may be some value in developing a 
somewhat less restrictive model of efficiency that may provide some indication to 
policy makers of the effects of their policy on efficiency. To that end consider the 
following. 
Efficiency and Higher Education 
From the early eighties all Government statements concerning higher education 
emphasised the need for universities to become more efficient and accountable. As 
Williams puts it (in the eighties) 'government higher education policy was 
dominated by two main concerns: to help reduce public expenditure; and to increase 
efficiency 	  and to be explicitly accountable for it' (Williams 1992 p4). The 
development of Performance Indicators (PIs) was one response of the funding 
councils' to the need to make universities more accountable. Another response and 
related to the development of PIs was the development of explicit funding formulae 
which make clear to universities the basis on which they are being funded. 
Although this research is not concerned with 'testing' the hypothesis that 
universities have become more efficient as a consequence of the development of a 
new method of funding it is of interest to speculate as to whether the new funding 
changes have altered the behaviour of institutions in ways that appear to have 
increased their efficiency. In order to do this it is useful to begin with a definition 
of efficiency. In so doing we will necessarily raise a number of issues explored in 
our discussion of production functions; the most important concerns the definition 
and measurement of the inputs and outputs of education and how these inputs 
(however defined) interact (the processes of education) to produce the outputs of 
education. Since we have explored these issues earlier we will not do so here. 
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When economists examine efficiency in education they concern themselves with 
two types of efficiency: production efficiency and exchange efficiency. (We are not 
concerned with Pareto efficiency, another efficiency concept, because it is 
concerned with internal and extenal efficiency (for a fuller discussion see Verry, D. 
1987)). Production efficiency has itself been subdivided into two types, both 
borrowed directly from the theory of the firm as described in traditional economics 
textbooks. The two aspects of production efficiency are technical efficiency and 
price efficiency. Note our comment on page 26 about price efficiency. (Two 
books that attempt to show how these concepts of efficiency can be related to 
education are Monk (1990) and McMahon and Geske (1982) and we will base our 
definitions on those that they elaborate). Technical efficiency is achieved when 
inputs in educational processes are combined in such a way as to maximise outputs. 
If we knew the shape of the education production function this would provide us 
with the necessary information to maximise output. (For the present we will 
abstract from the problems that we described earlier with respect to defining and 
measuring the 'inputs' and 'outputs' of education). 
However, inputs cost money and since educational budgets are limited it is 
desirable to produce educational outputs at as low a price as possible. A movement 
to a position where the cost of producing an educational output falls is a move 
towards price efficiency. (In some of the literature this is referred to as economic 
efficiency.) An example of price and technical efficiency is provided in Figure 1. 
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Figure 6:Price and technical efficiency illustrated using two 
educational inputs 
Curve Qo represents technically efficient ways of producing student outputs - any 
point on this curve is technically efficient. If the line CC in Figure 1 represents the 
relative cost of two inputs, teacher time and student time, a move from Y to Z 
represents an increase in price efficiency, for it now costs less to produce a unit of 
output. To summarise, where output is maximised per unit of input we have 
technical efficiency, curve Qo, and where it is maximised at least cost we have price 
efficiency. Where curve Qo is tangential to line CC we have price efficiency for 
student output being maximised at least cost. Other points on Qo, such as Y, are 
technically efficient but not price efficient. Points such as R and X are neither 
technically not price efficient. 
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Figure 7: Various efficiency concepts illustrated using two 
educational outputs 
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Teaching output 
In education, we are often concerned with more than one output; for example, 
universities provide a teaching service and a research output. We can apply the 
above efficiency concepts to this situation too. In Figure 2, the technically efficient 
frontier for research and teaching is given by BB and a move from X to Y illustrates 
an increase in production efficiency. If P2P2 represents the objective function of the 
educational authority, that is, the combination of research and teaching the authority 
desires, a move from Y to Z represents a move towards what is called allocative 
efficiency. We have now moved from PiPi to P2P2 which represents a higher level 
of satisfaction. When we are concerned with satisfying society's demands or, in 
economists' jargon, society's objective function, we have a special case of 
allocative efficiency called exchange efficiency. 
Exchange efficiency refers to the efficiency with which appropriate educational 
outcomes are matched with the educational demands of 'society'. It is similar to 
allocative efficiency, except that we are now concerned with society's demands. 
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When we have production and exchange efficiency we have economic efficiency. 
Clearly, exchange efficiency implies production efficiency but the converse does 
not hold. Moreover, it is not at all clear what is meant by the educational demands 
of 'society'. Suppose that educational institutions have one preference about the 
mix of teaching and research, whereas the government has another. In that case, 
we can achieve production efficiency at two different exchange efficiencies. In 
short, economic efficiency now has two possible meanings. Thus, in Figure 1, 
production efficiency is achieved at Z and Z1, and the exchange efficiency depends 
on whether we give priority to the government's objective function P2, or the 
institution's preference function P21. The important conclusion of this analysis is 
that economic efficiency in education depends just as much on whose educational 
objectives we are maximising as on the technical relationship in education between 
inputs and outputs. 
Thus, in analysing the implications of any method of financing higher education, 
we need to ask whether it is consistent with the achievement of both production and 
exchange efficiency. To take a simple example: the government as the decision-
maker may wish to allocate resources in education in such a way as to maximise 
economic growth. If we measure economic growth in the standard way as 
increases in per capita income, the government needs to know what level and type 
of education will best serve to increase per capita income. This decision having 
been made, perhaps with the issue of cost-benefit analysis, the next decision 
concerns the method of funding most likely to ensure the goal is achieved as 
efficiently (cheaply) as possible, i.e. production efficiency is attained. Let us 
assume that the government has discovered that the highest economic returns to 
education are from postgraduate courses in pure science (actually this is rarely the 
case). The government may consider that a change in the system of financing 
students, say by giving postgraduate grants to students studying pure science, will 
lead to the desired increase in the number of postgraduate pure scientists. 
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Alternatively, the government may consider a change to the way that institutions are 
financed; for example, it could decide to allocate resources to institutions on the 
basis of their numbers of postgraduates in pure science. The choice between these 
two changes to the financing of higher education should be made after their 
implications for achieving production efficiency have been considered. That is, not 
only should the Government introduce changes that will result in more pure science 
postgraduates but it must be by a method that encourages institutions to do so as 
cheaply as possible too, i.e. it should encourage production efficiency. 
Our research findings may indicate the direction in which efficiency, particularly 
production efficiency, has been moving in response to the changes to university 
funding. However, for the reasons stated earlier in this chapter we will not be able 
to measure precisely these changes to efficiency. We return to this issue in our final 
chapter. 
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Chapter 2: "Economic" Models/Theories of 
Universities 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter we examined the use of the education production function 
and the economist's concept of efficiency. Implicit in the EPF work is the notion 
that educational institutions, whether schools or universities, will strive to become 
efficient. As we argue, this may be an unreasonable assumption because the 
incentive structure and mechanisms found in the private sector of economy are 
rarely found in the education system. In order to understand how universities 
behave it is necessary to develop existing theories /models or develop new ones. In 
this chapter we examine attempts that have been made, within what might be 
broadly described as an 'economic' framework, to understand university behaviour. 
Four models are considered, the utility-maximising model, the human capital 
model, what we term the Clark-Williams model and the Garvin model. For 
different reasons, and to different degrees each of the models is deemed inadequate 
or incomplete as an explanation or predictor of a university's response to funding 
changes. However, they do provide some useful insights and these will be 
commented on in the concluding chapter. 
The Utility-Maximising Model 
The utility-maximising theory of universities is very clearly described in Culyer 
(1970). It is one of the few early examples of an attempt to develop a "purely 
economic theory of universities with minimal reference to the contribution made by 
other disciplines" (pp349). Perhaps it would be fairer to describe the paper as an 
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attempt to develop a model of university behaviour which has some predictive 
power. It is clearly based on the non profit models of institutional behaviour 
developed by economists to replace the neo-classical models which assume 
institutions (firms usually) are motivated by the pursuit of pecuniary returns. There 
have been other attempts by economists to analyse university behaviour in terms of 
a 'utility maximising model', for example Becker 1975, James 1990 and Massy and 
Zemsky 1997, but they tend not to predict but to describe, using increasingly 
complex mathematical models and statistical tools. In this way they may be seen as 
an improvement on Culyer's model, but they suffer from the same weaknesses and 
do not attempt to 'explain' global phenomena as Culyer does. To illustrate this 
point consider the Massy model: ' We begin, though, with some simplifying 
assumptions about faculty attitudes and behaviours. At issue is the behaviour of 
individual faculty members, but for modelling purposes we focus on academic 
departments'. A number of simplifying assumptions are then made. The first is 
`that faculty themselves integrate the motivational complexity to a 'bottom line' we 
call utility, and that certain characteristics of utility can be inferred from 
departmental behaviour'. The second 'simplifying assumption is that faculty value 
discretionary time - at least in part because increases in discretionary time enable 
increased research output. Research success produces both extrinsic and 
instrumental benefits for the faculty member, and faculty tend to prefer lower to 
higher teaching loads because teaching load correlates negatively with discretionary 
time. Our third simplifying assumption is that faculty are intrinsically interested in 
educational quality, and that at least some institutionally-based incentives encourage 
that view'. The results of their study are generally positive, but what this means 
must remain problematic: each assumption is open to challenge and major issues, 
such as the meaning of 'educational quality' are not addressed. Perhaps it is this 
type of work, if ever read by other academics interested in education, that gets the 
economics of education a bad name; it certainly seems to provide an argument for 
43 
the subject developing into the 'political economy of education' rather than merely 
the economics of education! 
To return to Culyer, his model assumes that within universities there are three 
groups of actors, administrators, teachers and students and it seeks "to explain the 
behaviour of university administrators, teachers and students in terms of their 
motivations, the constraints which govern their behaviour, and the changes in 
behaviour which are predicted when the environmental constraints are altered" 
(p351). 
The three classes of actors are assumed to maximise their utility by appropriate 
behaviour within the university environment. The university is perceived as "a 
productive enterprise producing principally two products: research output and 
instruction to graduate and under graduate students" (p351). The model is intended 
to predict the output mix of universities and how it might change in postulated 
changes to the environment. (The funding mechanisms, though not explored by 
Culyer, may be seen as an environmental factor which, if changed, will affect the 
university output mix. Funding method may also change, and again Culyer does 
not explore this, the input mix in terms of change in the behaviour of and type of 
students, teachers, administrators already in the system and those subsequently 
recruited). 
The major economic hypothesis used in utility maximising theory is described by 
Culyer as "the classic implication that as it becomes relatively more costly for a 
person to acquire ownership over one of the variables in his utility function, other 
variables will be substituted for it. Utility theory has not, of course, succeeded in 
producing an unambiguous demand theorem, and we shall assume (because it 
yields the right answers) that the economic goods in the utility functions of both 
buyers and sellers are superior goods" (p352). Culyer proceeds to explore the 
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utility functions and the constraints on these functions for the three groups of actors 
in universities, administrators, teachers etc. One such constraint which he explores 
is the budget constraint, the size of the grants secured by institutions. However, if 
administrators' utilities are to be maximised they will alter their behaviour in 
response to changes in the method of funding as this will, among other 
consequences, affect the size of their budget. Hence the budget constraint may, if 
the funding method permits, be affected if administrators and teachers, by, for 
example, recruiting more students or obtaining more research grants. 
Culyer explores other constraints on the actors in the system and possible conflicts 
that may arise between them. Administrators, for example, may be interested in the 
pursuit of a good academic reputation for their institution, for example, through 
high research rating and good degree results. To that end he/she will want to retain 
and recruit good teachers and researchers and to be rid of the rest. Academics' 
utility will be threatened by such conditions in university life and academics may 
seek to escape from the "arbitrary" change that may be demanded by managers -
hence their desire for security of tenure or, at least 'permanent' rather than 
temporary contracts. 
A further conflict may arise in the way that funds are allocated "Ceteris paribus, 
teachers would probably prefer a more comprehensive library stock, greater 
numbers of competent professional colleagues, research assistants, etc., while 
administrators might prefer more personal telephones, carpets, social junketings, 
and other entities which improve their efficiency and increase their on-the-job 
utility. Here is a fruitful source of conflict over the distribution of expenditure 
within institutions (in consultation in the UK with the Funding Council) which is 
ameliorated only in part by the fact that some individuals have functions both as 
teachers and administrators" (p355). 
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Whether administrators in the seventies, let alone now, would recognise this 
depiction of themselves may be open to question, but there may still be a conflict of 
interests. An academic today may gain more utility from activities related to 
research; reading, writing and thinking, than administrators who may be more 
focused on returns to the funding council, requiring teachers to fill in forms on 
student numbers, research income and their publications. Anybody currently in the 
university system will recognise this requirement on university staff and the contrast 
between the current position and the much more collegial and relaxed scenario of the 
seventies and early eighties. (This change is explored more fully in our research). 
This is not to imply that today is worse or better than the past, but to emphasise the 
difference in emphasis to different aspects of university academics' activities. 
Culyer proceeds to use the model he has developed to explain what was then a 
recent phenomenon, student unrest. He explains the unrest in the following way: if 
"the present value of this actual stream (of utility to students) is lower than the 
present value of an alternative certainty - equivalent potential utility stream, then 
there exists an incentive for students to change conditions so that the potential 
stream becomes the actual stream" (p362). He proceeds to explain why protest 
takes place in term time rather than vacation time "the opportunity cost of time is 
higher (than in vacation time) due to the pressure of foregone earning as well as 
foregone vacation study" (p363). He further argues why Sociology students are 
more likely to engage in protest "Further implications from so simple a qualitative 
theoretical construct can be inferred only with the introduction of some 
hypothesised empirical determinants of the two behaviour determining functions. 
One might postulate that the relative height of the two curves will be different for 
different categories of student. Consider, for example, the possibility that some 
disciplines may make extravagant claims (or, less strongly, may be believed - by 
students - to make extravagant claims) for their usefulness in the analysis of 
important problems. In the sense that (say) Sociology provides a less formal and 
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reliable body of analysis to apply to real world problems than (say) Economics (sic) 
or Engineering, we have a prediction that the difference between the potential 
(expected) and actual utility streams will be larger for the former students, and 
hence the marginal benefit curve from protest would be higher. Conversely, due to 
the relatively low value placed upon current studies, the marginal subjective cost 
curve would be relatively lower for the former category of students. Hence the 
implication may be derived that Sociology students would be a higher proportion of 
the protesters than Economics or Engineering students" (p363). 
In his conclusion Culyer claims that "The phenomena of university administrators, 
teachers and students' behaviour appears to be explained by the utility model and 
the right structures" (p366). He further claims that "this approach makes it possible 
to predict the consequences of changes in the constraints upon university decision 
makers" (p317). Change to the methods by which universities are funded may be 
deemed to be change in the nature of the "constraints" on universities - different 
strategies are now required to maximise utility. The utility to be maximised will be 
that of the university decision makers. The model, unfortunately, is not clear as to 
who the "university decision maker" is. Indeed, in the earlier part of the paper 
Culyer, in exploring the potential conflict between administrator, teacher and 
student utility functions highlights the need for compromise. Where this 
compromise is struck is presumably a consequence of the relative power of the 
actors in the university. How this power is allocated is clearly central to the way in 
which universities behave, but we are given no rules for quantifying power and 
thus to make predictions. Culyer's model can "explain" what has gone on; what 
has taken place reflects utility maximising behaviour of the actors given changes in 
the relative "price" of their actions. But, we are provided with no "rules" for 
establishing where the relative utility functions are located. Nor does Culyer tell us 
the conditions under which utility functions may shift. The notion of "price" 
suggests that quantification is possible but, again, no examples of how price is to be 
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measured are provided. Perhaps this is empirically impossible and, if so, renders 
the predictive power and testability of the model impossible. Indeed, the model has 
a very high level of generality in which contextual factors are not dealt with and 
alternative explanations are ignored. 
To illustrate this last point: Culyer explains student unrest as taking place during 
term time rather than in vacations because of differences in the opportunity cost of 
time. He ignores the possibility that there may well be no foregone earnings during 
vacations and that access to the library and laboratories may together make 
opportunity costs actually higher during term times, particularly if examinations are 
approaching. Not only is his own explanation problematic, but alternatives are also 
ignored. Students may demonstrate during term time merely because they are 
together during term times. Or the reason for the demonstration at the particular 
time may be because it was then that the French protests had begun and it was these 
that sparked off the British protests. And, if Culyer's model was to be used to 
"explain" French student behaviour, he is confronted by the uncomfortable fact that 
their protests took place both in term and vacation time. 
Similar doubts arose with respect to other claims for this model. Sociology 
students are more likely to protest than other groups because of their subject "less 
formal and reliable body of analysis... hence the marginal benefit from protest 
would be higher". Perhaps Sociology students are merely more politically 
motivated and this may also explain why they enrolled in Sociology courses in the 
first place. 
Culyer's model appears to have inherent weaknesses. It may also suffer because 
the theory of demand on which it is based does not transfer very readily from the 
market place (for which it was developed) to the university system. We have 
focused on Culyer's model not because it is the best of its genre, it is not, but 
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because it is the most general and, because it is less technical than most of the others 
which are littered with complex mathematical equations, it is more readily explicated 
and its flaws more obvious. 
The Human Capital Model 
E. St John has argued, with respect to the USA, that "human capital theory has a 
substantial influence on the formulation of policy proposals for the financing of 
higher education" (St. John, E. 1994, p67). Its relevance to higher education 
finance stems from the fact that it is a theory that purports to explain individual 
behaviour (see Schultz 1961 and Becker, 1964, 1993) and it also provides the 
conceptual arguments and empirical justification for government spending on 
education. The theory does not explicitly consider mechanisms for funding 
universities but, as we comment later, it may have implications for the way funding 
is arranged. 
What is Human Capital Theory? 
Human capital theory views decisions to invest in education as a choice with costs 
and benefits, both pecuniary and nonpecuniary (Becker 1964, 1993). For 
individuals, the pecuniary costs include the direct costs of attending (tuition, books, 
living expenses, and so on) and indirect costs (foregone earnings), while the 
primary pecuniary benefits are gains in lifetime earnings. Nonpecuniary benefits 
include satisfaction with work and related social and psychological benefits. For 
society, the pecuniary costs include both the direct expenditures of tax pounds or 
dollars - the subsidies provided to institutions and, more recently, to students - and 
indirect costs associated with the decreased opportunity to make other investments 
(for example, in defence, health and so forth), while the benefits include gains in 
productivity and tax revenues. The nonpecuniary benefits to society are said to 
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include intergenerational equity and an increased sense of democracy. Quoting 
from authors who have been influential in the renaissance of human capital reveal 
slightly different emphases as to what is central to the theory. 
"Much of what we call consumption constitutes investment in human capital...in so 
far as these expenditures increase the value productivity of human effort (labour), 
they will yield a positive rate of return". 
(Schultz, 1961, p1). 
"This study is concerned with activities that influence future monetary and psychic 
income by increasing resources in people. These activities are called investments in 
human capital" (Becker, 1993, p2). 
"People spend on themselves in diverse ways, not only for the sake of present 
enjoyment but also for the sake of future pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns" 
(Blaug, 1992, p207). 
"The basic premise of the human capital approach is that variations in labour income 
are due, in part, to differences in labour quality in terms of the amount of human 
capital acquired by the worker" (Cohn and Geske 1990, p34). 
There are many similarities between the definitions. Firstly, each implies that 
individuals take into account the future consequences of their actions in terms of the 
returns which they receive. "Human capital", it seems, involves an investment 
rather than a consumption activity on the part of individuals and we would expect 
economic actors to form expectations regarding the outcome of their investment. 
Secondly, the definitions do not indicate the type of activity which could be classed 
as a human capital investment. Hence, the human capital concept has been applied 
to fields such as health care, migration, education, family planning and training. 
Here we focus on the human capital approach as applied to education as this area 
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appears to have generated the majority of academic controversy regarding both the 
appropriateness of the treatment of education as an investment rather than a 
consumption decision, and the effects (if any) of education on future returns. 
However, although there are similarities in the definitions there are also differences. 
The author's differ regarding both the consequences of investment in human capital 
and the mechanism by which an investment in human capital leads to an expected 
return. 
In the definitions of Becker and Blaug, the consequences of an investment in human 
capital are broader than those expected by Schultz and Cohn and Geske. In the 
former set of definitions, the returns from human capital need not be in terms of 
increased income but may also appear in terms of "psychic income" or "non-
pecuniary returns". In the definitions employed by Schultz and Cohn and Geske 
the return is pecuniary. There is also a difference between the mechanisms which 
may produce an expected return. For Schultz and Cohn and Geske, an investment 
in human capital causes a rise in "productivity" or "labour quality" leading to a rise 
in income. Blaug and Becker are even less explicit regarding this mechanism. 
Becker refers to "resources in people" whilst Blaug refers simply to individuals 
"spending on themselves". From the individual's perspective the mechanism may 
be unimportant, as long as the human capital investment yields a return. 
Although there are differences in all cases the essence of the model concerns the 
motive behind decisions to spend on education, whether by the individual or by the 
state. Individuals invest in education to improve their future lifetime pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary income and societies invest in education to promote economic 
development. There may also be other motives for spending on education, such as 
consumption benefits for the individual and perceived social, political and cultural 
benefits for society. When a government states that its policy of expansion of 
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higher education is in order to "catch up with our neighbours", in terms of the 
proportion of the population in higher education, so that the UK can become 
economically competitive, we are witnessing an example of human capital theory in 
action. The motive for spending now is to enhance economic gains later. (Whether 
or not the predicted economic gains are realised is not at issue, though policy 
makers would be advised to empirically analyse the consequences of their actions 
and use the results to inform future policy). 
Human capital theory has been subjected to critiques, theoretical and empirical. The 
principal challenges have been: that it is too narrowly conceived, ignoring in 
particular the influence of social and political forces in society (see Bowles and 
Gintis 1976 for an illustration of this argument); that it misrepresents, or 
misunderstands, the nature of the relationship between education, earnings and 
productivity (The most abstract depiction of this view is presented in Arrow's 1973 
paper on "screening"); that the human capital view of the operation of labour 
markets is naive, they are characterised by segmented and internal labour markets. 
Doeringer and Piore (1971) develop this institutional model. It is a model which 
has more recently been radicalised by Piore, Gordon et. al. (1982), Edwards 
(1979). It can be argued, however, that all these theoretical attacks miss their 
target, the human capital model, since they do not have anything to say about the 
core of the theory, the motives for spending on education. 
The model has also been criticised because it does not "explicitly address the issue 
of the organisational productivity in higher education" (St John, 1994, p69). St 
John develops this argument by stating that human capital theory would assume that 
market forces "would influence institutions to assume competitive behaviours" ibid 
(p69) and that history has shown this not to be the case with academe being 
motivated by ideas of academic excellence and not productivity. Whether this claim 
is true of the USA is open to question. However, whether any British University 
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academic or administrator would accept this view in the nineties strikes me as highly 
improbable. Other criticisms such as that human capital theory does not adequately 
address issues of equity and constraints on its attainment, or that it does not always 
accurately predict student enrolment patterns in response to "price" changes would 
only have some validity if human capital theory ever claimed, and it does not, that 
education is the only factor influencing occupational mobility and that "price", 
however measured, is the only factor influencing student enrolment. 
For the purpose of this study, human capital may be seen as relevant in the sense 
that as the reward system, the funding method, changes do institutions adapt their 
own internal allocation and incentive structures to "push" individuals in the 
direction(s) perceived to maximise the institution's success in raising 
income/reducing costs. The longer the planning period over which they are 
prepared to take action now, presumably incurring both financial and psychic costs, 
to enhance their future economic viability, the stronger would the explanatory 
power of the model appear to be. If institutions do not respond to the changed 
incentive structure this would indicate that the human capital, and most economic 
models for that matter, either have little validity in the university world or, and this 
seems more improbable, the structures already existing were appropriate to the 
changed funding method. 
The paragraph above indicates one way in which the human capital model relates to 
this study: do the institutions and individuals behave as though motivated by future 
as opposed to present economic gains? As described above some proponents of 
human capital theory, Schultz and Psacharopoulous also claim that investments in 
education do result in an increase individual income and productivity. This 
proposition cannot be tested in this research. However our evidence will indicate 
what effect funding changes have had on the quality and quantity of teaching and 
research. It these have risen then funding policy will have added to the sum of 
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human capital - a stated policy of government. If there are ambiguities in our 
findings these will be explored and some resolutions will be attempted as to the 
effects of government policy on human capital formation. 
The Clark/Williams Model 
Burton Clark's "The Higher Education System" (1983) identified four main types 
of institutional control: bureaucratic, political, professional (or collegial) and market 
(pp145-171). These he placed on a continuum from bureaucratic (involving a 
heavy dependence on authority) to market (involving a heavy dependence on 
exchange). By combining bureaucratic and political models under the rubric of state 
authority and defining professional (collegial) models as indicative of academic 
oligarchy he reshaped this continuum into a Triangle of Coordination shown in 
Figure 1. 
Figure 1 Triangle of Coordination 
 
State Authority 
 
Academic 
Oligarchy 
Market 
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The position of countries depicted in Clark's diagram, if true in 1983, is certainly 
not so in 1997. 
Williams (1984, 1988) developed Clark's model into one describing alternative 
methods of funding institutions with implications for the efficiency with which 
institutions will function. Williams characterises three models of funding the 
"bureaucratic", "collegial" and market model. We consider each in turn. 
The Bureaucratic Model 
Under the 'bureaucratic' model, financial decisions are usually taken at a senior 
political level, often the central government; this authority decides both the 
resources available to the education sector and the rules according to which these 
resources are distributed between institutions and within institutions. The looseness 
and flexibility of the rules will determine the 'freedom' of action of institutions, 
departments and teachers, but because this 'freedom' is subject to bureaucratic 
control it can always be reduced by some tightening of the rules. So, the measure 
of control exercised under the 'bureaucratic' model will vary according to the degree 
of discretion allowed administrators and teachers at the various levels of the system. 
A situation in which the responsibilities of institutions are being laid down more 
explicitly and their rules of accountability also clarified and strengthened reflects a 
"bureaucratic" mode of control where the rules are being tightened. 
The merit claimed for a "bureaucratic" method of funding is said to be both 
quantitative, in so far as educational provision can be adjusted to meet manpower 
'needs', and qualitative, in so far as educational standards can be adequately 
protected from above. The principal demerit is the fact that administrative 
regulations tend to be cumbersome and inertial in effect, preventing institutions 
from reacting quickly to changing circumstances. This system of funding, may 
therefore, discourage innovation. There may also be some loss of academic 
55 
autonomy. Whether this loss of freedom is viewed as desirable or not may well 
depend on what the objectives of institutions, e.g. universities, or their funders, are 
perceived to be and whether academic freedom is seen as inimical to the attainment 
of those objectives. There may be costs in addition to the loss of academic 
freedom. The more complex that the regulations are the more they are likely to cost 
to implement and to monitor. If there are appeals procedures then these too will 
augment costs. There may also be damage to staff morale undermining their 
effectiveness - a cost too often overlooked by administrators when introducing new 
systems of accountability and control. Evidence from the UK regarding the effect 
of the "bureaucratic" model suggests that it may adversely affect both internal and 
external efficiency (Mace, 1993 and 1995). 
Evidence concerning the operation of the Joint Training Partnership Act (JTPA) in 
the USA suggests that their "bureaucratic" model, with its emphasis on output-
related funding, has resulted in significant losses to both external efficiency and 
equity.1 
 (Bureaucratic models are more usually associated with input related 
funding). To quote from Green and Mace 1994: 
"The problems associated with performance-based contracts (PBC) are 
undoubtedly a consequence of the type of PBC that have been used, i.e. 
contracts in which a large proportion of a provider's payment is dependent 
on trainees completing and being successfully 'placed' .... 
The major problem identified with PBCs was said to be 'creaming' 
.... "there is a built-in incentive to 'cream' for both providers and SDAs 
(Service Delivery Area) because payment and incentive money are related to 
success in placement. Even with the new legislation some scope for 
creaming and cheating will exist because, we were told, disabilities (a 
barrier to entry) may be exaggerated by providers and within the other 'hard 
1 	 The JTPA was a billion dollar plus government initiative to promote 
training and employment, with particular emphasis being given to the most 
disadvantaged in society. 
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to serve' categories there will be a tendency to recruit trainees who have 
more education, are more motivated and have greater ability. It is difficult to 
see how this type of creaming can easily be stopped. Nor would it 
necessarily be desirable to stop it since more motivated trainees are more 
likely to benefit from training than unwilling recruits". 
(Green and Mace, 1994 pp29-30). 
They comment also that the quality of training appeared to be very low, although the 
Government's intention had been to encourage and improve training. Green and 
Mace's evidence illustrates the way that inefficiencies and inequities may arise from 
a bureaucratic funding model that has not been carefully designed and effectively 
monitored. In the case of JTPA inefficiencies arose because payments were being 
made where no training or long term "placement" in jobs was taking place. 
Inequities occurred because the "hard to serve", who were supposed to benefit from 
the scheme, were often excluded because they were hard to "place". 
The point is that once institutions understand the rules of the game they will 
manipulate them to their own ends, for example to maximise income, which may 
not be the same ends as those of the regulating body. The research assessment 
exercise which we describe in the next chapter is an illustration of a "bureaucratic" 
style funding method and as we report has resulted in institutional behaviour that 
may not serve either production or exchange efficiency. When we consider our 
evidence we will consider how the changed method of funding has altered 
institutional behaviour and make some tentative comments about its effect on 
efficiency. 
The "Collegial" Model 
The 'collegial' model contrasts sharply with the 'bureaucratic' model in that 
institutions are usually more or less financially independent, say, as a consequence 
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of past endowments, and are therefore free to manage their own affairs at will. The 
merit of this system is the academic freedom that is thereby achieved from outside 
influences. However, this freedom, far from supporting innovations, may actually 
be stultifying because it tends to turn education institutions into clubs operated in the 
interest of teachers. That is how Adam Smith saw the universities of Oxford and 
Cambridge in the eighteenth century: 
"If the authority to which he (the college teacher) is subject resides in the 
body corporate, the college or university, of which he himself is a member, 
and in which the greater part of the other members are, like himself, persons 
who either are, or ought to be teachers, they are likely to make common 
cause, to be all very indulgent to one another, and every man to consent that 
his neighbour may neglect his duty provided he himself is allowed to neglect 
his own. In the university of Oxford the greater part of the public 
professors have, for these many years, given up altogether even the pretence 
of teaching .... The discipline of colleges and universities is in general 
contrived, not for the benefit of students, but for the interest, or more 
properly speaking, for the ease of the masters. Its object is, in all cases, to 
maintain the authority of the masters, and whether he neglects or performs 
his duty, to oblige the students in all cases to behave to him as if he 
performed it with the greatest diligence and ability". 
(Smith, 1776, II, pp760-61). 
Any system of funding education or training through general grants which are 
virtually guaranteed year after year is akin to the 'collegial' model. To some extent 
the old British system of making quinquennial grants to universities was very like 
the 'collegial' system. It had the advantage of protecting academic freedom and 
insured that those best informed about the needs of the institutions made the vital 
decisions about resource allocation. However, the problem with such a system is 
that the needs perceived by the academic community of a university may not be the 
same as those perceived by the government, or by students - exchange efficiency 
and, almost certainly, production efficiency will suffer (definitions of these terms 
were given in the previous chapter). It is largely for this reason (and the need to cut 
public expenditure) that the quinquennial system of funding university education in 
Britain was abandoned in the mid 1970s; ever since, the central government in the 
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UK has taken a more active part in determining the allocation of resources within 
the university system. 
This model does not reflect current university funding methods and consequently 
our data will not shed light on how such a model does affect university behaviour. 
The Market Model 
In both the 'collegial' and 'bureaucratic' models, power is ultimately vested in a 
body, representing the government or university. This contrasts with a third model 
of resource allocation in education or training where control is much more diffuse 
and indirect. This is the so-called 'market' model and under it a provider's income 
is generated by selling its services - teaching, research and consultancy - to whoever 
wishes to buy them. In this model, power is shifted to the consumer and to the 
units which produce and sell the services. The characteristic of such a model is that 
resources will be allocated according to an incentive structure. To take an example 
from universities, if research is more highly rewarded than teaching, universities 
will devote more of its time and energy to research and vice versa. 
The advent of 'full-cost' fees for overseas students in British higher education in 
1980 heralded a major shift towards a 'market' model in at least a part of British 
higher education. The effects of this change have been dramatic for many British 
universities and polytechnics where foreign students form a large percentage of the 
student body: in consequence, they have developed new courses, tailored to the 
demands of foreign students and spent thousands of pounds per annum marketing 
their product. Also, it has been claimed that the quality of education has suffered 
(Times Higher Education Supplement, February 1985). Here, incidentally, is a 
good example of what a relatively small change in educational finance can 
accomplish. 
59 
The merit claimed for a 'market' based system of funding is that it causes higher 
education institutions to become more responsive to changing economic and social 
circumstances. In short, it forces the education system to adapt itself to the felt 
'needs' of society and, in consequence, to become more efficient in the sense of 
providing the output that the economy demands. Of course, this claim rests on 
several assumptions (as Mace, 1993 points out) that consumers (students) are well 
informed about subject choices, that they are influenced by the labour market 
implications of these choices, that capital markets operate perfectly and that the 
labour market itself functions efficiently, providing appropriate signals to students. 
Let us examine and consider the possible efficiency implications in using a "market" 
model. In order to achieve an efficient, optimal, allocation of resources it is 
necessary that the pricing policy in education should not be determined by market 
forces as this may result in under-investment in education for the following reasons: 
externalities, consumer ignorance, distortions in related markets, merit goods, 
decreasing costs, and principal/agent problems and equity. 
Externalities: Some of the benefits of education may accrue not only to the 
individual user, but also to society at large. These extra benefits are called 
externalities. Examples of education externalities are said to include crime 
reduction, social cohesion, technological innovation and intergenerational transfer 
of knowledge from parents to their offspring. In deciding how much to consume, 
individuals generally weigh only the personal benefit against the personal cost; they 
should be induced to consider the impact of their consumption on others. A pricing 
scheme that results in just enough consumption to equate personal benefit with cost 
is therefore sub-optimal. 
Consumer Ignorance and Merit Goods: Individuals may be unaware of all 
the personal benefits of educational services. In addition, even those who are aware 
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of them may have insufficient income to consume the minimum amount considered 
socially desirable by public authorities, without unacceptable sacrifices in the 
consumption of other basic commodities, such as food, clothing, and shelter. 
Thus, educational services are said to have the characteristics of "merit goods". In 
other words, public authorities may have more information and resources 
concerning what is best for users than the users have themselves. To illustrate this 
point: the likely impact upon wages may be known by consumers, but the effects of 
education upon agricultural productivity, earnings in the informal sector, or upon 
family health and nutrition are much less likely to be anticipated (still less 
quantified), by purchasers of education. 
Imperfect markets: "Marginal cost pricing may be inefficient because of 
distortions in related markets: the markets for inputs (such as teachers, when their 
salaries are inefficiently subsidised); and the markets for financial services (such as 
access to credit for educational purposes). Access to credit has important 
implications for efficiency. For example, without access to financing, a brilliant 
child from a deprived background cannot invest in education, even though the 
future returns may be very high. Thus, in the absence of a credit market, the social 
benefit of a unit of education may exceed the private benefit". (Jiminez, E.1987, 
p23). 
Decreasing costs: Scale economies are a well-known cause of market failure, 
leading to monopoly. Scale economies are particularly likely to occur at higher 
levels of education, for example in the purchase of expensive laboratory equipment. 
But they may also occur at lower levels of education where the bulk purchase of 
such items as books and equipment may enable large discounts on price to be 
obtained. A further point about costs, markets and efficiency concerns the way in 
which transaction costs may rise if markets are developed in education. (Bartlett, 
Le Grand (1993)). 
61 
Principal/Agent problems: "The relevant decision-making unit for matters to 
do with school attendance is the household - or, more accurately, the parents within 
it - and not the child. Thus, whereas rates of return to schooling compare the 
returns to the pupil with the costs to the parents, in fact the important issue is the 
perceived balance between the costs and benefits to the parents of sending their 
child to school. Since only some portion of the returns to schooling will accrue to 
parents, there may be rational (if regrettable) reasons for households appearing to 
under-invest in schooling, notwithstanding its apparently high economic returns". 
(Colelough 1993, p2, 3). 
Equity: There are two kinds of equity concern in education. The first relates to 
the impact of education on the future distribution of income, while the second 
relates to access to education, in this case university education. 
A "market" model may affect both types of equity if it results in policies, for 
example by imposing charges on students, which adversely affects the opportunities 
for certain groups to participate in university education. Whether this result is seen 
as inequitable depends on the value systems of those making judgements about 
equity. Even so, whether denying education to those able to benefit from it, but 
unable to afford it is deemed inequitable or no, it may also be inefficient if those 
denied education would have proceeded to become productive members of the 
labour market. 
Since universities compete for students, research grants and contracts, consultancies 
etc. elements of this model of funding certainly exist in Britain in present. Our data 
will shed some light on the effects of such a system of funding. 
The "Clark/Williams model" presents polar cases of funding models. In reality 
most funding methods are hybrids, having elements of two, if not all three, of the 
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different models described. It is thus difficult to derive testable hypotheses that our 
research could verify or refute. In addition, the individual models themselves may 
give rise to a degree of ambiguity. For example, the "bureaucratic" model does not 
define how loose or tight will be the regulations that institutions are obliged to abide 
by. If the rules are "loose" then institutions may pursue their own objectives, 
possibly reducing exchange efficiency through enhancing internal (production) 
efficiency if they allocate resources to areas in which they are most effective. The 
reverse position may obtain if the regulations are very tight. Thus we will make no 
attempt to "test" the models, though we will comment, on the relevance of our 
findings to these models in the concluding chapter. 
Garvin's Model 
Probably the most sophisticated analysis of university behaviour is that of David 
Garvin in his book The Economics of University Behaviour 1980. The book 
begins with a brief description and critique of the work of other social scientists' 
models of university behaviour. He argues, in particular, that one principal 
weakness of their analysis has been their failure to give sufficient weight to 
economic considerations in their models and thus, in his view, the models are 
incomplete and unable to adequately describe, predict and understand university 
behaviour. His work is an attempt to repair this deficiency by developing a model 
in which economic considerations are central. The novelty of his work and its 
relative sophistication are two reasons why we give it so much attention here. 
Another is that his study has been rather neglected by both economists and other 
social scientists, whereas it appears to us that there may be considerable potential in 
developing it if we are to understand university behaviour. 
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Garvin notes, as do all economists when discussing non-profit organisations such 
as universities, that in such circumstances market discipline tends to be weak. To 
put his own work into perspective he points out that although non-profit 
organisations operate within an economic environment (as do all organisations) 
where there may be certain elements of competition "goals other than those of 
efficiency may be guiding the allocation process" (pl). These other goals and their 
effect on internal allocation procedures have been paid little attention by economists. 
Instead 
`economists have traditionally focused on student demand and on rates of 
return on investments in higher education, rather than on institutional 
behaviour (the supply side) and its determinants'. (p2). 
In contrast to economists other social scientists have been concerned with the 
organisational characteristics of universities and have, he claims, developed four 
models of university behaviour. These he describes as the "collegial", 
"bureaucratic", "political" and "organised anarchy" models. 
The "collegial model" emphasises the common values unifying staff at universities 
and the consensual nature of the decision making process in institutions. In contrast 
the "bureaucratic model" emphasises the centralisation of power and the 
bureaucratic characteristics of universities and the influence that this has on 
'university policy making, the conduct of research, and other aspects of academic 
life' (p3). The "political model" recognises that there are different interest groups in 
universities pursuing different agendas. University behaviour is only understood 
when these differences are recognised and in particular how power is distributed 
between the various groups. The organised anarchy model depicts universities as 
having 
`three general characteristics that set them apart from many other 
organisations and render classical models of decision making inappropriate, 
namely, preferences are problematic, technology is unclear, and 
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participation is fluid. In those circumstances, the process of choice becomes 
critical'. (p4). 
and it is only when these processes are understood that university behaviour itself 
can be understood. (See Footnote 1 for a fuller description of the models). 
The problem with these models, which are similar in many respects to Clark's is, 
Garvin claims, that they focus on internal decision making rules "while paying little 
attention to the environment within which universities operate" (p5). They are also 
difficult to test without the addition of further assumptions, also a feature of the 
Clark/Williams model discussed earlier. A third problem is that the models, unlike 
Culyer's model and the human capital model tell us little about the motivation of 
administration and faculty or, indeed, institutional goals. Their concern, Garvin 
asserts, is much more with differences in the structures and processes within 
institutions. 
The economic model he develops is different: it assumes, as in Culyer's model, that 
administrators and faculties are motivated by self interest - "purposive behaviour is 
assumed throughout". He further assumes that behaviour is set in a market context, 
a market that operates both within institutions and between institutions. The model 
explicitly takes into account "the behavioural implication of different sources of 
costs and resources" (p5). (He does not, however, consider the effect of different 
funding arrangements on institutional behaviour). 
His model he argues may be seen as complementary to the others he describes, 
rather than as a substitute. However, he does not show how the models can be 
integrated, if indeed they can. Thus we are not in a position to use the "hybrid" or 
integrated model to either explain why universities behave in a particular way or to 
predict how they will respond to a given change in their environment or conditions. 
Indeed, having said that universities operate in a market context he then modifies 
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this statement when he describes the higher education system (in the USA) as 
"segmented by geography, quality of institution, and highest degree offered" and 
thus that "aggregate figures which imply that these institutions all compete in the 
same market, are quite inappropriate" (p8). This statement will come as no surprise 
to anybody familiar with higher education anywhere in the world and nor will the 
claim that "Institutions of higher education, can be assigned to different submarkets 
on the basis of their location and their quality" (p10). What, perhaps, should have 
been explored is how institutions came to be in a particular submarket and whether, 
if they so wish, they can move from one submarket to another. Here the whole 
question of finance and of funding institutions could have been explored, but was 
not. 
He makes the valid point that where institutions have greater prestige - prestige is 
generated by faculty, graduate programmes and the calibre of students - this will 
affect the size of its potential market and its ability to raise tuition fees. Institutions 
are competing in terms of what he calls "tuition-prestige"; institutions offer 
combinations of tuition and prestige in an attempt to attract students. 
Garvin then develops analytical tools to demonstrate that universities do compete in 
a highly segmented market and that the policies and internal allocation procedures of 
universities reflect their goals. These goals "were taken to reflect the utility 
maximising preference of its (the university's) administration and faculty" (p161). 
But Garvin does not explore how the goals are established. Are they internally set, 
externally established, or is it some combination of the two? Nor does he explore 
what Culyer makes central to his model, how conflicts, for example, between 
management and faculty, are reconciled. Although costs and revenues associated 
with different actions are explored and used to explain, for example, tuition levels, 
other factors could also have explained these tuition levels within the same costs and 
revenue structure. These other factors, such as organisational structure or 
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personality of the chief executive, could also have explained alternative policies 
towards tuition. 
Garvin shows that he is aware of some of these problems when he states 
`The coerciveness of the market, however, can be easily over emphasised. 
Universities, because of their heavy reliance on revenues from nonstudent 
sources, their unwillingness to set tuition at market-clearing levels, and their 
status as non-profit institutions, are often subject to only weak market 
discipline. It therefore becomes important to understand the goals being 
pursued by institutions, and how these goals are effected in the setting of 
policy'. (p52). 
If we look in more detail at Garvin's analysis the weaknesses of his analysis 
become clearer. For example, in his analysis of graduate and undergraduate 
programmes, pp44-53, he appears to suggest that departments' and institutions' 
behaviour is determined by their utility functions. Those functions are dominated 
by the need for "prestige" which is related to quality of faculty, quality and size of 
graduate programmes, and research income. Although he provides plausible 
explanations for behaviour, for example in explaining the growth of graduate 
teaching, he is perhaps a little less persuasive in the contrasts he depicts between 
high and low prestige departments. 
Tor the departments of high prestige, increased research funding led to a 
commensurate increase in the demand for graduate students as research 
assistants, and to the subsequent expansion of graduate programs. At the 
less prestigious departments, expanding graduate programs served as a 
vehicle for attracting a larger and more qualified faculty, greater prestige, 
and, only later, a larger volume of sponsored research'. (p52). 
How departments became high or low prestige in the first place is not explained. 
Possibly this is a function of funding. Although Garvin recognises that budget 
constraints effect administrators in his utility maximising model, he does not 
incorporate this into his empirical analysis. Having described his model and its use 
in understanding university behaviour he goes on to explore its use in explaining the 
internal allocation procedures of universities. However, as he concedes, "an 
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analysis of the university's internal organisations yield important insights into its 
behaviour, many of which could not be derived from the utility maximising model 
presented earlier" (p59). 
The fact that a number of ad hoc assumptions have to be introduced to explain 
internal organisations testifies to the fact that his theory suffers from some of the 
weaknesses he identifies in the non-economic models he criticised. Garvin seems 
to recognise this point when he states "the two approaches (the utility maximising 
model to explain institutional behaviour and the internal organisational model) are 
designed to answer different questions 
`The utility maximising model is quite abstract and necessitates a high level 
of aggregation, while the analysis of internal organisation is more detailed 
and views university operations through a finer filter. As such, the two 
approaches are designed to answer different questions and to provide 
different insights, with the former taking a more macro organisational view 
and the latter a more micro analytic perspective'. (p59). 
However, in this case does the model generate testable predictions? It does not. 
Nor does it seem reasonable to assume, as he does, that there are not conflicts 
within faculty and between administrators and also between both. How are they to 
be resolved? One possible explanation is that whoever holds the purse strings and 
controls recruitment of staff and students determines policy, but this will differ 
between institutions and through time and, if so, whose utility is being maximised 
and what is the predictive power of the model across the university system? 
There remains the further problem of whether a utility maximising model is the best 
model to explain behaviour. On pages 38 and 39 Garvin discusses two alternative 
models, the profit maximising and income maximising models. He dismisses both 
as inadequate to explain behaviour. But are his grounds for dismissing them 
correct? Take, for example, the profit maximising model. Garvin says it is 
implausible for three reasons. The first is that they have no motive to maximise 
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profits because "universities are supplied with capital with no expectation of 
financial return". But, even if this is true for some aspects of public funding of 
universities (though surely not for much of their commercial funding), managers 
may want to generate a surplus to strengthen reserves or plough them back into 
desirable projects. Second, "most prices (for tuition), especially at state 
universities, appear to be well below those that would fully exploit their monopoly 
power". Do universities have monopoly power? The fierce competition for 
students and research income suggests otherwise. However, his own evidence 
does indicate that tuition fees can be raised and are raised when institutions have 
sufficient "prestige". (This is a scenario familiar to those who have examined the 
level of overseas student fees in the UK and observed how they differ between 
institutions). This may be seen as evidence of a segmented market in which 
institutions with greater prestige exploit their superior market position by charging 
higher fees. There is also evidence for this differention in the part-time MA market. 
(see Pratt (forthcoming )). Garvin's concluding point is that "universities do not 
seem to be minimising costs". They seem more concerned as he says, quoting from 
Bowen, to "raise as much money as they can and spend it". It may have been true 
in the past, but this is certainly not the case now, at least not in Britain. The move 
towards short-term and part-time contracts and the increasing number of 
redundancies (voluntary usually) and early retirements is testimony to cost concerns 
everywhere in tertiary education. Garvin's critique of the profit-maximising may 
have had some resonance in the sixties, certainly less so now. 
Having discussed alternative models and developed his own model Garvin then 
uses it to attempt to explain institutional improvements in terms of "prestige" and the 
spread of doctoral programmes in the USA. We will only consider here the spread 
of doctoral programmes, and that briefly. (The "prestige" model reveals empirical 
results that are, to say the least "a bit ambiguous" (p40)). Garvin adopts what he 
describes as a market approach to the spread of doctoral programmes. He finds that 
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there was considerable variation in the number of new PhD programmes introduced 
in different disciplines over the short period (five years) that he examined and his 
model attempts to explain why those variations exist. 
In his model the introduction of new programmes depends in the first place on 
student demand (number of BAs graduating in a discipline). It also depends on 
supply, with the establishment of new doctoral programmes depending on the 
elasticity of the supply of places at institutions already offering graduate training. If 
this elasticity is high, then more demand can be accommodated. If low, and 
existing programmes are unwilling to grow then "the increase in students seeking 
graduate training will translate into a demand for new doctorate programmes" 
(p140). However, "whether this demand will influence university behaviour is not 
at all clear" because it depends "on the preferences of faculty and administration in 
establishing institution's priorities" (p141). That is an internal imperative which 
may be in conflict with external demand. Garvin argues that public institutions are 
more likely than private prestigious institutions to respond to the external pressure if 
they are to remain competitive. 
Other pressure identified as affecting the establishment of new doctoral programmes 
are variations in industrial demand, particularly in "large, service-orientated urban 
universities (which) consciously design their programmes to meet manpower needs 
of their local communities". This increased demand for manpower causes wages to 
rise in the areas concerned, thus further influencing student demand. The final 
influence is sponsored research. The availability of research funding increases the 
benefits to the institution of introducing a new doctoral programme. Sponsored 
research also reduces the costs to institutions of setting up new programmes, so 
there is also a supply side effect. 
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Garvin then proceeds to 'test' his model for new doctoral programmes by using 
rank correlations of the number and percentage of new doctoral programmes with 
increases in BA graduates and increases in sponsored research through regression 
analysis. The results are by no means clear. "One peculiar property of these 
questions is that they produce conflicting estimates of the relative responsiveness of 
new doctoral programmes to increased student demand and to increased research 
support" (p148). It is difficult to see how Garvin therefore justifies his claim. 
`In spite of these conflicting results, the empirical work clearly confirms the 
importance of both student demand and sponsored research in explaining 
disciplinary differences in the rate of introduction of new doctoral programs' 
(p148). 
Garvin then goes on to examine the diffusion of new doctoral programmes over a 
longer period than five years, a period of analysis that he acknowledges to be 
"incomplete". He develops a number of hypotheses, in which both supply and 
demand side factors are introduced. However, at the end he concludes 
`Unfortunately, it is difficult to test formally any of the preceding 
hypotheses because most of the necessary data are unavailable. This chapter 
should, therefore, be regarded as exploratory, with most of its theories only 
tentative. A complete theory explaining the diffusion of new doctoral 
programs will require much additional evidence'. (p159). 
Unfortunately, in making this statement he accepts how partial his analysis is and 
that like the models whose drawbacks he discussed in his first chapter, his model 
also lack(s) important details, "making them difficult to test without additional 
assumptions" (p4). Thus, although Garvin's model is of much greater 
sophistication than the previously discussed models and it makes explicit the role 
that economic analysis can play in understanding university behaviour it does not 
provide anything like the complete story. 
It may be that the story would have been more complete had he given more attention 
to the insights that other disciplines could make - undoubtedly a very difficult task. 
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It may also have been improved by taking into account the influence on university 
behaviour of such factors as the way in which institutions receive their funding. If 
there are differences in this, as there certainly are in the USA, this might account for 
differences in the way that universities behave. Our research, though based on 
British experience, will certainly show whether funding method does affect 
university teaching and research and, if so, its importance in developing a model of 
university behaviour. 
In this chapter we have critically examined 'models' that attempt to 'explain' how 
universities will behave in given circumstances. In the concluding chapter we will 
comment on how these changes relate to the models described above. As our 
examination of these models and, in the preceding chapter, economists' treatment of 
education production functions they do not provide a productive theoretical 
framework for investigating universities' responses to the changed funding method. 
Many of the other studies of universities appear to have, implicitly at least, 
recognised the inadequacy of economists' work in this area and have been more 
descriptive/ analytical than theoretical. (See for example Williams, 1992, and Sizer 
1989). This is a view that we share and is the reason why we adopt the approach to 
our research described in Chapter 5. 
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Footnote to Chapter 2 
The collegial model, emphasises the common values unifying the members of 
academic institution, and is rooted in the traditional notion of a "community of 
scholars." According to this view, universities are characterised by an absence of 
hierarchy, decision making by consensus, and widely shared values, leading to 
general agreement among members on the purposes of the organisation. 
The bureaucratic model, in contrast, emphasises the degree to which power is 
centralised. Universities, in fact, possess a number of bureaucratic characteristics, 
among which are a formal division of labour, an administrative hierarchy, a clerical 
staff, and the payment of fixed salaries. Thus, a number of analysts have argued 
that universities are more accurately portrayed as bureaucracies than as loosely knit 
communities, and have used that framework to explore how variations in these 
bureaucratic traits (e.g. the degree of administrative centralisation) affect university 
policy making, the conduct of research, and other aspects of academic life. 
The political model emphasises the conflicts that arise between various groups 
within the university. Not only do faculty members, students, and administrators 
often have very different ideas about the purposes of a university and about 
appropriate policies for achieving its goals, the faculty itself seldom presents a 
united front, for faculty members in different disciplines often disagree on 
educational matters. The political model recognises the existence of these internal 
factions and argues that the precise distribution of power within a university, the 
nature of interest groups, and the political processes that are employed to resolve 
internal conflicts are important keys to understanding university behaviour. 
Finally, some analysts have likened universities to "organised anarchies." 
According to the organised anarchy model, universities share three general 
characteristics that set them apart from many other organisations and render classical 
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models of decision making inappropriate, namely, preferences are problematic, 
technology is unclear, and participation is fluid. In those circumstances, the 
process of choice becomes critical, for the way in which various choices present 
themselves to decision makers can have an important effect on outcomes. As a 
result, differences in timing, in the rate at which new problems arise, in 
organisational structure, and in the degree of organisational slack are all viewed as 
important to understanding university behaviour. 
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Chapter 3: Recent Changes in University 
Funding 
Introduction 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first briefly describes the general 
context in which universities operated in the eighties. In the second we introduce 
the major innovation in the funding of universities during that period, the 
introduction of an explicit funding formula in which the most important 
development was the RAE. In the final section of the chapter we examine some 
general problems with the development of performance indicators for universities. 
The Funding Changes 
The eighties and nineties have been a period of significant change for universities. 
It began with a 20 per cent cut in planned public expenditure, the biggest reduction 
in income ever imposed on British higher education. The reductions in real 
expenditure were of the order of 8 per cent. Over most of the period student 
numbers were rising rapidly, despite continuing financial stringency. As Williams 
has stated until 1992 "government higher education policy was dominated by two 
main concerns: to help reduce public expenditure; and to increase efficiency by 
encouraging institutions to 'earn' a larger proportion of their income from both 
government and non-government sources, and to be explicitly accountable for it. 
Early in the decade the first theme was dominant; by 1990 the second had become 
more important" (Williams, 1992 p4). Through most of the nineties the 
government was still demanding a considerable expansion of student numbers, 
without higher education receiving a commensurate increase in public expenditure. 
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University Income Main Source (fm 	 Constant 	 Prices 
Year Ex Home Research Other OS Fees UK Other Total 
1979/80 1,050 210 46 359 1,670 
1980/81 979 206 54 324 1,563 
1981/82 943 235 52 66 300 1,596 
1982/83 1,049 131 103 47 71 23 210 1,634 
1983/84 1,015 126 111 51 76 27 237 1,643 
1984/85 989 124 114 54 82 37 267 1,667 
1985/86 955 121 116 59 91 43 285 1,670 
1986/87 963 123 128 64 100 48 324 1,750 
1987/88 942 115 118 64 100 50 333 1,722 
1988/89 967 117 127 66 102 55 405 1,839 
There was a change in the balance between the different sources of income as well 
as a significant reduction in core funding. 
The changes in universities' sources of income between 1980 and 1989 are shown 
in table 1 below. 
Table 1 
Source: University Statistics Vol. 3: Finance (annual). In 1979/80, 1980/81 and 
1981/2 the NA (not available) figures are included in the 'other' column. Deflated 
by UPPI. Taken from Williams (1992). 
The changes did not mean that total government support for universities had fallen 
since government support was provided through research council grants and 
government contracts as well as through exchequer grants and payment of home 
76 
fees. Thus, the two main changes to university finance were changes to the way in 
which government supports universities and a substantial increase in income from 
non governmental sources. Thus, the proportion of university income provided by 
government has fallen, even though in real terms the amount remained roughly 
constant. 
Changes in the mechanisms of university funding were no less radical than the 
changes in sources of income. At the beginning of the 1980s the traditional block 
grant system of funding universities was still in place although it had been suffering 
"severe strains since 1974 when the quinquennial system of funding collapsed 
under the twin pressures of stagnant demand from students and very high levels of 
inflation" (Williams ,1992). In 1980/81 over 60 per cent of university income was 
provided as a single block grant from the UGC, and universities were not told how 
much was for teaching or research. Universities were aware that some institutions 
did better than others, but the UGC always maintained that the criteria that resulted 
in this must remain confidential for fear that if its assumptions in making the grants 
were known this would affect universities internal allocation of resources. 
(Ironically, the reason why the funding council reveals its criteria for awarding 
grants now is to influence internal allocations). In practice the grants were 
incremental in that, whatever the criteria used by the UGC to calculate them, 
universities received their previous allocation plus an increment which was always 
positive. 
The somewhat cosy positions of universities changed in 1981 when cuts were 
imposed on the basis of a selectivity exercise taking into account research 
performances and 'A' level scores of university entrants. Universities were 
outraged by the severity of the cuts and on the non-transparency of the criteria used 
to inform these cuts particularly with respect to research performance. The cuts 
were extremely severe ranging from 6 to 30 per cent and they were to be 
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accommodated within a mere four years. The outcry from the universities, 
particularly those that fared worse, and the determination of the government to 
direct resources according to its own strategic priorities resulted in the development 
of a more systematic and explicit funding methodology by the UGC. 
Subsequent developments in UGC funding strategies focused largely on the 
separate identification of resources for research and for teaching. One reason for 
this was the dissatisfaction of universities, particularly the most affected, with the 
criteria used in the 1981 cuts. Another reason was the view that discrimination was 
to become a permanent feature of the system. In addition, the National Advisory 
Body (NAB) was expressing concern about the wide discrepancies between 
resources per student in universities and polytechnics. As a consequence of these 
pressures, a systematic evaluation of research activity in each subject area in each 
university was carried out in 1985. This evaluation was repeated with some 
modifications in 1988/89, 1992 and 1996. In these exercises a specific proportion 
of the UGC grant was identified as being for research. In the first exercise `R;' the 
research element, was divided into four parts: 
• SR or 'Staff Research', intended to support the personal research of academic 
staff. 
• DR or 'Direct Research', a contribution to cover the overheads departments 
incurred a grant from research councils and charitable bodies. 
• CR or 'Contract Research' which provided a small bonus, some two per cent 
for research funding from sources other than research councils or UK charities. 
• JR or 'Judgmental Research', allocated on the basis of judgements about the 
quality of research in each departmental cost centre in each university. In 1986 
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this was less than 35 per cent of the research component, but has risen very 
substantially since. 
This quality assessment was based largely on evaluations of publications and peer 
judgements. 
Williams (1992) summarises the period in the following way. 
`It is misleading to consider the 1980's simply as a period of cuts in 
higher education resources. It was rather, one of changing patterns of 
finance. Overall there was some modest growth in institutional income 
and, in contrast to the previous decade, student numbers grew 
substantially. However, there were considerable changes in the sources 
of funds, the channels through which they became available to 
universities, polytechnics and colleges, the relative shares of the two 
sectors, and the activities for which they were sued. Restructuring 
imposes strains on any management system. Some universities and 
polytechnics undoubtedly adapted to these changes much more 
successfully than others, and many certainly did experience a decline in 
the real resources available to them'. 
This pattern of cost cutting, striving for efficiency gains and increasing university 
accountability has continued since. Universities are still being required to make 
efficiency gains annually, although this may be modified soon. Some universities 
are coping with this requirement rather better than others. Cost cutting, university 
student expansion, and a whole raft of government initiatives such as the 
establishment of interdisciplinary research centres (IRCs), the introduction of the 
Engineering and Technology Programme (ETP) and the Enterprise in Higher 
Education Initiative (FHE) have all affected university behaviour in the late eighties. 
In addition there has been the Jaratt and Merrison Reports, both of which have 
resulted in organisational, management and other changes in universities. (The 
reports are summarised in Appendix 1). But, above all, as an influence on 
university behaviour, management and the planning of educational and financial 
strategies has been the change in the method of funding. 
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Until the eighties the funding councils provided the core funding to universities in a 
continuing and reliable way. Following the draconian cuts of 1981 there was a 
switch from the implicit, opaque and historically based funding method to a method 
of funding that was based on a much more explicit criteria. If these criteria were not 
satisfied, funding for a given university would suffer. This change in funding 
method meant that funding council money, formerly, so dependable became "soft" 
money, as Williams has put it, rather than "hard" money as in the past. The 
changes introduced in 1986 have remained basically similar to this day. The 
principal feature of the funding change, as stated earlier, is that in grants to 
universities the payment for teaching and research is separated and that the research 
allocation is dependant on the "quality" of research at a university. The payment for 
teaching is based on the number of students studying multiplied by the unit of 
resource for the subject they are in and the level of the course. The research 
component of grant allocation is rather less straightforward than that for teaching 
and it has undergone some modification. The changes are described below. 
There have been four research assessment exercises to date, 1986, 1989, 1992 and 
1996. There have also been proposals for changes to the assessment of teaching 
and when put into effect these will undoubtedly affect institutional behaviour. 
Currently, however, the university funding mechanism with respect to teaching 
does little more than reward institutions in much the same way as before 1986 i.e. 
based on student numbers, adjusted for subject area, level of course, and the status 
of the student, full or part time. There have been some changes within universities 
in response to the threat to alter funding according to the quality of teaching, rather 
than according to the numbers enrolled. Funding for teaching, however, is still 
determined essentially by numbers, adjusted as stated above, and although there 
have been moves within universities to promote teaching quality through the 
development of "relevant" quality assurance mechanisms and structures, to date this 
has not greatly impacted on resource allocation within institutions. No doubt when 
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teaching quality does affect funding institutions this will change their behaviour as it 
did with respect to research, though not necessarily in the same way. This change 
in behaviour, if it does take place, would reinforce our contention that funding 
method, including the PIs used in it, is the central engine driving change in 
university behaviour. Since those funding changes are, as yet, undeveloped we 
will here confine ourselves to the changes currently affecting university behaviour 
and those that have been explored in our research. 
The research assessment exercises (RAE) have had a single objective, "the purpose 
of the exercises has been to produce ratings of research quality for use in the 
determination of the grant for research" (my italics) (HEFCE, 1993, pl). The 
Report on the 1992 exercises is very clear as to the impetus for funding councils' 
involvement in research evaluation. Public funding constraints were affecting 
higher education from the early 1980's and "The initial impetus for the University 
Funding Council's (UC) involvement in research evaluation arose from the public 
funding constraints applied to higher education in the early 1980's. With the UC 
responsible for funding both teaching and research and the real value of grant falling 
year by year, the Committee perceived selective funding of research as the only 
means of protecting the quality of both. The UC's Strategy Advice of September 
1984 announced the Committee's intention to 'adopt a more selective approach in 
the allocation of research support among universities in order to ensure that 
resources for research are used to best advantage" (Williams 1992). 
This selective approach resulted in the 1986 exercise described earlier. It comes as 
no surprise that universities unused to such exercises, and where many of whose 
members did not receive the grades expected, were extremely critical of the 
exercise. The UGC for its part was somewhat defensive about its procedures 
although as the first attempt "in any country to make a comprehensive assessment of 
university research ... (it is not) surprising that it was imperfect and came in for 
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criticism" (Williams ibid pl). (In the section on performance indicators we describe 
and discuss these criticisms so we will not discuss them further here. Further 
comments are provided in Appendix 2). Suffice to say there were changes to the 
1989 exercise in an attempt to take account of these criticisms. There were still 
many criticisms of the exercise, given in the section on Performance Indicators 
(PIs). In the 1992 exercise, the funding council, then the UFC soon to be replaced 
by the Higher Education Funding Councils, again attempted to take account of the 
criticisms levelled at the previous exercise. These are discussed in the next section. 
The obsession with the development of PIs of research continued and the latest 
instalment, the 1996 and fourth exercise, dominates the thinking and behaviour of 
universities. Whether an "old " or "new" (mainly the former polytechnics) 
university the money available through this exercise will crucially affect their future 
position in the university system. For the 'new' universities it is an opportunity, 
available in the 1992 RAE but not exploited by many, to enter research as a 
significant player. For the "old" universities the choices, are, perhaps, even more 
significant. Are they to remain in or to enter the "elite" able to enjoy, 
disproportionately, funding council research grants, research council awards and 
contracts and grants from other sources, principally charities, government 
departments and private commercial and industrial firms? Or are they, if 
unsuccessful, to become the "teaching factories" of the new system, condemned 
through inadequate research ranking to an inability to provide a high quality 
research infrastructure, including top researchers, and, commensurately, to attract 
the "best" research students? For all universities, 'old' or 'new', the new funding 
mechanism with its emphasis on the allocation of research funds through a PI, the 
RAE, has crucial implications. Given this importance let us consider in general 
terms the use of PI s to evaluate universities and in the next chapter the effects that 
the RAE is claimed to have had within four disciplines, psychology, geography, 
chemistry and economics. 
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Performance Indicators for Teaching and Research 
Introduction 
In the previous section we described some of the changes experienced by the 
university system in the eighties. As we pointed out the most important of these 
changes has been to the method by which universities are funded, with the 
replacement of a rather opaque method by an explicit funding formula intended to 
make the whole system more transparent. Within the formula the most significant 
development was the introduction an indicator of research performance through a 
research selectivity exercise, later known as the RAE. The purpose of this section of 
the chapter is to describe and critically examine the development of PIs in the UK 
university system and to make a number of general points about the development of 
research performance indicators. As such it may be seen as a development, though 
not of theoretical nature, of the concern with university productivity which we 
examined earlier: we are concerned with universities' staff responses to funding 
changes and these responses are necessarily correlated with the overall 
performance/productivity of the universities. 
Before examining in detail the use of PIs in British higher education it should be 
noted that the development of PIs for universities is by no means confined to Britain 
(see, for example, Dochy et. al. (1989). This book explores many of the problems 
associated with PI s such as their reliability, validity, objectivity, ambiguity, level of 
aggregation and usefulness. As we shall show similar concerns have been 
expressed about the university PIs developed in Britain. The book does not explore 
two further concerns that have also been expressed about PIs: their costs relative to 
their benefits and the lack of any theoretical underpinning of the PI s developed. 
Concurrent with the introduction of the RAE in Britain there were already other 
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indicators of university performance being developed. However, unlike the 
funding council's PIs funding was not dependent on these other indicators. 
These PIs were produced in response to the report of the Steering Committee for 
Efficiency Studies in Universities (the Jarratt Report 1985) and are periodically 
published by the CVCP/UGC as University Management Statistics and 
Performance Indicators since 1987 . It must be conceded that despite Jarratt's 
injunction that: 
'A range of performance indicators should be developed, covering both 
inputs and outputs and designed for use both within individual institutions 
and for making comparisons between institutions.' 
(Jarratt 1985, p36) 
the thirty nine indicators have been developed their meaning for performance may 
be somewhat ambiguous. Thus we have interesting and qualified tables showing 
such things as 'research income per F-1 'b academic staff and 'telephone expenditure 
per FTE student', but what do they mean for performance if they are rising or 
falling? The performance indicators that funding council is concerned with are 
rather more sophisticated and we now examine these. 
Teaching 
Since our concern in this research is with the effect of funding change on staff 
perceptions of changes, if any, to their research and teaching outputs we will 
consider two PIs used by the Government and the CVCP to evaluate these outputs: 
degree results and research. We recognise that it can be argued that the first PI, 
degree results, is only one measure developed to evaluate teaching performance; 
other measures developed include unit costs per student, non-completion rates, 
employment success rate and, more recently, the quality assurance mechanisms. 
None of these is so clearly an output measure as degree results. We note in passing 
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that the method used for the new quality assurances seem more concerned with 
processes than outputs. There have been questions raised as to whether HEFCE 
methods of teaching assessment have really got much to do with teaching quality. 
To illustrate this point consider the HEFCE lecturer assessment documents 
assumingly reported in the Evening Standard by Allison Pearson (Evening Standard 
7/11/95, p 11). 
Included in the advice for assessors are: "Giving and receiving feedback to another 
person can be a powerful way of providing help if it is constructively handled by 
both people concerned". (The) "Observer" observes. Observer gives observee 
feedback. "Every five seconds, the assessor is to count the words and silences and 
marks them in little square boxes on a grid. High scores are awarded for non-
verbal communication (good use of eye contact, no distracting mannerisms) and 
visual aids (the overhead projector is a particular favourite)". 
The crucial question for teaching assessment surely concerns the student learning 
which is taking place and it is by no means clear that this is the focus of the HEFCE 
exercise. We recognise that there are intrinsic problems to do this satisfactorily. 
Instead we shall focus on what appears to be a less problematic way of assessing 
teaching at universities, that of degree results. It is certainly a method which 
appears to have some appeal to both the funding councils and the CVCP since it is 
prominent in their publications on performance indicators in universities. (See 
UGC/CVCP 1987 onwards). Superficially, degree results certainly appear an 
attractive PI since a degree is the (apparently) most obvious outcome of teaching 
activity. Indeed the 1987 White Paper makes this point clear: 
"Academic standards and the quality of teaching in higher education need to 
be judged by reference mainly to student's achievements. The numbers and 
class distribution of degrees awarded provide some measure as, conversely, 
do non-completion rates. 
(DES, 1987b: p28). 
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If we take the measure of degree results as the percentage of those with first or 
second class honours we see significant differences between universities (see 
Johnes and Taylor, 1990, p106). 
However, before using these results as a PI we need to be assured that we are 
comparing like with like. The most obvious causes for difference would, Johnes 
and Taylor argue, be differences between student characteristics and difference in 
university characteristics (ibid). For example, are students of equal ability attending 
universities, is the gender balance similar, do similar proportions live at home, and 
is English language competence of all students similar? Each one of these possible 
causes of difference is itself beset by problems. To take student ability, is this to be 
measured by some intelligence measure? (We will not here rehearse all the 
arguments surrounding views on this matter). Should we use instead 'A' level 
results, which are certainly convenient because they are so readily available? 
However, these results are nonetheless suspect because of variations of standards 
and curricular content across examining boards, because of variations between 
subjects and through time and also because of the fact that increasing numbers of 
students are entering university without 'A' levels, through access and alternative 
routes. 
If we turn to university-related factors, differences may occur because of: 
difference in staff: student ratios; difference in subject mix (some subjects have 
consistently higher proportions of first and upper second than others); difference in 
university histories; difference in library facilities. All the above factors and more 
were examined by Johnes and Taylor (1990) in what is the most comprehensive 
study to date of the use of PIs in British universities. Johnes and Taylor use 
regression analysis to discover whether the factors mentioned above independently 
affected degree results. Those that were significant were used to construct an index 
that allowed the raw degree results to be standardised. The correlation co-efficient 
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between raw degree results and standardised degree results never exceeded 0.42 in 
any of the four years for which Johnes and Taylor performed their statistical 
exercise. This suggests actual degree results may be, at best, singularly misleading 
as a PI. To quote at length from Johnes and Taylor: 
"Using regression analysis, it was found that over 80 per cent of the 
variation between universities in degree results can be explained 
(statistically) by a set of plausible explanatory variables, the main one being 
the mean A level score of each university's student entrants 	  
Other variables also played an important part in explaining inter-university 
differences in degree results. These include the percentage of students 
living at home during term time and type of university (i.e. ex-CATs, new 
greenfield universities, civics and Scottish universities) 	  
although a performance indicator can be constructed based upon the 
variation in degree results not accounted for by explanatory variables such 
as A level score, it is by no means certain that such an indicator would be 
useful for measuring performance. 
Finally, a further problem of using degree results as a performance indicator 
needs to be underlined. Degree results are under the direct control of each 
university's examining body, and although these are advised by independent 
external examiners there may nevertheless be a strong temptation for 
universities to award more 'good' degrees if those with unfavourable degree 
results are seen to be penalised in the allocation of funds. This would 
inevitably result in a general upward trend in degree results and a narrowing 
of differences between universities. It may therefore be inappropriate to use 
degree results as a target variable since this variable is itself determined by 
those who are affected by it". 
(Johnes & Taylor, p117/8). 
It may be that if Johnes and Taylor had included in their analysis the leadership 
qualities of different university heads, differences in the structuring of curricula, 
courses and teaching method, and included a control for certain characteristics of 
teaching staff, they may have reduced the 20 per cent residual from their 
regressions. However, their research nevertheless, does demonstrate the naivety of 
these measures of output. 
Further questions are raised about whether standards of degrees themselves may be 
changing. The HEQC's interim report, Graduate Standards Programme, reports on 
a study of degree awards in eight subject areas over 21 years in what it calls "pre- 
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1992 universities", or old universities. The subjects examined were civil 
engineering, French, physics, history, biology, accountancy, mathematics and 
politics. It found a "general increase" in the proportion of "good" degrees, that is 
2:1s and above, in all the subjects areas studied. The increase was mainly linked to 
an increase in the proportion of 2:1s awarded, but all subjects, especially in recent 
years, showed a rising trend in the proportion of first-class honours degrees. The 
report also stated that the 2:1 has now become the modal degree class across the 
university system in all subjects studied, except civil engineering and maths. In 
1973 similar research revealed that a 2:2 was the modal degree. The report also 
found substantial variation in the proportion of "good" honours degrees awarded by 
different institutions. The proportion of total graduates who were awarded a 2:1 or 
above ranged from less than 30 per cent in some institutions, to more than 70 per 
cent in others. 
Such evidence is treated as sufficiently important by the HEQC for it to include in 
its next phase of the graduate standard programme plans to examine "criteria for 
honours worthiness" (ibid). Our research, both through the questionnaires and 
interviews, may shed some light on university staffs perception of what has been 
happening to the quality of teaching and degrees. 
Research 
Probably the most influential, and certainly the most visible, PI for universities has 
been the establishment of a number of research selectivity exercises in which 
research PIs were established to evaluate the quality of research in university cost 
centres/departments. The funding council grant received by a university depended 
to a significant extent on the research grades awarded to its cost centres. It has been 
funding council policy to make the research grade increasingly important in the 
allocation of funds to universities. Any evaluation of the research selectivity 
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exercises is hampered by the lack of openness about the precise methods used, by 
the fact that the methods used differed across fields of study and by the fact that the 
methods are said to have changed somewhat between the different research 
exercises. 
To illustrate the change in method: 
"The 1986 exercise was based upon peer review with little emphasis being 
placed on the actual research output produced by universities. Subject 
panels consulted well-known academics in each subject area and research 
councils provided information about research grants awarded during the 
previous five years. In addition, each university or cost centre was asked to 
submit an extremely brief account of its research performance and future 
research plans and to select five recent publications which accurately 
reflected the research work being undertaken in each cost centre (or 
department in many cases)". 
(Johnes & Taylor, p155/6). 
The very limited approach adopted in the 1986 exercise was criticised on several 
grounds. The main criticisms made by the HEFCE itself included differences in 
assessment methods across subjects, that rankings seemed to influenced by research 
grant income and that little attention was given to work in progress. (The full list is 
given in Footnote 1). 
The UFC adopted a more comprehensive and more formal approach to its 1989 
exercise. In particular, more data describing research output (we discuss their 
output measures later) were collected and used in the 1989 exercise. The UFC was 
keen to stress that the assessments made by advisory groups and panels were 
'output led' (rather than 'income led' as in the 1986 exercise). (The method of 
assessment is given in footnote 2). 
Johnes and Taylor (1992) give five criticisms levelled at the 1989 research 
selectivity exercise. First, there was inadequate consultation in the design of the 
questionnaire. Second, and as with the earlier exercise, it was claimed that the 
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process of evaluation was undertaken too hurriedly, with only three months allowed 
to evaluate the research output of the entire UK university sector. Third, 
assessment was based on the research output of all full-time academic staff in post 
during the assessment period, but since staff turnover was high in some 
departments, such a procedure might give a misleading impression about research 
potential of a given department. There were also inconsistencies in defining 
research output. These included, edited books being counted as authored books; 
book reviews being included as articles; unpublished research reports included as 
books; co-authored books included twice (or more) under separate authors; no 
distinction being made between publications in non-refereed journals and in refereed 
journals. 
Finally, there was still concern about the five-point rating scale and whether it 
enabled comparisons to be made between different subjects. There was some 
dissatisfaction, particularly from subjects with low mean scores about inter-subject 
differences in scores. The circular letter from the UFC shows a wide discrepency 
between scores with for example, Pharmacology (3.6) Classics (3.3) scoring 
significantly higher than, for example, Education (2.5), Anatomy (2.5) and Clincial 
Dentistry (2.4). It is possible that these scores do reflect differences between the 
subjects, but if they do not it undermines one of the purposes of the RAE. This 
was to provide universities with guidance in the allocation of research funds 
between subject areas, the intention being to encourage a shift of resources away 
from low-rated subjects towards high-rated subjects. This would be efficient only 
if the ratings were comparable between subjects. If there are reasonable doubts as 
to whether this is the case it would be unwise for universities to shift resources 
between subjects. 
Some institutions have in fact pursued policies precisely the opposite from those 
intended by the UFC and shifted resources towards low rated cost centres (Williams 
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1992, Mace, 1993). This policy makes sense for a very obvious reason: it is easier 
to increase the rating of a low rated department than a high rated department and the 
increased rating attracts an increase in funding council grant. It appears that 
universities are aware that the law of diminishing returns applies in the research 
selectivity exercise. There may also be other reasons for not reallocating resources 
towards high rated cost centres. For example, reducing resources provided to the 
low rated areas may affect the balance of a university's academic offerings in a way 
unacceptable to its management. Universities may also recognise that there are 
economies of scope to be realised by retaining and supporting a wide range of cost 
centres and academic activities. 
The problem of comparability across subjects mentioned above has been 
acknowledged by the UFC but was not regarded as being of any great significance. 
(P. K. Jones, 1989, p17). 
"Anxieties were expressed in some panels that they were being 'tougher 
than others but Executive monitoring and guidance seems to have 
avoided this". 
Additional criticisms, again cited in the HEFCE report, included: Little information 
was published on the criteria that would be used by panels making it difficult for 
universities to determine their best strategy for presentation; lateness in providing 
list of units of assessment; the exercise favoured large departments, particularly in 
the physical sciences, the ratings in the sciences favoured excellence in basic and 
strategic to the disadvantage of applied research. 
Finally, there was some evidence of cheating, "mis-reporting" as the HEFCE puts it 
in the 1989 research assessment exercise. In some cases, inaccurate publication 
dates were included in order to gain advantage and publications were included when 
they should have been attributed to another institution (HEFCE 1993 p2). 
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The 1992 exercise was more carefully prepared, but many of the problems cited 
above remain and can be found in the HEFCE's own words. In brief they are: 
"(a) 	 Little information was published on the criteria that would be used 
by panels, and even the 5-point rating scale was published at a late 
stage of the Exercise, making it difficult for universities to determine 
their best strategy for presentation. 
(b) The full list of units of assessment was not settled in advance and, 
when it was agreed, was so large as to enable some universities to 
gain an unfair advantage. 
(c) Some of the forms were unnecessarily complex; in particular there 
was need for more precise definitions of publications. 
(d) No facility for systematic verification of the accuracy of the 
submissions was built into the Exercise, and there was some 
evidence of deliberate 'mis-reporting'. 
(e) The Exercise favoured large departments, particularly in the physical 
sciences. 
(0 	 The ratings in the sciences favoured excellence in basic and strategic 
to the disadvantage of applied research. 
(g) 
	
By assessing all staff in post for any part of the 5 year review 
period, the Exercise was unduly retrospective". 
(HEFCE, 1993) 
One factor that has not received adequate attention by the HEFCE is the enormous 
cost of the exercise and how this related to the benefits. Further, the measure of 
research output, though more sophisticated in the 1992 exercise, still suffered from 
serious flaws. To see why this is the case let us consider the major factors that have 
been used by the funding councils to measure research performance: peer review, 
publications, and research income. And, although it has not been explicitly included 
in the RAE, we will also comment on another measure of research performance, 
citations, that may also have influenced members of the assessment panels. Each of 
these measures is bedevilled by problems which are briefly recounted below. These 
are not considered by HEFCE but we consider they are of fundamental importance 
to the success or failure of any research assessment exercise. 
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Peer review: Tognalini is one of the commentators who has a positive view of 
peer review. He states: 
"Peer reviews are often seen as the PI par excellence. Peer reviews serve at 
least four important functions: 
(a) they bring to the decision-making process knowledge and 
perspectives; 
(b) they enlist colleagues and thus have the potential of improving the 
wisdom of those decisions and fostering acceptance of them; 
(c) they protect staff from both the appearance and reality of outside 
pressure; and 
(d) they create forms of accountability such that the choices filially made 
are more likely to be reasoned and defensible. 
An important dimension is that the process and outcomes are clearly 
understood". 
(Tognalini et. al., 1994, p155) 
A number of criticisms have been made of the peer review and these certainly 
indicate a less sanguine position than that taken by Tognalini. (See, for example 
Anderson (1978), Johnes and Taylor (1990), Johnes (1987,1990)). The most 
obvious criticism of peer review is that any measure based on the opinions of others 
in the field will inevitably be highly subjective: ratings are likely to be heavily 
influenced by the individual reviewer's personal interests and by his or her loyalties 
and affiliations to particular institutions. 
Further criticisms include the fact that ratings based on peer review are also 
influenced by 'halo effects': individual departments, or cost centres acquire benefits 
from the overall reputation of the institution as a whole. The reputation of a 
department can be considerably boosted by the presence of one highly productive 
and eminent researcher. The department may retain this reputation long after the 
eminent researcher has left and may no longer be deserved. The problem here is 
that unless 'peers' are alert to all developments in their area, and this may include 
new interdisciplinary developments, there is a danger that their judgements may be 
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out of date. Also, as Johnes (1989) has shown large departments appear to have an 
advantage over smaller departments when evaluation is based on peer review. 
Probably, this is because a large department is more visible than a small one, and 
there is more chance that someone on the review panel will know the work of at 
least one of its members. (Though being 'known' by a member of a panel may not 
always be an advantage, if there is personal jealousy or little respect for the 
departmental academic's work!) One final point is that the practice of peer review 
may encourage departments to spend more on enhancing their image outside their 
university in an effort to increase their ranking. From society's and the funding 
council's perspective this would almost certainly be seen as an inefficient use of 
scarce university resources. 
Publications: Publications have been a major determinant of research rating in 
every RAE, presumably because they are the most obvious evidence of research 
activity. Moreover, they are usually considered to be a more objective measure of 
research output than those based on peer review. 
"In general, a publications count is based on refereed publications in 
academic journals. Any count derived using all forms of publication (e.g. 
books as well as papers) requires a weighting system to reflect the relative 
merits of the various forms of publication. The suggestions for the 
weighting of journal articles to books have ranged from 1:4 (Crane 1965) to 
1:18 (Meltzer 1949; Manis 1951)". 
(Johnes and Taylor, p149) 
If a count of publications relies on obtaining a list from each department its success 
clearly depends on the degree of co-operation from individual departments, if they 
have such a list themselves. If it is obtained from journals there is the problem of 
deciding which set of journals to use to ensure that they adequately reflect the 
research activities of a specific subject area - biases will inevitably result. As 
Johnes has shown the selection of journals in a specific subject area because they 
are generally considered to be of high quality and of general interest would result in 
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a bias against highly specialised research areas (Johnes, G. 1988). (This is the 
major concern of Harley and Lee about the ranking of economics (see next 
chapter)). A further problem is that academics who publish 'outside' their own 
specific subject may well not be counted in their department's submission, thus 
disadvantaging the department and the academic concerned. Indeed, since they are 
also unlikely to be included in the submission of the department that does research 
in the relevant area, the individual, the department and the university may all be 
disadvantaged. 
Journal articles vary in length (though this does not necessarily reflect the quality) 
and it could be argued that a publications count should take this factor into account. 
Indeed, if no account is taken of article length this could lead to a proliferation of 
short papers in order to boost research 'output' and hence the ranking of 
departments. A quantity measure of research output may well lead to a 'price' in 
terms of quality and type of publication, being paid by the academic community. 
Our evidence suggests that this is certainly the case for the Humanities (see 
especially Chapter 8). Similar problems are encountered when using books as a 
measure of 'research output'; they too vary in length and quality. It is possible that 
`weights' could be attached to articles (and books) of different quality, but this 
would require a consensus of opinion on an appropriate weighting system and 
necessitates a subjective judgement of each paper's relative quality. This would be 
both time-consuming and beset by similar problems to measures of research output 
based on peer review. 
It is important that some weighting system to reflect relative quality should be 
devised if a publications count is to become the standard measure of research 
output. The danger of not doing so is that it may lead to a lowering in the quality of 
research if researchers begin to sacrifice quality for quantity in order to boost their 
research rating. As our evidence shows this may well be encouraged by 
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departmental heads who are keen to count as many of their staff as possible as 
`research active' so as to maximise income from the RAE. The sensitivity of 
ranking to the weights attached to different types of publication has been clearly 
demonstrated by Johnes (1990). 
Johnes and Taylor also point out further problems arising from the use of a 
publications count to measure research output. One is a consequence of the time lag 
between completing a piece of research and its publication. If the author moves to a 
different institution, the question arises as to whether the publication should be 
credited to the institution where the research was done or the researcher's current 
institution. Different views may arise if the RAE is seen as a measure of potential, 
in which case use present institution, or past activity, in which case use previous 
institution. Certainly, using present institution would appear to involve some 
injustice to the previous institution which not only paid the academic's salary, but 
also provided the infrastructure for their research. This raises another issue in that 
if the new institution does not have an appropriate research infrastructure then the 
new recruit may not be able to produce research of the same quality and quantity as 
previously and therefore past publications are not a very useful measure of likely 
future output, or potential. 
Multiple-authored papers also pose a problem. In the absence of any firm evidence 
of relative contributions to a paper, the credit for a publication with more than one 
author should be divided equally between each author. A further point to be made 
is that as a result of the development of RAEs in which publications are central a 
result may be an increase in the number of journals and the submission of papers in 
general. Unless there is a commensurate increase in the availability of referees 
and/or their time spent on refereeing the quality of refereeing may suffer with a 
diminution in the quality of papers published in any given journal. 
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Research income: Publications or citations necessarily require a time lag over 
which to perform the count, whereas the funders of research normally want a more 
up-to-date picture of the research output of departments. Measures of research 
income appear to provide a picture of current research activity, though this may not 
be very accurate in those cases where a research programme is being funded over a 
number of years. A further attraction to the funding council of using research 
income is that the data are readily available at both university and cost centre level. 
However, the obvious problem of using research income data as a measure of 
research output is that it is an input into, not an output of, the research production 
process. The receipt of a grant indicates nothing about the quality or even quantity 
of research produced from the input. Moreover, fields of research where grants are 
in short supply are disadvantaged by such a measure, hence the constant complaints 
of humanities staff who, until the new research council is established, that their 
research is neither properly supported and disadvantaged in any RAE that uses 
research income in its assessment. An alternative view is that research grants and 
contracts can be used to reflect the market value of the research being undertaken 
since they are awarded for a specific package of research, proposed and approved at 
the outset. But it is still merely a measure of input. 
Linke (1991), however, has argued differently claiming that research grants are a 
valid measure: 
"Because the grants provide necessary funding to conduct particular 
research projects, they are in one sense a measure of input or effort, and 
within fields requiring similar resources they also provide a measure of the 
relative scale of activity, or process. And for competitive grants in 
particular, ... they also signify successful peer assessment of prior research 
productivity". (p93). 
This does not meet the arguments above, for all that Linke is claiming is that it is 
sufficient to measure research (output) by inputs, processes and peer review, but 
not by output. 
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Citations: Another measure of research performance, though not one apparently 
used in the RAE, is the use of a citation index. If your peers are citing your 
research then this will reflect the quality of the research. However, there are many 
well documented doubts about this method of measuring research, possibly the 
reason it has not, so far as is known, been used by research assessment panels. 
One reason for not using citations is the reason why an author is cited. Their work 
may be cited as examples of flawed research practice, rather than the reverse. There 
are also differences in the citation practices between subjects and authors and this 
may result in serious bias in the results of using citations to assess the value of 
research. There is a further problem that it may take time before peers become 
aware of new research, particularly if published in an obscure journal. This would 
be of particular significance for the RAE, which takes place approximately every 
four years, since it may mean that by the time an author's work is making an impact 
and being cited will be too late for inclusion in the RAE. Further problems may 
arise if authors deliberately ignore other works in their field, or/and, cite their own 
work excessivel). Citation clubs may develop in which a group of academics agree 
to cite each other, whether appropriate or not, so that their citation index is 
improved. If an author is working in an obscure, or newly developing, area they 
will be disadvantaged compared to authors working in well established fields with 
many outlets for publication and citation. There is the well known problem of 
jointly authored works of only counting the first author in an index. The 
discussion above suggests that before a citation index is used the biases that may 
result from it, including its possible effect on authors' practices need to be 
addressed. 
In addition to the problems inherent to the evaluation methods discussed above, 
there is the failure in the research exercise to take account of the differences in the 
characteristics of the universities themselves. 
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"A number of factors could potentially affect a university's research output. 
The statistical analysis undertaken in this chapter indicates that a university's 
research output is significantly related to four main factors: its student/staff 
ratio; the resources devoted to research (e.g. expenditure on research or the 
number of 'research only' staff relative to all academic staff); being located 
on the geographical periphery of the UK; and whether or not a university is 
an ex-CAT. In addition, a significant 'Oxbridge' effect was found. The 
research performance of Oxford and Cambridge was exceptional even when 
input factors were taken into consideration. 
Specifically the UFC rating which each university could have expected 
(given its particular array of inputs) was computed and compared with the 
actual UFC rating received. The resulting variable was only weakly 
correlated with the UFC's research rating. It is therefore vitally important to 
take input variations into consideration when evaluating research output.". 
(Johnes & Taylor, p170) 
The concern of Johnes and Taylor is clearly about value added which will be 
inadequately reflected in the research exercise if output measures are not 
standardised for input differences. However, there is a problem in adjusting results 
for the Oxbridge effect or being an Ex-Cat because these effects may result from the 
relevant academic communities being better/less able to undertake worthwhile/less 
worthwhile research. Therefore to adjust for these effects may reduce the real 
differences in research performance. Moreover, in the Johnes and Taylor exercise, 
even when their standardised measure is used, 40 per cent of the variation in 
universities research rating remains unexplained. 
One final point concerns the objectives of the research exercise and whether they 
have been achieved. The UFC intended resources to be shifted within universities 
from lower to higher rated cost centres. However, there is some evidence that this 
did not occur. To quote from some earlier research undertaken by the author: 
"At one institution we were told that 'It is better for a big department/cost 
centre to go up one rating than for a small department to go up two'. In 
order to achieve an increase in research income the same institution 
combined two departments, a small 'outstanding department' and a large 
'below average' department, which resulted in an overall departmental rating 
of four. The net result was that by merely combining departments, no other 
changes taking place, the income from the research exercise was 
substantially increased". 
(Mace, 1993, p18). 
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The funding councils have shown a willingness to evaluate their RAEs and have 
certainly been prepared to revise the methods employed. However, the exercise is 
still the subject of considerable criticism including criticism of the "improvements" 
that the funding councils have made in response to earlier criticism. An example of 
this is that the 1992 exercise was criticised for being too concerned with the quantity 
of publications rather than with their quality. In the 1996 exercise only four 
publications were submitted. However, it has been argued that research that gives 
rise to numerous publications, often the case in engineering and science, will not 
receive full credit if only four of the publications are counted in the RAE. 
Having considered in more general terms the use of PIs to evaluate university 
performance it is of interest to examine the response of academics to the assessment 
of individual subjects. This issue we address in the next chapter. 
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Footnotes to Chapter 3 
Footnote 1 
1. The criteria for assessing research quality had not been made clear to 
universities. 
2. The identity of the assessors was confidential. 
3. The ultimate rankings appeared to be strongly influenced by the ability of 
universities to attract research grants, particularly from the research councils 
(thus favouring large departments). 
4. There was insufficient consultation with professional bodies about the 
appropriate methods of assessment to be used. 
5. Different assessment standards were used for different subjects. 
6. Evaluation of research on the basis of UGC cost centres/university 
departments had not allowed proper assessment of the work of inter-
disciplinary research groups and of joint departments. 
7. The descriptive terminology in announcing the ratings was confusing: 
'below average' had been understood to imply a low absolute standard. 
8. The exercise, being retrospective, had taken little account of work in 
progress and research potential. 
9 	 There had been no appeals mechanism against particular ratings. 
(HEFCE, 1993, pl) 
Footnote 2 
1. Around 70 advisory groups and panels were set up involving 300 members 
and covering 152 subject units of assessment. In addition about 100 outside 
advisers were consulted in confidence. 
2. Each advisory group or panel was provided with information obtained from 
each institution describing the research output in each identifiable subject 
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area over the period 1984-88 inclusive. This included a brief description of 
each department's research accomplishments and future plans as well as a 
numerical summary of publications and research reports. In addition, up to 
two publications were listed for each full-time member of the academic staff 
in post during 1984-88. 
3. 
	
	 The advisory groups and panels were then asked to rate each department on 
a five-point scale common to all subject areas. The ratings of different 
subjects were intended to be directly comparable and this was to be achieved 
by using the concept of 'attainable levels of excellence' in each subject area. 
In effect, this meant that research output was compared against an 
international standard. 
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Chapter 4: The RAE and Individual Disciplines 
Introduction 
So far we have considered general criticisms of the RAE. In a number of cases 
criticism has focused on the treatment of a particular discipline, and it is quite 
possible that more general conclusions about the validity of the whole RAE might 
stem from criticism that is based on an individual panel's work. We will describe 
and comment on four examples of discipline based critiques from Psychology, 
Geography, Chemistry and Economics. 
Psychology 
David Marks' paper in the July 1995 issue of The Psychologist provides an 
example from Psychology. Marks begins by reiterating the general criticism made 
of peer review, whether the peer review is based on journals, grants or merely 
impressionistic. According to Marks "in spite of the fairly momentous implications 
of RAEs for the future funding of academic disciplines, few precautions appear to 
have been taken to insulate panels' decisions from well-known biasing factors in 
human judgement" (p315) and this despite earlier criticisms of RAEs, for example 
by Gillett (1989). Marks then reports the results of his own analysis of RAE data. 
Using 17 variables in stepwise forward regression Marks determines which 
variables best predicted research rating by the Psychology Panel. To quote his 
results in full 
"This analysis reveals that five variables explained 82 per cent of the 
variance in the Psychology Panel's ratings of departments in the 1992 RAE. 
Only two of the five, the average number of academic journal articles per 
staff member and the proportion of active staff, were measures of research 
output. The remaining variables are input measures, two provided as 
background information to the Panel (number of C and D staff, and ABRC 
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income) and one, the availability of an animal laboratory, not one of the 
officially provided indicators but nevertheless appearing to have significant 
influence on the Panel's quality ratings. Reassuringly, geographical 
location (north vs south) and university status ('older' vs 'newer') were not 
significant predictors of ratings. However, proportion of active staff was 
highly correlated with ratings (.581, df=63, pce.001) and played a 
significant role in determining funding" (p317). 
Oddly "Publication output in the form of authored and edited books, refereed 
conference papers, book reviews, and other kinds of publication had no impact on 
ratings" (p317). He goes on to prophesy that what will happen as a consequence 
"the profile of academic publishing will shift towards an even more severe 
manifestation of the 'publish or perish' syndrome already endemic among the 
academic population" (p317). 
Marks proceeds to explore the "biases" in favour of departments with animal 
laboratories, towards big departments and against such areas as health psychology. 
He considers that in part the bias arises from the composition of the Psychology 
Panel. Six of its seven members come from big departments with animal 
laboratories. This may well be a feature of other panels judgements - the 
composition of the panel predisposes them to certain types of judgements. This, 
however, may be to some extent unavoidable. What is not is "the confusion that 
existed in the 1992 RAE between input and output measures" (p318). Marks 
proposes "Panels should be instructed to base their ratings upon the quality of 
research outputs and consider the cost-effectiveness of departments' research using 
measures of output per unit of input as previously suggested by Gillett (1987a, 
1987b) and Colman et at., (1992) (p318). However to do this evaluation of 
research effectively may impose, as Marks concedes, an intolerably heavy burden 
on panel members. 
Moreover, although Marks' criticisms have some validity they may be overstated. 
It is possible that good research is correlated with publishing in refereed journals, 
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having large numbers of research active staff in departments and that because of 
their successful research activity that they also attract research funds. Similarly 
large and expensive animal laboratories may not be funded unless they are 
associated with what is perceived as good research. However, these are all 
speculative claims, to some extent recognised in Professor Baddeley's response to 
Marks in the same journal where he comments "correlation does not imply 
causation" (and) "There is a severe limit to the extent to which post hoc analysis can 
give clear and credible answers to causal questions" (p320). This is a worrying 
comment from a member of the RA panel. Of even more concern perhaps are two 
further comments in his response: "We were given a varied and imperfect set of 
indicators" p319 and "Clearly any attempt to come up with a fair assessment of 
research quality will provide at best rough justice (p320). Members of the academic 
community whose financial support rests in large part on the results of the RAE 
may well consider they have a right to more than "rough justice". 
Geography 
Marks' response is very much focused on the Psychology Panel's work and its 
effect on Psychology departments' meetings. A general critique of the RAE, from 
the point of view of one discipline Geography, is that of Jenkins (1995). Using, 
implicitly, a rational behaviour model Jenkins (1995, p4) argues that 
"individuals, departments and institutions have far more powerful economic 
reasons to push research way up the agenda! Individuals are more likely to 
perceive that their promotion/career prospects are likely to be progressed 
through being in a high ranking research department. While as rational 
economic maximisers or rather "loss minimisers", individuals, departments 
and institutions will recognise that "since the marginal financial rewards for 
improved research ranking are so much higher than extra funds which can 
be obtained from improved teaching, all universities will tend to concentrate 
resources on improving their research, which will defeat the objective of 
concentrating research funding, at the same time to encourage a relative 
neglect of teaching" (Williams, 1994, p2) (Jenkins emphasis)". 
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Jenkins examines the impact on teaching of the RAE and teaching quality 
assessment (TQA) exercises. A consequence, Jenkins maintains, is that much more 
teaching is being undertaken by postgraduate and part timers and in making 
appointments and promotions much more emphasis is "placed on research 
productivity and potential vis-a-vis teaching". The TQA has had a relatively limited 
impact on behaviour, resulting in relatively minor changes such as compulsory 
student questionnaires and course booklets. The reason for this is given by one of 
the interviewees in his sample (not provided). 
"The teaching exercise has made no impact yet. So far we haven't been told 
what the rewards or penalties are likely to be for success or failure in this 
exercise...By contrast it was clear from the start that there would be 
substantial rewards and penalties in the research exercise. 
The next research review...is still heavily stressed, as is the consequence of 
a slip in grading - a drop by one place may mean the loss of...jobs. The 
threat is explicit...it is only when the quality assessment for teaching 
determines funding and recruitment that it will be accorded appropriate 
priority. By then it is maybe too late" (p7). 
Jenkins not only reports on the emphasis on research but also that 
"The RAE has significantly shaped what "counts" as scholarly activity and 
in particular is deterring staff from researching and writing for discipline-
based pedagogic journals and producing teaching related materials, in 
particular student textbooks and information technology-based teaching 
materials (p7). 
The impact of the rules and funding arrangements of the RAE on the 
production of these materials is now becoming a matter of public record. In 
late 1993 I met four established geography editors from leading publishing 
companies which publish in all disciplines. The edited transcript (Davey et 
al., 1995) makes clear that staff are being deterred from writing student 
textbooks (p8) and the general picture for teaching is gloomy" (p10) 
and for research he argues that we are heading (if not there already) in the US 
higher education direction 
"in US higher education, particular the widespread recognition in the 
academic community that the faculty reward system has promoted a narrow 
view of scholarship, i.e. refereed original research and devalued other forms 
of scholarly activity, in particular undergraduate teaching" (p11). 
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As with Marks' critique Jenkins' method may be flawed in so far as it is based on a 
"pilot study of views" (we are not told how many staff, who they were, or how 
they were selected) and "excerpts from a discussion with leading publishers" (p6). 
Again "sampling" details are omitted. Jenkins does concede "possible bias in this 
study" and urges readers "to interrogate it from their own experience and to follow 
up this study by researching other disciplines' experience" (p6). 
Chemistry 
Professor Waigh, though specifically concerned with the implications of the RAE 
for chemistry is, as with the previous review of the RAE, also concerned with the 
overall impact of the Exercise on universities and their staff and on research 
generally. He contends that 
"With the aid of a few senior academics, the Universities Funding Council 
(now the Higher Education Funding Councils) devised and implemented the 
Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) to bring about the R, T, X division 
by evolution. The research performance of every department is ranked, and 
the top-ranking departments get more money, on a sliding scale. The 
entirely predictable effect is that the strong get stronger and the weak get 
weaker: (my italics) a department finds itself either on an 'up' escalator 
which leads to salvation, or a 'down' escalator which leads, in the new 
'caste' system, to the status of 'untouchable' (p541)". 
As Waigh points out the effect of this policy, if it is successful, is to create an 
underclass of academics who because of shortage of time, increased teaching (and, 
presumably, administrative responsibilities) and lack of resources in terms of both 
equipment and support staff are effectively disbarred from research. He claims that 
"For all except a minority of academics, research is being discouraged -
taking away one of the major attractions of a university post. At the same 
time, staff-student ratios are getting worse and teaching loads are rising. 
There has also been talk of teaching throughout the year, in a search for 
greater efficiency" (p541). 
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The whole policy he claims is likely to result in a need to spend more money to 
attract staff to a position in universities that no longer provides the same attractive 
conditions of service as erstwhile and reduces the quality of teaching to such an 
extent that "very few students have any concept of 'scholarship' or of learning for 
its own sake". Whether these are the results of government policy has still to be 
empirically tested. He also fails to recognise that some of these effects may be 
precisely what lies behind the changes in government policy towards universities. 
Perhaps a more critical assertion made by Waigh concerns the effect of the policies 
on the nature of the research process itself: 
"Concentrating research effort into relatively few centres might make some 
sense if the effect was catalytic. In practice, highly-focused research 
institutes do not work very well, for a variety of human reasons. At best, 
they lead to a consensus view of the most significant areas for research, 
which loses freshness and originality. At worst, they provide stressful, 
secretive, competitive environments that turn into dogfights. New 
discoveries are often not predictable: the more competent researchers there 
are, spread over the greatest number of departments, the better". 
If this assertion is correct then there may be long term, if not more immediate, 
damage to research in the UK. He also alludes to the effect that the policy may have 
on the cost of research: he contends that it will rise because under the RAE the 
emphasis is on getting grants because 
"If a researcher happens to be doing good but cheap research he or she will 
not be praised for effectiveness, but castigated for failing to attract large 
sums of money. The frantic grantsmanship that ensues is a waste of 
everybody's time, since there is only a certain amount of money in the pot, 
and perfectly good research programmes may be abandoned because they 
are cheap!" (p4542). 
Not only is there the problem of getting a large grant to achieve recognition in the 
RAE there is the further question of the quality of academics' publications. He 
believes that the panel members will be unable to read all the publications listed in 
the university returns (a point made by Marks with respect to Psychology) but also 
that quality will be measured by use of a citation index. We have discussed these 
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problems earlier but the specific point made by Waigh is how it will bias research 
ratings in Chemistry 
"A problem with this approach is that some areas, particularly biochemistry, 
are trendy and busy and produce high impact factors. High-quality 
publications in mainstream chemistry, such as the Journal of the Chemistry 
Society, suffer badly in comparison. Small, specialist research areas suffer 
from very low impact factors, irrespective of the quality of the research" 
(p472) 
This apparently adverse impact for mainstream chemistry contrasts sharply with the 
claimed effect on mainstream economics discussed in the next section. There it is 
asserted by the authors assessing the effect of the RAE that non-mainstream 
economics is adversely affected whereas mainstream economics is very favourably 
treated. It would appear that if these evaluations are correct the same procedures are 
producing very different effects in different disciplines. 
Waigh goes on to consider the impact of all research of an individual counting 
solely towards the institution in which they are employed on 31 March 1986. He 
considers that the development of "a transfer market reminiscent of the football 
league" will effectively concentrate the 'stars' in the richer departments. In order to 
enhance efficiency he proposes that research funding should be according to cost-
effectiveness. 
"It would be possible to calculate a cost per publication, and low figures 
should be a cause for celebration". 
One problem not explored by Waigh is how the 'value' of a publication is to be 
measured. 
In order to prevent staff being abandoned in low rated departments with high 
teaching loads he proposes an alternative way for the HEFCE to fund research "we 
should fund people rather than departments, to do research". However, there 
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remains the problem of the criteria to be used to select these people. It would not be 
enough to do it by publications given the problems he has already indicated. 
Economics 
It is interesting to note that despite the difference in subject the comments on the 
RAE focused on similar concerns: the inadequacy of peer review, the apparent bias 
towards certain large departments and particular types of research activity, and the 
development of an academic "underclass". The final subject review of the effects of 
the RAE makes many similar observations, but it differs from the previous three in 
two important respects: it is based on a much more systematic and more substantial 
piece of research and it aims to test an explicit hypothesis. 
In the words of the authors, Harley and Lee: 
"This paper aims to report the results of empirical research designed to 
expose the impact of the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) on the work 
and employment of academic economists in both the old and new 
universities in the UK. The central hypothesis of the research is that the 
existence of lists of core journals which are believed to count most in the 
ranking exercise poses a serious risk to academic diversity within the 
economics profession.(1) The core journals have tended to select for 
publication predominantly work which might be defined as mainstream 
economics because it is located within a well-defined neo-classical core. 
There is therefore considerable pressure on departments which want to 
maintain or improve their research rankings to appoint mainstream rather 
than non-mainstream economists and upon individuals within those 
departments to publish more where it is believed to count most". 
(Harley, Lee 1996, pl) 
Their definition of MS and NMS is 
"We included in our definition those working within a Marxist, Post-
Keynesian, Evolutionary or Sraffian framework and indicated as much in a 
covering letter which also stated our research interest" (p3). 
Whilst correctly noting that research quality and productivity has always been 
central to the academic process, the authors' concern is that the context in which 
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research is undertaken has changed as a result of the recent RAEs that it is now 
harnessed to managerial ends through the HEFC RAE' and this managerialism has 
worked to the detriment of Non-Mainstream Economics (NMS) research. This 
managerialism has adversely affected work and prospects in non-MS fields and the 
bias is the result of the peer review method of assessing research. The paper does 
not explore many of the concerns with peer review that we examined but focuses 
instead on the fact that the peers were all MS economists who Harley and Lee assert 
only used MS journals in their research assessment with the consequence that NMS 
academics and their work were undervalued. This paper is highly relevant to our 
own research and thus warrants a more detailed presentation and discussion than the 
papers we considered previously. 
Before presenting and discussing the findings their sampling method deserves 
comment. 
"A questionnaire was sent to all those economists who could be identified as 
having an interest in non-mainstream economics from attendance at non-
mainstream conferences and study groups, contributions and subscriptions 
to non-mainstream journals and membership of non-mainstream economic 
associations. 
Questionnaires were then sent to all other economists who could be 
identified as working in those departments from which we had non-
mainstream replies" (p2). 
We are not informed of the response rate, though reading of the Appendix suggests 
it may have been 38 per cent. As they admit, given the sampling procedure, it 
certainly over-represents non-mainstream economists. In addition, one might cavil 
at their definition of non-MS economists, essentially those not working within the 
neo-classical tradition. All MS economists are grouped together as though they 
were homogeneous and thus differentiation within the group is discounted. It may 
be that neoclassical economists should themselves have been further subdivided 
since there is little doubt that work within this paradigm is not equally valued either 
by publishers or by peers. Within the MS group one need only peruse the elite 
111 
journals to see the greater value that appears to be afforded to mathematical papers 
as opposed to papers, for example, in development economics. Indeed, their own 
quote from Whitley indicates that within MS economics a significant division exists. 
"Research involving statistical data and empirical indicators seems to be 
separated from theoretical model-building activities in economics and have a 
lower intellectual prestige ... Thus theoreticians can obtain high reputations 
by producing highly abstract and general models of ideal worlds without 
considering how they are related to economic phenomena in real worlds: 
their work is partitioned from empirical economic studies, and they do not 
need to demonstrate any systematic connection between them". 
(Whitley, 1986, p192.) 
Harley and Lee first consider how criteria for recruitment of economists has 
changed. 
"Fifty-three percent of economists who had been working in the old 
universities for three or more years and sixty-four per cent of those in the 
new believed that there had been change. In the old universities, the most 
commonly stated single category of change was a greater emphasis placed 
on publications (22%). However, the second largest category of response 
(17%) (actually 19.9% in their table) mentioned explicitly a greater emphasis 
on mainstream research or publications; 15 per cent said there was a greater 
emphasis on mathematical and technical skills and a further 13 per cent that 
recruitment policy was specifically targeting those with a record or 
publishing in core journals, categories which we have taken together to 
imply a paradigm-shift" (p5). 
Their results are summarised in table 1 below. 
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n % n % 
35 21.7 15 22.4 
21 13.0 26 38.8 
32 19.9 4 6.0 
24 14.9 4 6.0 
21 13.0 2 3.0 
6 3.7 0 0.0 
22 13.7 16 23.9 
n=161 100.0% n=67 100.0% 
More publications 
More on research 
change to ms explicit 
greater technical skills 
emphasis core journals 
short-termism 
other 
Table 1 Economists Perceptions of Changes in Recruitment Policy 
The paper also reports on the respondents who considered that there had been no 
change in recruitment policy, approximately 45 and 41 per cent respectively of MS 
and non-MS economists. But in the Old universities 31.6 per cent said that quality 
of research had always been important in recruitment, whereas only 14.9 per cent of 
respondents in the New universities mentioned quality of research. The other 
important difference between Old and New universities was in the importance they 
attached to teaching when recruiting staff: 17.3 per cent in the Old contrasting with 
38.3 per cent in the New universities. 
The authors next examine the impact of the RAE on departmental work. 
Recruitment policy is again examined here, but the emphasis is on the differences 
between non-MS and MS economists as to how policy had changed as well as 
reporting differences between New and Old universities. As can be seen from the 
Table below there are significant differences between the university types in the 
perceived impact on departmental work. 
113 
n % n % 
34 13.1 16 17.2 
67 25.8 4 4.3 
42 16.2 2 2.2 
26 10.0 9 9.7 
35 13.5 8 8.6 
3 1.2 18 19.4 
31 11.9 31 33.3 
18 6.9 3 3.2 
4 1.5 2 2.2 
n=260 100.0% n=93 100.0% 
more pressure to publish 
to publish diamond/core/ms 
pressure to_publish more 
refereed journals 
work more ms/tech 
greater division of labour 
More research targeted 
teaching suffers 
other 
Table 2.1 Impact of RAE on Departmental Work (Q.6) 
The 19% in the New Universities reporting greater division of labour reinforces the 
impression of a two tier system developing within institutions themselves. The 
paper makes considerable use of quotes from respondents and we include some in 
the extended footnote 1, they reinforce some of the evidence that was collected in 
our own study. 
The effects on recruitment policy were seen to be greater for non-MS (66%) as 
compared to MS economists (29%) in the old universities and respectively 43% 
compared to 26% in the new universities. 
"Out of the 63 institutions from which our original sample of non-
mainstream economists came only seventeen could be definitely identified as 
having recruited non-mainstream economists in the last three years and the 
majority of these were in the new universities. Even high-ranking 
departments in the old university sector strong enough to support some non-
mainstream and ostensibly proud of their heterodoxy could not boast a 
single non-mainstream appointment during that period". (p24). 
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The concern that universities shared for achieving a high research ranking in the 
RAE through appropriate recruitment practices is further supported by 
advertisements appearing in the academic press. 
"Out of some 20 job specifications which the researchers obtained by 
sending for details of posts advertised in the educational press, only three 
did not specify an area of interest within the mainstream or make reference 
to ranking in the last research assessment exercise". (p25). 
Not only do the authors report changes in departmental activities and in individuals' 
work, but in exploring the effect of the RAE they found, as we did in one of our 
institutions, a divide growing between research active staff and other staff. A 
divide that will be exacerbated as research staff have their teaching loads lightened 
with commensurate increases in the load on other staff. This divide is much greater 
with New than Old universities. 
Further non-MS economists were much more likely to perceive a change in 
departmental policy, 85 per cent of NMS were more likely to perceive a change, as 
opposed to 61 per cent for MS economists. The authors report considerable 
hostility by both groups towards the RAE which stemmed from 'what was 
perceived to be interference in the academics' traditional freedom to set their own 
research agenda, to produce the knowledge they considered to be important and to 
disseminate it in the way that they saw fit' (p14). An example of this view is 
reflected in the following quotes given in the footnote below. 
Harvey and Lee report on changes in the diversity of work. No less than 50% of 
economists in the new universities and 41% in the old reported that they had 
changed the direction of their work in some way to fit in with the demands of the 
RAE and, perhaps not surprisingly, the effect was greater for Non-MS (51%) as 
opposed to MS economists (36%). A further group felt under pressure to change, 
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but has yet to do so: 28% and 19% respectively for Non and MS respondents. 
Some examples of economists views are reflected in the quotes below: 
"I have been distracted from writing a second book to churning out papers 
for journals 
plans for further editions of books dropped. Plan for a book based on 
major research project split into series of articles for submission 
I've switched to a mainstream topic because even with 31 publications 
(including two books) I haven't been promoted 
now set objective of publishing in the mainstream for benefit of 
departmental rating and my promotion prospects". (p16) 
As the quotes clearly indicate the pressure to change the orientation of work has 
affected departmental/university policy towards promotion, which reinforces the 
general effect of the RAE. Whether this is intended or not by the HEFCE is not 
explored in the paper. 
The detrimental pressure exerted by the RAE, at least in the view of some of their 
respondents, is further illustrated in quotes given in footnote 2. Notable too is the 
effect this policy has on the willingness of academics to remain in economics 
departments. Some, it appears, are contemplating moving to other departments, 
business studies for example, to pursue their academic interests which they perceive 
as threatened in their current departments. The effect on individual work practices 
appears greater on the young and untenured economists who feel compelled to "play 
the game" until their appointment is confirmed. (See footnote 3). The apparent 
pressure to conform to what the authors take to be orthodoxy appeared to be 
reinforced by the relationship found between RAE rating and the pressure to change 
the nature of academic work. 
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2 3 4 5 
59.1 47.8 34.8 29.5 
22.7 32.2 37.7 52.6 
18.2 20.0 27.6 18.0 
n=22 n=90 n=69 n=78 
change in own work 
yes 
no 
felt pressure 
Table 5.1 Change in own work (Q.7) by departmental ranking in old 
universities 
However, this is not an altogether surprising finding since so much money and 
prestige is attached to higher RAE ratings. The important point is the direction in 
which the respondents are being compelled to move towards MS research that we 
described earlier. 
The major conclusions of Harley and Lee's paper are: 
1. Non-MS work is seen as threatened and with it diversity in economics 
teaching and research. 
2. Economists, it is claimed are being pressurised by peers, departments and 
institutions towards more short term research and to publish it in what are 
considered to be the journals which count most in the ranking exercise. 
3. Doubts are expressed about peer group review. The authors contrast the 
effect of different forms of peer review and express doubts as to the 
competence of the RAE panel to assess all areas of economics work. 
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4. 	 In the long term the authors conclude that NMS as an area of research will 
shrink and students will be ignorant of this area. Potential intellectual 
challenge essential for developing knowledge may well be weakened. 
If the claimed consequences for economics, as described in Harvey and Lee, are 
also true for other disciplines then the nature of a university may well change. 
Managerialism and peer review may together have reduced the range and focus of 
creative research and undermined academic autonomy. The restrictions may not 
necessarily either be in the interest of government policy (to support wealth creating 
research) nor of the individual discipline. These are matters which we consider at 
length when we present our findings. 
We have presented Harley and Lee's findings at length because much of their 
evidence concerns our own research and evidence. However, this does not imply 
unreserved acceptance of their conclusions for a number of reasons. First, the 
authors' hypothesis of the MS bias is undermined by note 2 on p29 of their paper. 
The note claims that their economics department was a leading non-MS department, 
but despite the biases they claim for MS in the RAE it was "the only one 
(department) in the new university sector to have scored a 3 in the last RAE". This 
department outranked many MS departments in the New and Old universities and 
this despite the claim by the authors that the RAE panel was staffed by MS 
orientated academics chiefly concerned with publications record in the so-called 
"Diamond list" (see footnote 4) It is unfortunate that this apparent paradox between 
hypothesis and evidence is not mentioned. 
Other criticisms may also be made of their study. Their sample of economists, as 
they admit, was biased towards NMS economists whose views may not reflect 
those of the majority of economists. However, as it is this group that Harley and 
Lee see as being most affected by the RAE this bias may have some justification. 
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The extent of the bias is unfortunately not explored which means we have no way 
of comparing the distribution of MS and NMS economists in the sample with the 
distribution in the population and thus knowing the extent of the bias. We have 
already alluded to the way in which the economists were grouped: either in the MS 
or NMS group. Although this would make no difference to the results in the 
aggregate, the grouping may disguise important differences in the perceptions of the 
effect of the RAE on subsets within the groups. It is unfortunate also that the 
analysis of the data did not include some investigation of the interaction, if any, 
between the NMS and MS sample on the one hand and the New and Old 
universities on the other. 
Despite these caveats which certainly cast some doubt as to whether the authors 
have confirmed their central hypothesis, the results do suggest that economists 
perceive the RAE, the principal PI used to assess universities, to have had a very 
significant effect on research, publications, recruitment and departmental and 
institutional policy. These are questions which are central to this research and we 
will, where appropriate, compare our results with those made by Harley and Lee 
and the other discipline-based reviews of the RAE discussed earlier. Although our 
research is concerned with more than the effect of the RAE, many would argue that 
it is the introduction of assessment of research through research panels and the huge 
sums of money attached to either receiving a low or high ranking from that PI that 
has had the greatest impact on university behaviour. 
We have carried out a detailed review of PI which we have supplemented with what 
could be called a series of case studies embracing the humanities, social sciences 
and sciences. This review has a crucial bearing on our research, to be reviewed in 
the following chapter. We have noted the self criticism of HEFCE and their attempt 
to accommodate them in our criticisms in subsequent RAEs. Despite such 
accommodation major criticisms remain, in particular the literature highlights 
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continually the problems inherent in peer review, using publications and research 
income. 
We shall be concerned in part to see whether our intensive case study of two 
contrasting universities bears out, extends or challenges the serious misgivings of 
the RAE reported in this chapter. 
Our next chapter will outline our research design, methodology and its legitimacy. 
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Footnotes to Chapter 4 
Footnote 1 
Awareness of (supposed!) criteria for RAE permeates all research and publication 
activities (author's bracket). 
Publication of books discouraged, only top journals valued. Teaching performance 
ignored. 
Pressure to publish regardless of intrinsic worth. The more articles the better, the 
more mathematical the better. 
Focus is now upon statistically competent, young, cheap personnel with the 
potential to churn out ephemeral research findings. No concern with originality and 
long term potential. It has become frenetic and trivialised. 
More mainstream and "safe" research. Also a more short term view point - less 
emphasis on scholarship 
Footnote 2 
I do not regard it as desirable that academics should be required to publish - only 
that they should be constantly examining their subjects with a view to rejecting and 
exposing falsity, and publishing only when they have something to say and they are 
reasonably certain they are right. Mass publication leads to chaos and disorder in 
the state of knowledge. 
I am seriously considering moving out of an economics department into a more 
hospitable environment in another part of the university. I shall not change the 
content of my work. 
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Footnote 3 
I personally have been interviewed at other universities where it has been clear that 
publishing in core journals is the criteria 
in my inquiries regarding other posts at older universities I have been asked about 
research interests and the RAE and journals have been signalled. At a selection 
committee of a large older university I was recently asked directly which journals I 
aim to publish in over the coming 2 years. 
I am a Marxist, but since I am on probation until Jan I have been forced to do 
mostly mainstream research or else I know I wouldn't be made permanent 
on advice from a present colleague, when I applied for my current post, I stressed 
my ability to teach mainstream micro. I also told them that my research interest was 
general equilibrium. Subsequently I "came out" and pointed out my research as 
Marxist equilibrium. I doubt I would have got my present post had I not pursued 
this little deception. (p21/22). 
Footnote 4 
The Diamond list of 27 economics journals was compiled by Professor Diamond of 
the USA in 1988. The list was drawn up on the basis of citations. 
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Chapter 5: Research Questions, Design And 
Method 
Introduction 
The research method should be dictated by the research question(s) and objectives 
of the research. We have earlier described our research questions as: 
(i) How have universities responded to changed methods of funding with 
respect to patterns of teaching and research activities. 
(ii) If there are changes to universities are these changes consistent with the 
orientations given by the Government for the introduction of these new 
methods of funding universities? 
(iii) Has the type of research undertaken changed? 
(iv) Is there a trade off between teaching, research and administration? 
And we have described our objectives as the following: 
(a) The overall objective of this research is to examine the effect of changed 
funding methods, particularly the introduction of the RAE, on teaching and 
research in the old universities. More specifically we intend to: 
(b) examine the response with respect to teaching and research, of institutions, 
their policies and staff to changes in funding methods; 
(c) discover whether there are differences between cost centres and between 
universities. And, if so, to explore the reasons for these differences; 
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(d) discover whether there have been changes in the amount and type of 
research and teaching being undertaken by academics; 
(e) feed the results back into theories of institutional finance and to policy 
making at the macro and the institutional level. 
Clearly, in order to answer our research questions we require information about 
changes, if any, in patterns of research and teaching in universities and we have to 
devise a means for establishing the causes of the changes. Diagrammatically our 
question is whether the relationship is as in Figure 2. Note the broken arrow from 
other influences. The importance of these other influences relative to funding 
change is one question we need to address. 
Figure 2 
Funding 	 Institutional 
Method 	 Response 
..e- 
 
Change in Teaching 
and Research 
 
Other Influences 
The changes in the method of funding have been described earlier. In this chapter 
we have to establish a means of determining institutional responses to the change in 
funding method and the effect that this response has had on teaching and research. 
One possible method to measure changes in teaching output is to examine published 
statistics or changes in degree results, numbers of university students and staffing. 
One way to measure changes in research output could be to examine the research 
selectivity results to see how they have changed for universities since the change in 
funding method of 1986. We evaluate these statistical indicators in chapter 3 and 4 
and we found the method flawed. However, though flawed, they do provide some 
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quantitative indicators of university output against which other indicators of output 
can be compared. 
If published sources are of doubtful validity for our purposes we are left with using 
unpublished material (internal institutional documents and arrangements) or/and 
generating our own data. Our review of internal documentation from selected 
institutions and interviews with senior management personnel revealed that certain 
internal documents would help us to answer some of our research questions --
statements on resource allocation policies and the reason for their change being one 
example. However, internal documents did not address such questions as to how 
time spent on teaching and research has changed or whether the quality and type of 
teaching and type of research had changed. Thus it is necessary that we generate 
our own data. 
Given the constraints of time and money it would clearly be impossible to include 
the whole population of universities in the empirical work. We therefore chose a 
small case study approach. Two questions need to be answered before the sample 
is selected and the first again concerns the time and resources available. The 
number of universities that can be included in the sample is determined by the 
amount of data to be collected from universities, how it is to be collected, how it is 
to be analysed and the human and financial resources available. The second 
question returns us to our research question(s) and whether those demand a certain 
sample size so that they can be meaningfully answered. For example, the ability to 
generalise from our results will be significantly related to the range and number of 
institutions included in our empirical work. A trade off clearly exists between the 
limited availability of resources and the ability to generalise from the results and say 
something meaningful for policy and theory. In the event the shortage of resources 
prevailed and we therefore chose to confine our case studies to two institutions, 
reflecting contrasting elements of the university spectrum. Although we have 
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confined our study to two universities we hope to compensate by studying these 
institutions in some depth. Within these institutions, we will undertake a detailed 
study of institutional policy and research and teaching activities. Internal documents 
and interviews with staff are two sources of information and published documents 
are a further source. To obtain a systematic picture of staff research and teaching 
activities a large percentage of staff would need to be interviewed. However, as a 
representative sample of staff in a single university could be in excess of a hundred, 
individual interviews were clearly not possible. We decided to design a 
questionnaire and distribute it to a random sample of one in three academic staff. 
Having briefly laid out our research method, we will discuss the method in more 
detail examining in order: 
• Sample of institutions; 
• Questionnaire design; 
• Sample of academic staff to be given questionnaires; 
• Sample of staff to be interviewed; 
• Institutional statistics and documents; 
• Published statistics to be used; 
• Issues arising with our method, including the use of the case study approach. 
Sample of Institutions 
As we have restricted resources to pursue our research we were limited in the 
number of cases we could consider and therefor decided upon a small scale study 
We decided to exclude Scotland because both the funding arrangements and the 
history of universities is so different from that of England. Similar considerations 
apply to Ulster where there is the additional problem of the so called,"troubles". 
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Wales also has different traditions although until 1992 its university was funded in 
the same way as the English universities. 
Within England there are significant differences in history and structure in 
university institutions. Oxford and Cambridge, for example, are atypical 
universities. Amongst the other universities there are differences between the 
Redbrick, Greenfield and ex-CATs. There may also be differences between 
institutions according to their ranking in the RAEs. 
In deciding which institutions to select we were influenced by our central research 
question: the effect of funding changes on teaching and research. We decided 
therefore to choose two institutions: one a traditional multi-faculty prestigious 
university rated high in the RAE and the other an ex-CAT with a more limited range 
of faculties that was rated low in the RAE. We recognise that this will limit our 
ability to generalise from our results, but it does, given our limited resources, 
enable us to examine differences and similarities in response to changes in funding 
method from two universities with very different characteristics. If they do respond 
in similar ways to funding changes, such evidence would shed light on our research 
question concerning the central role of funding in determining university behaviour. 
Questionnaire Design 
The questionnaire consisted of closed questions with a number of open questions. 
The closed questions were highly selected to reduce the time needed to complete the 
questionnaires. It is well established that there is an inverse relationship between 
length of questionnaires, time needed to complete them and response rate. In 
addition, we knew that we were going to interview a number of people in the 
institutions selected and this would give us a further opportunity to explore any 
additional questions generated by our analysis of the questionnaires. The responses 
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to the questionnaire could be described by statistical techniques supplemented by the 
qualitative analysis of the open question. Furthermore, the responses to our 
questionnaire could be compared to the responses of senior staff we interviewed. 
A copy of the questionnaire is provided in Appendix 3 so we will confine our 
discussion here to a general description and the rationale for its structure. The 
questionnaire is divided into three sections. The first concerns the characteristics of 
the respondent: age, sex , year of appointment, seniority and department/cost 
centre. The reasoning for obtaining this information was so we could see if the 
findings were in any way systematically related to the individual characteristics of 
our sample. For example, it may be that the perceptions of changes to teaching and 
research differed between the humanities, social sciences, engineering and science. 
Such differences could be investigated in our statistical analysis. 
The second set of questions concerned staff perceptions of changes, if any, to their 
research. Thus staff were asked about changes to time spent on research, changes 
in quality and type of research and constraints on research activity. Each closed 
question was then followed by an open question in which the respondent is asked to 
give the reasons for the changes. The answer to the closed questions will enable us 
to discover what changes have taken place. The open question will give some 
indication of whether these changes have taken place in response to either internal 
management change, teaching or administrative changes or external forces, the 
RAE, or both. 
The third set of questions were designed to elicit similar information, with respect to 
changes to teaching. We asked staff about changes to their teaching load, how it is 
distributed between different teaching levels and method, how the quality of 
teaching has changed. We also asked staff about their perceptions of changes in the 
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support services at their university and changes, if any, in the quality of student 
intake. 
We offered confidentiality in order to facilitate responses. One consequence of this 
guarantee was that we could not follow up non respondents and that as a 
consequence we were unable to check the extent to which our sample may have 
been biased. However, we have checked the bias with respect to the distribution of 
staff in institutions. 
The distribution and collection of questionnaires was discussed with senior 
management at both institutions and in both cases they agreed the same method. In 
both institutions the internal mail system was used for distribution and collection. 
Respondents were asked to return their questions to a central point from which the 
researcher could collect them. 
Sample of Academic Staff 
Two questions arise with respect to the sample of staff to be given questionnaires: 
how they are to be selected and the number. 
We wished to discover, among our other objectives, whether staff perceptions of 
change were influenced by status, gender, discipline, type of institution. The fact 
that we needed to have cells large enough for useful statistical testing and to ensure 
that our sample included staff from all areas of work and of all levels, required a 
sample in excess of 100. Since this was to be a postal questionnaire and responses 
to such questionnaires could be as low as 30 percent, we decided that we needed a 
sample of one in three in one university and one in two staff from the samller 
university in our case study. 
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Sample of Staff to be Interviewed 
As the interview schedule makes clear the staff to be interviewed needed to be 
familiar both with institutional policy and with the reasons for it. This meant that 
we needed senior staff who were involved in the institutional decision making 
process. Thus we included in our sample of interviewees pro-vice chancellors or 
their equivalent. We also required staff who were familiar with the effects of policy 
at the departmental level. We therefore chose to include in our sample heads of 
departments which covered the major areas of university work. We chose to 
interview at least one head of department from each of the following: science, 
engineering, the humanities and the social sciences. We recognise that there may be 
significant differences within these categories for example physics may not be 
affected in the same way as chemistry. One of the biases which may enter the 
sample is that in order to obviate so far as possible any glaring biases we took 
advice from senior management as to which heads of department were in the best 
position to give us the best overall view of the effects of policy and would also 
know of any significant differences in the effects, if any, on other university 
departments. We did not have any other alternative for selecting strategic staff. 
Interview of Senior Staff 
The interviews were designed to provide us with two sets of data: first, whether 
our research hypothesis of the central importance of funding changes in determining 
policies with respect to such matters internal allocation procedures, staffing was 
supported; second, to obtain further insights into the reasons for the responses 
given by the staff in our questionnaire and to note any differences between these 
staff and the sample of senior strategic staff. The most appropriate way to garner 
this sort of data is through a semi-structured interview. This type of interview 
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facilitates responses to questions that the researcher wants specifically answered and 
in addition it enables respondents to elaborate as much as they deem appropriate. In 
doing so they may raise other issues that they consider pertinent. The structure of 
the questionnaire was as follows: the first set of questions were concerned with 
exploring the general changes that have occurred to the department/institution and 
the cause of these changes; the second set of questions was concerned more 
specifically with the impact of the internal allocation procedures on departmental 
activity, including policies designed to ensure a high rank in the forthcoming RAE; 
the third set of questions was concerned with view of our research design and the 
results from our questionnaire which were made available to the strategic senior 
staff. A copy of the questionnaire is provided in Appendix 4. 
Institutional Statistics and Documents 
We were interested in changes to teaching, research and institutional management 
structure and organisation that had taken place since the change in funding method 
in 1986. We were guided in our selection of institutional documents by the senior 
management. Unfortunately, though not perhaps surprisingly, we were denied 
access to minutes of the decision making committees as they were deemed to be 
confidential. In the event the documents made available did not provide insights 
into policy that were not provided in the interviews. 
Published Statistics and Other Sources 
The CVCP/Funding Council publications on university management and 
performance provide useful background information. They were used in advance 
of our meetings with staff at the universities in our sample. The results of the RAEs 
were also consulted so that we knew the rankings of the departments/cost centres 
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whose heads we interviewed and also to provide a general picture of the institution 
itself. For further background information about the institutions we also made use 
of the USR/Higher Education Statistical Agency databases. Because of the nature 
of the study we did not use other published statistics as they might not relate to the 
questions motivating this research. 
Issues Arising in the Methodology 
Choice of Interviewees 
We have already mentioned the possible bias in our sample of interviewees because 
of their selection in consultation with our senior management contact at the 
institution. However, as we pointed out we did ask and get representatives from 
the major areas of work at the institutions. We could not have interviewed more 
staff because of the limited resources at our disposal. (As it was the arrangements 
and interviews at each of the institutions took more than three weeks). A further 
potential source of bias was the fact that a number in our sample had dual roles as 
members of senior management committees and as heads or ex-heads of 
departments. We were interested in their views from both perspectives and any 
possible conflict of interest between the roles. In the event we asked those to whom 
this problem may apply to elaborate where conflict may arise and in the interviews 
themselves we highlighted those questions where we thought there may be a 
conflict to discover whether this was the case or not. 
Bias in Interviews 
Apart from the possible source of bias mentioned above two others may arise. 
First, there is the fact that some of those interviewed may have also filled in the 
questionnaire and their perceptions of the effects on teaching and research of 
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funding changes may have been influenced in the process. The fact that most of the 
interviews took place more than 18 months after the questionnaires had been 
returned certainly reduces the potential for this source of bias. In addition the 
questionnaires themselves do not mention funding changes; it is the respondent who 
might mention it as a possible cause of their changed behaviour. A second source 
of bias may stem from the biased reporting of the interview by the researcher. The 
dangers of this would have been reduced had the interviews been taped, but this 
proposal had been rejected in the interests of encouraging the free expression of 
views. Certainly some of those interviewed did express the view that some of what 
they said should be treated as 'off the record' or be unattributable. Certainly, the 
quotes and the interviews themselves indicate that staff appeared to be uninhibited in 
the expression of their concerns. A written record, as full as possible, was made at 
the interview. This, however, does not preclude the possibility of bias. 
A possible further source of bias might arise in connection with choice of 
interviewees in that they were from senior management, at least having the rank of 
professor. This contrasted with our sample of respondents to our questionnaire, 
where for University A 72 per cent were non-professors and for University B the 
percentage was even higher at 83 percent. One reason for the choice of senior 
academic interviewees was to understand the influences on policy as well as the 
policies themselves. This could only be provided by senior management in the 
universities. Whereas it is true that other insights could have been given by other 
staff they would not have been in a position to provide the answers to many of our 
specific concerns, for example, about changes to staff recruitment and retention 
policy. The open ended questions in the questionnaire did enable staff to provide 
their perceptions of factors that had influenced them individually and to a lesser 
extent their institutions. 
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Range and Number of Questions 
In both the structured interview and the postal questionnaire we restricted the 
number of questions asked of staff for reasons given earlier in this chapter. There 
were of course many other questions that we could have asked. 
Design of Questions 
Two issues require explanation here: the use of 1986 as the base year in the 
questionnaire and use of 'more to less' categories for the answers. The year 1986 
was chosen as this was the year when explicit formula funding of universities was 
introduced. However, it may well not be associated with that by respondents. 
Indeed, it is quite likely that the people that would be most aware of the funding 
change was management and senior staff and that junior staff may only have been 
affected at the margin initially. The importance of the research exercise only 
becoming manifest to junior staff later as internal allocation procedures changed and 
staff were put under pressure to publish and teach more. However, whether staff 
were aware of the significance of 1986 is not really the issue. What is, their 
perceptions of change, if any, from that year. To choose a later year may have 
resulted in the results being influenced by other factors. The importance of other 
factors is explored in our interviews. 
The use of 'more/less' categories in the answers means that we do not know the 
base from which the answers are made and this limits the inferences that we can 
make from the data. In particular it limits the potential for comparing institutions 
and individuals within institutions. Thus, in an institution which focuses more on 
teaching than research, doing 'more research' carries a different significance than it 
would in an institution that focuses on research. Clearly, the reverse applies to the 
research focused institution. Nor, using a relative response category do we know 
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how much more is 'more' or how much is less'. This may well vary from 
individual to individual and, indeed, from question to question for an individual. 
However, although these points are valid they do not undermine the value of our 
research which, as we have stated earlier, is concerned with the direction of change 
in response to funding changes and not the amount of change. This is not to say its 
value would not have been enhanced if we had been able to obtain data on both the 
direction and the amount of change for each individual. To do this would have 
required extensive interviews with more than 250 staff and this was beyond the 
resources available to us. Alternatively, we could have added further questions to 
the questionnaire which we did not want to for the reasons already stated. The 
researcher's own institutional experience of such requests for self-evaluation has 
left him less than sanguine about their reliability. Staff are, however, likely to have 
a reliable sense of the direction of change rather than the amount of change. 
Use of Case/Small Scale Study 
We have already mentioned in the introduction to this chapter the reasons for using 
a case study approach and problems attendant on such an approach. In a discussion 
of this issue Stake (1994) states that 'case study is defined by interest in individual 
cases, not by method of inquiry used' (p236). Thus, if we accept this definition, 
case studies can in principle, be explored through differing forms of qualitative and 
quantitative enquiry or, indeed, via combinations of both. However, this may not 
be seen by all commentators as adequate, since the method used may be viewed as 
being central to the inferences that may be made from the data with respect to the 
case being examined. Indeed, as Stake would have it 'the concept of case remains 
subject to debate, and the term study is ambiguous'. It is perhaps for this reason 
that he proceeds to say 
"advocates calling the product a "case record," and occasionally we do, but 
the practice of calling the final report a "case study" is widely established. 
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Custom is not so strong that researchers ( other than graduate students) will 
get into trouble by calling anything they please a case study". (p237). 
A central issue is what can be learned from a case study or case studies or to put it 
more directively what is the purpose of the case study? Stake identifies three types 
of case study: intrinsic case studies where the purpose is a 'better understanding of 
this particular case' p237; the instrumental case study in which the aim is 'to 
provide insight into an issue or theory' and the choice of case is of secondary 
interest 
"it plays a supportive role, facilitating our understanding of something else. 
The case is often looked at in depth, its contexts scrutinised, its ordinary 
activities detailed, but because this helps us pursue the external interest. The 
case may be seen as typical of other cases or not. (I will discuss the small 
importance of typicality later.) The choice of case is made because it is 
expected to advance our understanding of that other interest". 
and; the perhaps inappropriately entitled collective case study 
"It is not the study of a collective but instrumental study extended to several 
cases. Individual cases in the collection may or may not be known in 
advance to manifest the common characteristic. They may be similar or 
dissimilar, redundancy and variety each having voice. They are chosen 
because it is believed that understanding them will lead to better 
understanding, perhaps better theorising, about a still larger collection of 
cases". 
Because authors seldom fit neatly into three categories Stak describes them as 
'heuristic rather than functional'. Indeed he shows these categories to be inadequate 
when he proceeds to describe other categories as well. His purpose is 
"My purpose in categorisation here is more limited: To emphasise variation 
in the concern for and methodological orientation to the case". 
As is apparent from Stake's overview the justification for a case study can be made 
on a number of grounds, serve many purposes and employ varying methods. We 
have earlier justified our method of investigation, but it may be worthwhile to set 
them in the context of the points made above, Our 'case' concerns the effect on 
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universities of the changed funding method introduced in the mid-eighties. Our 
inquiry was constrained by limited resources and we therefore decided on a detailed 
study of two universities (also 'cases' in Stake's terminology). There is an intrinsic 
interest in the individual institutions themselves, but there is also for us the more 
fundamental research question of whether they have been affected similarly by the 
change in funding method, whether this is consistent with any theories or models 
that have been developed, and what the implications our results may have for policy 
making. The design of the data collection method, incorporating both quantitative 
and qualitative methods, is such as to give us the information that is necessary to 
understand the individual institutions response to funding changes, to explain any 
differences in response that we may find and to shed some light on the explanatory 
power of existing 'theories' of institutional behaviour and the efficacy of the 
funding policy with respect to university teaching and research. 
Clearly, our study of two contrasting institutions is no basis for generalisation. 
However, negatively it may throw light on the validity of models purporting to 
predict the responses of institutions to changes in funding and, more positively, it 
may highlight crucial issues for further research. Further, if we do find that 
institutions as diverse as the ones selected do show a, perhaps unpredicted, pattern 
of common response to funding changes this would raise important questions about 
the policy itself. 
We return to some of these issues of possible bias and shortcomings of our research 
in the concluding chapters. 
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Part II: Introduction 
In the previous section of the thesis we have critically reviewed the empirical and 
theoretical work in the field of higher education funding and indeed much of the 
more general work by economists in the area of education. We concluded that 
some of the techniques used appear to be inherently flawed, in particular, the 
education production function. When we examined the models of higher 
education that economists and others have developed we concluded that, although 
they often provided useful insights into the way institutions and actors within the 
institutions may behave, these models were usually more descriptive than 
theoretical and either too general or too ambiguous to generate the stable 
hypotheses. In addition, apart from the Clark/Williams model, they did not focus 
on the question with which we are concerned: how a change from one method of 
funding to another may affect the teaching and research activities within and 
across the university system. Therefore, we decided that we would adopt a 
research strategy in which we would investigate the relationship between the 
method of funding universities and their teaching and research, with the precise 
effects on them to be discovered through the research. The choice of institutions 
and the method of creating the data to answer our questions was described in the 
previous chapter. In this section we present our findings in four chapters. The 
first, Chapter 6, describes the sample of staff selected to fill in our questionnaire 
and presents and comments on the results of the analysis of the questionnaires. 
These results are presented for the two universities in aggregated form. The next 
chapter, Chapter 7, examines the results when the sample is disaggregated so that 
we can investigate differences between departmental type, men and women, 
senior and junior staff, and newer and older appointments with respect to their 
views on changes to research and teaching. The concluding chapter of this section 
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presents the results of our interviews with senior staff at the two universities and 
relates these to our questionnaire results. 
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Chapter 6 : Main Findings 
Introduction 
In the first part of this chapter we describe the characteristics of our sample. In 
the second part we present the analysis of the questionnaires returned from the two 
universities. The results will be presented in the same order as the questions were 
given in the questionnaire and where appropriate we will also present the results 
from the open ended question which followed some of the questions. In many 
cases there were so few response to the open ended questions that analysis of the 
response would be unreliable. In those cases where there were an adequate 
number of responses we have coded them to facilitate presentation. At the end of 
the chapter we summarise the main findings and consider their implications. 
The Results 
Respondents and Their Characteristics 
At both universities a random sample of academic staff was taken. The response 
from University A, was 150 questionnaires of which 145 were valid* (a response 
rate of 53 per cent since 273 were distributed). From University B, 106 
questionnaires were returned of which 104 were valid (a response rate of 57 per 
cent since 182 were distributed). For a postal questionnaire this response rate is 
good (see Kerlinger, B. 1973) and may well reflect the nature of the sample, well 
educated academics who support research endeavours. It may also stem from the 
interest that academics may have in the changes in their academic life over recent 
years. A further possible reason for this high response rate may have been the 
accompanying letter from a senior academic at their university, Pro Vice 
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Composition of Staff in Sample (%) 
Professors Readers Senior 
Lecturers 
Lecturers 
University A 28 (40) 14 (20) 23 (33) 32 (46) 
University B 17 (17) 8 (8) 26 (25) 48 (47) 
Chancellor level, asking for their co-operation in the survey. The universities 
differed little in the gender composition of the samples: in University A, 80 per 
cent are male and in University B, 81 per cent. These percentages are very similar 
to the actual gender mix in the universities. If we turn to the composition as 
defined by status we again find that the mix is similar to that shown in the 
previous chapter. The composition of the sample from the two universities is 
given in Table 1 below. As Appendix 5 shows this distribution is similar to the 
actual distribution of staff in the two universities. 
Table 1 
Figures in parenthesis are number of responses. 
There is a statistically significant difference in the composition of staff between 
the two universities with the high ranking University (A) having substantially 
more professors and readers than University B, and proportionately less junior 
staff (p=0.02). This difference in part reflects the policy in University A, the elite 
university, of promoting promising staff and encouraging less 'effective' staff to 
leave. It may also be that University A has more funds to support promotion than 
is available in University B and that it has more funds because of its success, 
relative to University B, in all the RAEs to date. It can afford to keep and attract 
better researchers because of these additional sources of funds and so the cycle of 
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haves and have nots within the university system is to some extent self-
perpetuating. 
Three further characteristics of our sample refer to: the type of contract of staff, 
the year of their appointment to the university and their age. We are interested in 
investigating all three because we wish to know whether the sample of staff from 
the two universities differ since if they are different it may account for any 
differences we find between the universities. We are also interested to discover 
whether there are differences within the groups. For example, it is possible that 
younger and more recently appointed staff may not perceive as much change to 
university life as older staff who have witnessed more change merely because they 
have been in the university system longer. Our samples showed that University A 
had a somewhat more permanent full-time staff, 92 per cent as compared to 85 per 
cent in University B, and rather less temporary full-time staff, four per cent as 
opposed to nine per cent in university B. These differences are probably too small 
to be considered significant, although our interviews of staff at University B 
suggest that there may be a growing academic underclass in non-elite institutions 
(see chapter 8). The pattern of appointments was also similar in the universities 
and is presented in Table 2 below: 
Table 2 
Pattern of Appomttnent to UniVersity (70 
Within last 5 years Within last 10 
years 
Within last 20 
years 
University A 33 (39) 50 (59) 73 (86) 
University B 35 (32) 51 (47) 69 (64) 
Figures in parenthesis are numbers. 
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Under 30 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+ 
University A 1 (2) 23 (32) 36 (50) 34 (49) 6 (8) 
University B 5 (5) 24 (23) 29 (28) 36 (33) 6 (6) 
1)istribution of Sta 
One further possible factor that could affect our results is the age distribution of 
staff in the universities. The age distribution is given in Table 3 below: 
Table 3 
The pattern of age distribution is broadly similar between the universities. For 
both there appears to be a dearth of young blood even though, as shown in Table 
2, a large percentage of staff have joined these universities comparatively recently. 
As the interviews will show this dearth of young staff stems, in part, from a 
pattern of recruitment in which only applicants who have a proven track record in 
research are considered for academic positions. ( see chapter 8) 
This description of the sample from the two universities shows a remarkable 
degree of similarity with respect to all characteristics except the balance between 
senior and junior staff, where University A, the elite institution, has a higher 
percentage of professors and readers and a lower percentage of lecturers. 
Research 
With the exception of the ratio of junior to senior staff as we show above there is 
considerable similarities between the staff composition of the two universities in 
our sample. Given these similarities and the fact that both universities are funded 
through the same mechanism it is of interest to investigate whether the change to 
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research activity, if any, is also similar. The questionnaire was designed to help 
answer this question by eliciting staff views on changes since 1986, or their 
appointment if later, in the time that they spent on research, in the type of research 
they undertake, on changes in the quality of research in their field. We consider 
each in turn. 
Time Spent on Research 
In University A, 82 per cent of staff claimed that the amount of time they spent on 
research had changed. Of these 25 per cent said that they spent more time and 75 
per cent said that they were now spending less time on research. This means that 
of the total staff in our sample 61 percent considered the amount of time that they 
spent on research to have fallen as opposed to only 20 percent who considered 
their time spent on research to have risen. In University B, 78 percent said that 
the time they spent on research has changed. Of these, 26 per cent said that they 
now spent more time on research and 74 per cent said that they were now 
spending less time. For the total sample this means that 59 percent see themselves 
as spending less time on research and 21 percent as spending more time. Details 
of the changes perceived in the two universities are given in Table 4 below in 
percentages (with numbers of staff in parenthesis): 
Table 4 
Much 
More 
More Same Less Much 
Less 
University A 7 (10) 13 (19) 19 (27) 37 (54) 24 (35) 
University B 8 (8) 13 (14) 22 (23) 33 (34) 24 (25) 
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These results are similar for both universities. This is remarkable given the 
differences between the two universities in terms of their backgrounds, history and 
research record. University A it should be recalled has been ranked very high in 
all the research selectivity exercises to date and has a stated policy of pursuing 
research excellence; yet 61 percent of staff say they are spending less time on 
research. University B, in contrast has been ranked amongst the lowest in all the 
RAEs to date and yet its staff seem, marginally, to be experiencing less reduction 
in the time spent on research. As we shall argue later this does not mean that staff 
in University A are spending less time on research than staff in University B since 
these are not statements about actual time spent on research, but about changes to 
time spent on research. Nevertheless it is still a response that is somewhat 
surprising and perhaps not one intended by policy makers. 
To investigate further the responses to the question on time spent on research we 
separated our sample according to the rank of the respondent to see whether there 
were differences between ranks within and between the two universities. The 
results are given in Table 5 below. 
Table 5 
••• 
Time Spent  on 	 esearc 	 by Position 	 eld ( 
Position University Much 
More 
More Same Less Much 
Less 
Professors A 17 (5) 17 (5) 10 (3) 3 (1) 53 (16) 
B 12 (2) 0 (0) 18 (3) 24 (4) 47 (8) 
Readers A 15 (3) 5 (1) 25 (5) 45 (9) 10 (2) 
B 0 (0) 13 (1) 38 (3) 13 (1) 38 (3) 
Senior A 6 (2) 18 (6) 18 (6) 27 (9) 33 (10) 
Lecturers B 4 (1) 16 (4) 20 (5) 32 (8) 25 (7) 
Lecturers A 0 (0) 13 (6) 21 (10) 50 (23) 15 (7) 
B 11 (5) 19 (9) 21 (10) 36 (17) 13 (6) 
N.B. Because of rounding rows may not add up to 100% 
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The most obvious point to emerge from Table 5 is that the great majority of staff 
in both universities perceived themselves as doing less research then (1993) than 
in 1986, or since their appointment. Even so, in University A, 34 percent of 
professors and 20 per cent of readers perceived themselves as spending more time 
on research. In University B only three of the 25 professors and readers in our 
sample considered that they were spending more time on research. What is 
perhaps the most striking feature of the table is the percentage of professors that 
are perceiving themselves as spending 'much less' time on research, 53 percent 
and 47 percent respectively for University A and University B. The position of 
senior lecturers is similar between the universities, with around 60 per cent of 
senior lecturers perceiving themselves as doing less research. The response from 
lecturers in University B was somewhat different from their senior colleagues and 
from University A, with 30 per cent of lecturers (14 in all) perceiving themselves 
as spending more time on research. Surprisingly, at University A, 65 per cent of 
lecturers indicate that they are spending less time on research. This result for the 
elite university is the more surprising because, as we shall explore later, it does 
not appear to result from the fact that they are new appointments fresh from 
doctoral or post-doctoral research. 
Respondents were also asked in an open-ended question to give the reasons for the 
change in the time that they spent on research. It will come as no surprise to those 
familiar with university life in the last few years that the two major reasons given 
by staff for the decline in time spent on research were the demands made on staff 
by an increased teaching load and increased administration and management 
responsibilities (see Table 6 below). 
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Reasons for Decline in Time Spent on Researc 
Table 6 
Teaching Load Admin/ 
Manager 
QA RAE Other 
University A 
(n = 155) 
32 (50) 44 (68) 9 (14) 7 (11) 8 (12) 
University B 40 (43) 47 (52) 4 (4) 1 (1) 8 (11) 
(n = 111) 
QA = Quality Assessment RAE = Research Assessment Exercise. 
Typical of the written responses included comments such as "Bloody admin and 
writing applications for grants" and "Pressure of other activities: increased 
teaching load; more monitoring of activities; greater difficulty of acquiring 
research funds". Where there had been an increase in time spent on research 
nearly 40 per cent of those responding stated it was because they were working 
longer hours or receiving assistance with their teaching duties. In the interviews 
with senior staff (chapter 8) further similar evidence is provided to explain why 
most staff have less time to do research, but for some there has been a deliberate 
effort from departments to reduce their teaching load so that they can do more 
research. 
Type of Research 
The Government has in recent years promoted the idea that research carried out at 
universities should be more related to the immediate needs of the economy. The 
Advisory Body to the Research Councils has also supported the idea that 
university research should become more applied than in the past. If this is indeed 
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Government policy then one desired effect on universities of funding changes 
should be that staff are doing less basic and more applied research. Our 
questionnaire asked a number of questions about staff research, the two most 
pertinent to Government policy are: (i) has there been a change in the type of 
research undertaken by staff and (ii) if there has been a change, to what? We 
employed the research categories used by the ESRC: basic, strategic and applied 
and added a further category, personal research (See Appendix 3 for research 
definitions). 
Thirty one percent of the staff at University A indicated that there had been a 
change in the type of research undertaken since 1986 or since their appointment. 
Thirty four per cent of the staff at University B indicated that the type of research 
undertaken had changed. Given the relatively short period with which this study 
is concerned, (seven years since 1986) this may be considered a significant 
change. Of interest is the change in the type of research staff undertake and Table 
7 below indicates what these are. 
Table 7 
ange In Typeb 
	 ewarc 
University A University B 
More Basic 8 3 
More Strategic 15 17 
More Applied 33 34 
More Personal 9 14 
Less Basic 17 17 
Less Strategic 3 3 
Less Applied 1 3 
Less Personal 10 9 
N.B. The number of responses for University A was 76 and for University B 54. 
Some staff indicated more than one change. 
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The two most interesting results are for basic and applied research. Basic research 
seems to have been the principal sufferer, with 17 percent of responses from both 
universities indicating a decline only eight and three percent respectively in 
University A and University B claiming an increase. For applied research the 
results are reversed with 35 and 34 percent of responses from University A and 
University B indicating that staff were doing more applied research and 
respectively for the two universities only one and three percent indicating a 
decrease in applied research since 1986. If strategic research is considered as 
being more akin to applied than to basic research then this picture of a switch 
from basic to more applied research is reinforced since in both universities 13 
percent or more responses indicate more strategic research and only three percent 
of responses from both universities suggest a decline. There appears to have been 
a slightly greater change in personal research in University B than University A 
with more staff stating that they are doing more of it than in University A, 14 as 
opposed to 9 percent, and fewer responses that staff are doing less, nine as 
opposed to 12 percent. It is perhaps a little surprising that with the substantial 
increase in teaching and administrative loads staff claim that there has not been a 
significant reduction in the time available for personal research. 
When this analysis is disaggregated and the staff broken down into applied 
science, pure science, humanities and social sciences, it appears that all groups 
have been experienced a similar change, though not to the same degree (see next 
Chapter). As the interviews show (chapter 8) for most humanities staff research is 
either basic or personal and where there is change it is at the margin in certain 
humanities subjects, for example in languages. Although these changes are only 
reported by a little over 30 percent of staff it does appear that there has been a 
significant shift in the same direction in both universities. Indeed, the similarity in 
response is also remarkably close given the differences between the universities 
when responses are aggregated. In University A 67 percent of the responses 
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indicated more research was being undertaken and 33 percent that less was being 
done (since 1986). In University B the respective percentages were 68 and 32 
percent. The fact that more research is claimed by so many staff appears to 
contradict the earlier evidence presented that staff claim that they are spending 
less time on research. One explanation might be that they are using their research 
time more effectively and are able even though taking less time are doing more 
research. Another explanation may be that although staff are doing more of 
certain categories of research than formerly the additional time that they are 
spending on it is actually less than the reduction in time that they used to devote to 
other categories of research. 
There were 40 written responses as to why research activity had changed and 
nearly half of these gave their reasons as the availability or non-availability of 
research money. The general argument was that funders, particularly the research 
councils, were supporting 'wealth creating research and 'near market' research 
with the result that less money was available for basic research. The other major 
factor producing change, cited by 20 percent of respondents, was pressure from 
the RAE to publish quickly. This may be related to the previous point. If 
publication is dependent on research findings and receiving research funds is 
dependent on doing applied research ipso facto more applied research will be 
undertaken. This pressure from research funders and the RAE and its influence on 
type of research output is further explored later (chapter 8). 
Research Quality 
Respondents were asked to comment on whether the quality of research in their 
area in their institute had changed since 1986 or their appointment. At University 
A, 50 percent and at University B, 66 percent said that quality had changed. 
Details are given in Table 8 below: 
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Greatly 
Improved 
Improved 
Somewhat 
Same Declined Declined 
Markedly 
University A 12 (17) 21 (30) 51 (74) 13 (19) 3 (5) 
University B 13 (13) 32 (33) 43 (44) 10 (10) 3 (3) 
Chan e m Quality of Researc 
Table 8 
There is a difference between the universities in the type of change in research 
quality - with 45 per cent of University B's staff, as opposed to 33 per cent in 
University A, perceiving quality to have risen. Only 16 percent of staff in the elite 
university and 13 per cent in University B perceive quality to have fallen. It is 
somewhat surprising that despite the decline in time spent on research so many 
staff in both universities perceive quality to have risen. This result may stem from 
more specialisation by staff, more contract research being undertaken, or simply 
by staff using their time more effectively. 
When research quality was perceived to have risen the overwhelmingly important 
reason given in the open ended question was said to be new, young and 
enthusiastically hard working staff, cited by 45 and 38 percent in University A and 
B respectively. A typical quote is the following: 'Because staff (many appointed 
recently) have all put in incredible amounts of their own time'. These staff, 
particularly in University A, are also the staff who are bearing the bulk of the 
teaching burden. Where quality was perceived to have fallen the blame was 
squarely placed on lack of time and the frantic pressure imposed on staff to 
publish quickly - 45 per cent in both universities. 'More pressure to produce has 
led to publication for publication's sake', publish irrespective of the quality of the 
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publication and the research on which it is based, are typical statements reflecting 
this view. The interviews with senior staff give some support to this assertion. 
The response to questions concerning research indicate that staff are now spending 
less time on research than formerly: that within research there has been a shift 
from basic to applied research, and that concurrent with these changes research 
quality has risen, but less so in University A than University B. The interviews 
with senior staff that we report in chapter 8 may provide further insights into these 
changes. 
Teaching 
Our questionnaire asked staff whether the amount of time that they spend on 
tutorials, seminars and lectures had changed since 1986 or their appointment if 
later; whether there had been a change in categories of students taught; whether 
the quality of students had changed; and whether support services for students, 
such as library facilities, had changed. Before we consider each in turn, we should 
note that although we did not provide definition of tutorials, seminars and lectures 
none of the 250 respondents said that they had any problem in answering our 
questions concerning them. 
Tutorials 
In University A 72 percent of staff said that there had been a change in the time 
that they spent on tutorials. For University B there was a similar response, 75 
percent. When asked how the time had changed we found the following: 
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How Time::on Tutorials bad 
Table 9 
Much 
More 
More Same Less Much 
Less 
University A 20 (29) 33 (48) 28 (41) 12 (17) 6 (9) 
University B 26 (27) 33 (34) 24 (24) 11 (11) 6 (6) 
The pattern of change is broadly similar with significantly more time being spent 
on tutorials, 53 and 59 percent respectively for University A and University B. At 
both universities less than 20 percent considered that they were spending less time 
on tutorials. 
From the open ended questions we learned that the reasons for the increase in 
tutorial time were as any person familiar with the recent changes to higher 
education in England would expect: 59 and 47 percent of staff in University A and 
B gave the reason for the increase in time on tutorials as the increase in student 
numbers, coupled with a reduction in staff numbers. In some cases, as the 
following quotes capture, the increased need for tutorials was also associated with 
weaker students: "Increasing student numbers with weaker students who need 
more support". The question of students' quality is addressed later in this chapter 
and in chapter 8. In both there is support for the claim that students' academic 
ability on entry to the university may have declined. 
Seminars 
The pattern of change in time spent on seminars was less marked for the 
universities than the change in time spent on tutorials with 45 percent of staff in 
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University A and 40 per cent in University B reporting it had changed. Where 
there had been change it was in the direction of more time being spent on 
seminars, 35 and 20 per cent respectively for University A and University B. The 
details are given in Table 10 below. 
Table 10 
Much 
More 
More Same Less Much 
Less 
University A 9 (13) 26 (37) 56 (81) 8 (11) 1 (2) 
University B 9 (9) 11 (11) 71 (73) 7 (7) 4 (4) 
Figures in parenthesis are number of responses 
Of the 49 and 32 responses to the open-ended question respectively from 
University A and B, over 50 percent of the responses were, not surprisingly, that 
the increase in time spent on seminars was due to the increase in student numbers. 
Lectures 
Again, the picture for both universities was of more time being spent on teaching. 
For staff at University A 65 percent considered that there had been a change in the 
time that they spent on lectures since 1986 and for University B the percentage 
was 75. The direction of change was also similar for the universities with 49 per 
cent stating that they were spending more time on lectures in University A and 57 
per cent in University B. The detailed picture is given in Table 11 below: 
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Table 11 
Much 
More 
More Same Less Much 
Less 
University A 14 (20) 35 (51) 36 (52) 12 (17) 3 (4) 
University B 18 (19) 39 (40) 29 (30) _ 9 (9) 6 (6) 
Again, it will come as no surprise to learn that the increase in time spent on 
lectures was explained in terms of increased student numbers and reduction in 
staff, 43 and 46 per sent respectively for University A and B, and increases in the 
numbers of lectures and/or course revision, 31 and 40 percent respectively. One 
quote encapsulates the perception: "Reduction in staff numbers. Increases in 
student numbers. Increases in courses taught". 
If we judge the teaching responsibilities of staff by the amount of time spent on 
them the picture presented by these results for tutorials, seminars and lectures is of 
a substantial increase for most staff. The reasons for this increase and its effect on 
other activities such as research are considered later. The increase in teaching 
load affected all levels of courses, undergraduate, masters and research degrees 
and the pattern was similar in both universities. 
Changes in Courses Taught 
The pattern of increase in teaching tells us nothing about the courses that students 
are attending. To discover whether there had been changes to these we divided 
teaching into five categories: undergraduate, PGCE, Diploma, MA/MSc and 
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ChMigg$in :ogqrwAm Courses 
Undergraduates MA / MSc MPhil / PhD 
S I D S I D S I D 
University A 6 86 8 27 70 3 28 68 3 
University B 14 78 8 39 56 6 39 54 8 
research and asked respondents to state whether there had been an increase, 
decrease or no change in these categories of work. Table 12 gives the results. 
Table 12 
S = Same; I = Increase; and D = Decline 
Numbers in the cells for PGCE and Diploma were so small that we have not 
included them. 
The pattern of results is of almost universal increase in all categories of teaching 
for both universities. This probably comes as no surprise to university teachers, 
but if such a large percentage is claiming that they are doing more teaching and 
across all types of courses there may have been an effect on the quality of teaching 
provision, and on the quality and quantity of their other activities, such as research 
or administration. These effects were explored in the interviews and there does 
appear to be some concern that the quality of teaching and the quantity, though 
not quality of research may have suffered. We have already commented above on 
the questionnaire responses with respect to research we also asked in the 
questionnaire about changes in the quality of teaching. 
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Change Quality 'of ;eaci mg 
Much 
Higher 
Higher Same Lower Much 
Lower 
University A 8 (11) 37 (53) 35 (50) 19 (28) 1 (2) 
University B 5 (5) 39 (40) 39 (41) 16 (17) 1 (1) 
Quality of Teaching 
In both universities over 67 per cent of respondents thought that there had been a 
change in the quality of teaching. When asked how the quality of teaching in their 
field had changed we received the following response: 
Table 13 
Over 40 per cent of respondents in both universities considered that the quality of 
teaching had risen, 45 per cent and 44 percent respectively for University A and 
University B, whereas less than 20 percent in both universities thought that 
teaching quality had fallen. The issue of teaching quality is further examined later 
in an open-ended question as to why quality had changed. There appear to be a 
number of reasons why staff consider quality to have risen as Table 14 below 
shows. 
Table 14 
caching uality Rise ( esponses 
Staff 
Enthusiasm 
More 
Effort/ 
Experience 
Quality 
Assessment 
Exercise 
New 
Teaching 
Methods 
Oth. 
University A 
(n = 74) 
20 (15) 22 (16) 32 (24) 14 (10) 12 (9) 
University B 
(n = 63) 
21 (13) 25 (16) 29 (18) 14 (9) 11 (7) 
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Much 
Higher 
Higher Same Lower Much 
Lower 
University A 
% (n) 
0 (0) 12 (17) 52 (76) 34 (49) 1 (2) 
University B 0 (0) 4 (4) 67 (70) 28 (29) 1 (1) 
% (n) 
Again the pattern is similar between the two universities. Two quotes indicate 
what has been occurring. "We have put enormous efforts into the improvement of 
our courses. They are now better organised, better structured, ...." and 
"Retirement of older staff and replacement by younger, more highly motivated 
staff". Similar reasons for the increase in teaching quality were given in the 
interviews with senior staff. However, a number of the senior staff, particularly at 
University B were concerned that quality of teaching was increasingly likely to 
suffer because the resources available per student, and to academic staff, were not 
keeping pace with the increase in student numbers. 
Quality of Students 
We asked staff if the quality of student intake had risen or fallen and the following 
responses were given (see Table 15 below): 
Table 15 
Again, the differences between the universities are not very great and the direction 
of change is common to both universities in that where there was change in 
quality it was perceived to have fallen since 1986. The majority of staff, however, 
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School 
Teaching 
`A' Level 
GCSE 
"worse" 
More 
means 
worse 
Recruitment 
need 
Other 
University A 
(n = 70) 
44 (31) 16 (11) 11 (8) 9 (6) 20 (14) 
University B 19 (9) 13 (6) 25 (12) 28 (13) 15 (7) 
(n = 47)) 
considered there had been no change, 52 and 67 percent for University A and 
University B. 
Interestingly, one possible reason for the perceived improvement in teaching may 
be that it has become necessary because of a decline in the "quality" of student 
intake. The main reasons for the decline in the "quality" of students are given in 
Table 16 below. 
Table 16 
An interesting difference between the universities emerges with the "elite" 
university staff seeing the decline in quality as principally the fault of the school 
system, teaching or exam quality, whereas University B staff explain it much 
more in terms of having to recruit more students (for funding reasons) and that 
widening the net means taking people with more diverse and lower level 
qualifications. One quote illustrates the point "Increased numbers = lower entry 
standards". The elite university though also taking in more students appears to 
have found it easier to maintain entry standards. 
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Support Services 
Teaching and research are dependent on the support services available, 
particularly with respect to library support. We therefore asked for respondents 
perceptions of these services. At University A, 73 percent of respondents reported 
that there had been a change in such services and for University B, 84 percent 
considered there had been a change. When asked to describe these changes 90 
percent of staff said that they had declined, though 20 percent also stated that 
information systems available for students, computer support in libraries 
essentially, had increased. 
Staff in both universities perceive themselves as spending more time on all types 
of teaching than prior to the funding changes introduced in 1986. Despite their 
perception of a decline in the quality of the student intake and in the support 
services of the universities the majority of staff considered the quality of teaching 
to have risen. 
The responses as to how support services had changed provided a mixed picture. 
In University A and B respectively library facilities were perceived as having 
worsened by 73 and 66 per cent. A typical response was "library resources are 
under simultaneous pressure of larger student numbers and expenditure savings". 
Opinion was divided among respondents from both universities as to the effects 
on pastoral care with a small majority, under 10 percent, perceiving it to have 
fallen. At both universities computer support was said to have risen. This picture 
of a general decline in support was reinforced in the interviews with senior staff 
with concern being expressed about libraries, equipment and support staff. 
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Discussion of Questionnaire Results 
Main Findings 
(i) 	 Research Time 
Apart from the result for lecturers at university B the overall perception of staff is 
that they are spending significantly less time on research than formerly. One 
particular point of interest concerns the change in time spent on research by junior 
staff in university A. In the late 1980s University A had a policy of appointing 
staff who were expected to undertake research and gain promotion and if 
unsuccessful in this enterprise they were encouraged to seek more appropriate 
employment elsewhere. Junior staff at University A, then, were appointed to 
make a contribution to research. Our findings show that it is this particular group 
who indicate that they are doing less research and more teaching. It is possible 
that the research burden in universities is being borne by more contract staff and 
fewer, but more hard-working, non-contract academic staff. The finding that 
research time appears to have declined contrasts sharply with Williams's claim 
that 'It is likely that the new method of funding has increased the time spent on 
research' (Williams 1993:37). It may well be that this effect is also the opposite 
of the intentions of the funding councils. The interviews with senior staff at both 
universities indicated that there was increasing pressure from teaching and 
administration on time available for research but by working longer hours research 
output was being, for the most part, maintained. It is possible that in answering 
the questionnaire some staff were thinking in terms of the relative change in time 
spent on research, teaching and administration, rather than an absolute change in 
time. As we noted above time spent on university activities seems to have 
increased for all staff because of the funding changes. 
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(ii) Research Quality 
The overwhelming majority of staff who considered that the quality of research 
had changed perceived it to have risen, although they are spending less time on 
research. It is a matter of considerable interest that in University A, a centre of 
research excellence, nearly one-third of staff felt that research quality had fallen. 
Issues of objective measures of 'quality' do not arise in this instance, since we are 
interested in is people's perception of change in quality. 
(iii) Research Type 
Our results, with respect to changes in the type of research, raise a number of 
issues. The response to funding changes could be no response (the funding 
method is neutral as to its effect on the type of research staff undertake), growth 
inhibited in one research type or a switch of research type. If we consider the 31% 
(44) of University 'A' and the 34% (35) of University 'B' who responded that 
there has been a change in the type of research that they do: in both universities 
there appears to have been a relative shift from basic to applied research. What is 
of interest is that in the elite University A only seven staff out of 145 indicate that 
they are doing more basic research (five indicate that they are doing less) whereas 
29 say they are doing more applied research (only one is doing less). Is this an 
illustration of the inhibiting function of the change in funding policy? And if so, 
what are the consequences for the role of this university? 
These results do not relate to all university staff, but to those academic staff who 
are funded centrally. To illustrate this point, there has, in University A, been an 
increase in contract research staff and all types of research income since 1986. 
The point is that there appears to have been a shift in the allocation of research 
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activities between different categories of university staff as well as some shift in 
the type of research undertaken. 
(iv) Teaching Time 
We do not know from the questionnaire whether this is caused by changes in 
student numbers, type of student, changes in methods of teaching or course design 
(modularization of courses and greater assessment via course work involves more 
time). Promotion and incentive payments or other policy changes in the 
universities might also have encouraged academics to devote more time to 
teaching. Interviews with senior staff and data from the universities shed some 
light on these questions. Although there had been some changes in methods of 
teaching and modularization of courses and changes in the type of student, the 
overwhelmingly important reason was said to be the increase in student numbers. 
We do have direct evidence with respect to student: staff ratios and these show 
that for all categories of student, undergraduate and postgraduate, student: staff 
ratios have risen. Table 14 presents undergraduate: staff ratios for selected years 
and shows the increase to be 25% for University A and a massive 70% for 
University B. 
(v) Teaching Quality 
More time spent on teaching should, ceteris paribus, mean that the quality of 
teaching has risen. (If incentives are also provided for good teaching the pressure 
on staff to improve quality is increased). However, as staff: student ratios have 
fallen (table 17) 
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UndergraduateStaff Ratios 
1986-87 1990-91 1992-93 
University A 7.7 8.3 9.6 
University B 9.1 12.1 15.5 
1986-87 1990-91 1992-93 
University A 55.4 (10.9) 58.8 (11.4) 62.3 (12.6) 
University B 43.9 (9.7) 50.5 (11.7) 52.2 (9.8) 
Table 17 
Source: UGC/UFC (1986-93) and internal documents. 
teaching might suffer with less time available per student. Despite the perception 
of some staff in both institutions that the quality of students had declined in the 
period under examination, the percentage of graduates emerging with a first or 
upper second class honours degree, one measure of quality of student, does not 
appear to support this. Table 18 gives the figures for selected years, with those in 
parentheses giving the percentage of firsts. 
Table 18 
Source: UGC/UFC (1986-93) and internal documents. 
These results, if they suggest anything, indicate an increase in teaching 
effectiveness since the unit of resource, whether measured by student: staff ratios 
or finance, has fallen. However, this conclusion rests on the assumption that the 
quality of degrees has not changed over time. Work at Oxford Brooks University 
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Factor 1986-87 1990-91 1992-93 
University A 
Per FIE student 218 274 328 
Per 1-1E staff 2050 2770 3270 
University B 
Per FTE Student 209 272 252 
Per HE Staff 2250 3340 3490 
As % of General 3.3 3.3 3.4 
Expenditure - A 
As % of General 4.2 4.2 3.7 
Expenditure - B 
suggests that for some subjects in certain institutions this may not be a valid 
assumption (see for example Gibbs, Jenkins (1992)). The fact that the HEFCE 
itself has recently launched an inquiry into teaching standards and the quality of 
degrees indicates its concern that standards may be falling. Certainly our 
interviews with senior staff indicate that some are concerned that degree 
standards are under threat. 
(vi) 	 Support Services 
The perceptions of staff that these have declined is, to some extent, reinforced by 
the data provided in University Performance Statistics - the spending per FTE 
staff and per student as given in table 19. 
Table 19 
Source: CVCP/UGC and UFC (1987, 1990, 1992) 
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Although in money terms there has been no significant fall in spending, in real 
terms there has been some change both because of sterling devaluation and 
publishers' policy of increasing book and journal prices above the rate of 
inflation. However, per capita spending may fall because titles are being more 
carefully selected and library management has improved, resulting in support per 
student actually rising. In fact at both institutions the operation of libraries was 
said to have improved, but in neither case did the lecturers believe this 
compensated for the fall in expenditure on support. This reinforces the perception 
of staff that library support has fallen. 
Summary and Conclusions from Chapter 6 
In 1986 a new university funding method was introduced by the UGC of which 
the major feature was its explicitness as to how university teaching (student 
numbers) and university research were to be rewarded. This method of funding 
universities, now including the new universities, has, with a few minor 
modifications, remained essentially the same since 1986. This chapter has 
examined the effect on research and teaching of these funding changes through a 
questionnaire distributed to a sample of academic staff in two universities, one an 
old multi-faculty university ranked very high in the research selectivity exercise 
and the other a former CAT, ranked low in the research selectivity exercise. A 
crucial issue is the extent to which the university responses are related to changes 
in funding method. There is nothing in the questionnaire which directly relates to 
funding changes except the date 1986. However, interviews with senior staff in 
both universities indicated unambiguously that resource allocation and internal 
allocation procedures had been developed to reflect changes in funding methods. 
The relation between changes in method of funding and staff responses is 
mediated by managerial changes within universities. 
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Our principal finding was that despite the differences in the history and research 
rankings of the two universities their response to the funding changes is 
remarkably similar. That is, most staff perceive themselves as spending less time 
on research than prior to 1986. (This is true for readers and professors as well as 
for other staff). There appears to have been a relative shift away from basic 
research to applied research, for all groups of staff and cost centres. Where the 
quality of research is perceived as having changed, it is thought to have improved. 
The results for teaching are perhaps less surprising. Most staff, again including 
readers and professors, are spending more time on all levels and types of teaching, 
though the effect is greater for junior staff. This indicates that time available for 
research and publishing is falling. Staff perceive the quality of teaching to have 
risen, even though they perceive the quality of student intake to have fallen. Staff 
also perceived a decline in student support services, particularly of library support. 
From these results a number of points arise that should be of interest to the 
HEFCE and its paymaster, the Government. The first, not necessarily obvious to 
policy makers, is that changes in funding method do affect teaching and research, 
and the balance between them. Whether the funding council wished it or not, 
there appears to have been some trade-off between teaching and research, with 
teaching gaining; within research itself there appears to have been a trade-off 
between basic and applied research with applied research emerging as the winner. 
It is very possible that government policy with respect to Research Councils and 
funding methods contributes to produce a multiplier effect. Changes in funding 
methods, together with Research Council policy, may encourage applied research 
at the expense of basic research. 
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Although the effect on different categories of staff is not precisely the same, the 
pattern is that there has been a decline in time spent on research and an increase in 
teaching time - a pattern as obvious for the supposed leaders of research in 
universities, professors and readers, as for other staff. If the UK wishes to 
maintain or indeed enhance its position in the world of fundamental and applied 
research it is by no means clear that its funding policy is encouraging the 
necessary focusing of effort by the acknowledged leaders of research. Perhaps an 
even less benign effect is that the two institutions, starting from totally different 
positions historically and with respect to their research rank, end up by reacting in 
very similar ways. Indeed, although readers and professors in university B are 
doing less research than in university A, it appears that their lecturers are actually 
doing more than in university A. This may be no surprise to those who argue that 
funding formulae tend to push institutions in the same direction, but it may be an 
unwanted result if the Government and the HEFCE are interested in developing an 
elite set of universities, specialising in research and higher levels of teaching, with 
the rest specialising in lower levels of teaching and doing only small amounts of 
research. A possible conflict of equity and efficiency emerges here: if we have 
scarce research resources, to achieve the best results perhaps we should allocate 
them to those institutions already well endowed with human and physical capital 
and with a proven track record in research. This policy, though possibly 
enhancing efficiency, may be inequitable in that it gives to the 'haves' and 
consigns the 'have nots' to the position from which they cannot rise, because they 
are starved of resources. 
Our case study of these two universities suggest that undifferentiated policies 
applied to highly differentiated institutions may well bring homogenizing 
consequences to the detriment of other policy objectives. Perhaps our research 
brings out this contradiction between government funding intentions and 
outcomes in higher education. In order to examine further these conclusions we 
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decided to disaggregate the sample of staff in the two universities to see if the 
aggregated results presented were disguising subtler changes within the 
universities. These results are presented in the next chapter. To investigate 
further the meaning of our results we also interviewed a number of senior staff at 
each of the two universities. The results of these interviews are presented in 
chapter 8. 
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Chapter 7: Teaching and Research: Similarities 
and Differences by Gender, Year of Appointment, 
Rank and Department 
Introduction 
We have earlier described university staffs perception of changes to their research 
and teaching activities since 1986 and we have also compared the experiences of 
the universities. The picture described was based on the aggregation of all staff in 
the universities, but it may be the case that different groups within the university 
have been affected differently. We therefore carried out further analysis, dividing 
the sample into the following subgroups: gender, year of appointment, rank and 
department. The reason for investigating these sub-groups are given below. 
Gender 
There may be gender differences in the perceptions of changes to research and 
teaching. To discover if this is the case we analysed the answer to each question 
according to the sex of the respondent. Where differences are found we attempt to 
explain how these may arise. 
(Such differences may also be correlated with subject taught and rank.) 
Year of Appointment 
There may also be differences between those staff who have been at the 
universities longer and those who were more recently appointed. One possible 
reason for differences here is that the more recent appointments entered the 
universities after many of the changes to funding had already begun to take effect 
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and therefore they may not perceive the same changes, or certainly not to the same 
degree, as earlier appointments. 
Rank 
There may be differences associated with the rank staff hold in the university. 
One possible difference may arise because senior staff have been able to 
concentrate their energies and time on research whilst junior staff have been left 
with the burden of an increased teaching load. 
Departments 
There may be systematic difference between staff teaching different subjects. For 
example, across the country there has been a larger change in the numbers of 
students studying Arts subjects than there has been in Science or Engineering. 
This may mean that staff in the Humanities, and for that matter also in the Social 
Sciences, have different perceptions from staff in engineering and sciences of how 
their teaching and research responsibilities have changed. 
In order to examine whether there were differences across these subgroups, cross 
tabulations and the Pearson Test of significance was used. Where results are 
significant at the 0.05 level the associated tables are provided in Appendix 6. 
The first set of analysis presented here examines differences and similarities in the 
subgroups' perception of the changes in teaching. This analysis is undertaken for 
each university first and then differences between the universities are discussed. 
The same procedure is then followed for research, support services and the quality 
of students. A concluding section examines differences between the two 
universities. 
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In examining the differences we have followed the structure of the questionnaire, 
we first consider whether the perceptions of there being change is similar within 
each of the sub-groups. We then examine whether the direction of change within 
each sub-group is similar. To illustrate the reason for this form of analysis 
consider the following situation. Within the departmental sub-group all staff who 
perceive that there has been change may perceive it as being in the same direction. 
For example, all staff responding to the question on changes in perception of time 
spent on seminars may view it has having increased. However, although the 
perception of the direction of change is similar there may be significant 
differences in the proportion of staff within departments who perceive such 
change to have occurred. In this case there may be a difference between 
departments; Applied and Pure Science staff appeared to have experienced less 
change to the time spent on seminars than Humanities and Social Science staff. 
Such differences are not captured in the aggregated data presented in our earlier 
analysis, but are important and require comment as they suggest that the funding 
changes, which we argue are the major cause of change, may not affect all 
university staff in the same way. 
Teaching: Similarities and Differences Within Universities 
University A 
1. 	 Time Spent on Tutorials 
Perception of change: This was analysed by gender, year of appointment year, 
rank and department. There was no significant difference found within the 
subgroups in the perception of change to the time spent on tutorials. Most staff in 
all groups perceived there to have been a change in time spent on tutorials. 
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Direction of change: Although the perception of all groups was that time spent 
on tutorials had risen, there were differences within some of the sub-groups in 
their perceptions of the extent to which it had changed. We will consider each of 
the sub-groups in turn. Within the gender group no significant differences were 
observed. This may be surprising to those who think that women may be 
discriminated against with respect to research opportunities and promotion, both 
resulting in women receiving an increased teaching load, which would include an 
additional tutorial load. (However, it may still be that their teaching has increased 
with respect to seminars and lectures, rather than tutorials and this was 
investigated later). The results for year of appointment did not quite reach 
significance (p=0.07). This indicates that although newly appointed staff perceive 
the changes to their tutorial load to have increased slightly more than their 
colleagues, it is not sufficiently different to be significant. When the same 
analysis was carried out for the sub-group defined according to rank the results 
were similar to those for year of appointment in that they did not quite reach 
significance at the five percent level (p=0.07). There does appear to have been an 
increase in time spent on tutorials and it is borne more by the senior lecturers and 
lecturers and, to a lesser extent by readers, than by professors. Thus although 
there does appear to be some differences in perception of change they are only 
significant at the 0.07 level. Within the departmental group there is a very 
significant difference in the perception of the degree to which time spent on 
tutorials has changed (P=0.001) Staff in the Humanities and Pure Sciences 
perceive greater increases in the time that they spend on tutorials than staff in the 
Applied Sciences and, to a lesser extent, the Social Sciences. 
2. 	 Time Spent on Seminars 
Perception of change: There was no significant difference within subgroups, 
although for the departmental sub-group the test was nearly significant at 0.051. 
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Applied and Pure Science appeared to have experienced less change than 
Humanities and Social Science. This may be explained by the greater 
proportionate increase in student numbers in Humanities and Social Sciences. 
Direction of change: No significant differences were found for any of the sub-
groups. The perception of all groups was that time spent on seminars had risen. 
These findings indicate that females do not appear to be asked to do more teaching 
than their male colleagues; that irrespective of rank or years in the University the 
teaching burden, at least for seminar teaching, is shared equally; and that the 
difference noted for tutorial teaching in the Applied Sciences are not being 
compensated for by any increase in seminars when compared to other 
departments. 
3. 	 Time Spent on Lectures 
Perception of change: No significant differences were found for any of the 
subgroups. For all groups there was a perception that time spent on lecturing had 
changed. Thus for all categories of teaching, tutorials, seminars and lectures there 
appears to be no significant differences across sub-groups. 
Direction of change: With the exception of the departmental subgroup no 
significant differences were found in the direction of change in time spent on 
lectures - it had risen. However, significantly more staff in the Pure Sciences, 
and to a lesser extent the Humanities and Applied Sciences, than in the Social 
Sciences, perceived it to have risen 'much more' (p= 0.00002). Another 
difference between departments was that proportionately more staff in the 
Humanities and Applied Sciences considered the time spent on lecturing to have 
fallen, respectively 32 percent and 20 percent. This finding for Humanities is 
slightly at odds with the comments reported earlier that University A has 
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expanded student numbers in those areas where there is 'spare' capacity (although 
the lecturers may not agree with this) and a surplus demand for places, i.e. in 
Humanities and Social Science. One possible explanation is that the lectures are 
given to larger groups of students than previously and that the burden of lecturing 
is not being spread across staff as it had been, so reducing the burden of lecturing 
for some staff. 
4. Change in Teaching, by Level of Course 
If we turn to the questions concerning the respondents' perceptions of change in 
the amount of undergraduate, masters and research students' work, the pattern 
across the groups and within the groups is broadly similar with all groups 
perceiving work in all areas to have risen. One comment, and again it relates to 
the differences between Humanities and Sciences, and to a lesser extent Social 
Science, is that research student work in the Humanities does not appear to have 
increased as much as in the Science. 
5. Change in Quality of Teaching 
Perception of change: There were no significant differences within or between 
groups as to whether the quality of teaching had changed. In all cases more than 
55% of respondents perceived there to have been a change in the quality of 
teaching. This means that some 45% did not perceive there to have been a 
change. 
Direction of change: Apart from the department subgroup there were no 
significant differences in the direction in which teaching quality had moved - it 
had risen. In each group at least 60% attested to this. In contrast, within the 
departmental sub-group there was a significant difference (p = 0.002). Within 
Humanities, Pure Science and Applied Sciences over 60% claimed quality had 
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improved. In Social Sciences 60% claimed quality had fallen. It is not clear why 
social scientists' perceptions should be different as the figures for change in 
enrolments are no higher than, for example, those in humanities subjects. 
Comments on Results for Teaching in University A 
Our results for the sub-groups indicate that the changes to funding are affecting all 
groups similarly. That is, in general, the changes do not appear to discriminate 
systematically in favour or against the sub-groups we examined. There are 
however some differences, both between and within sub-groups, that do require 
comment. We consider the differences revealed in our results in turn. 
Tutorials 
Two differences emerged within the groups. The first concerned the direction of 
change within the sub-groups defined according to year of appointment and rank. 
As we suggest later these may be treated together as they are correlated. The 
reason for the differences, both very close to significance, may well arise from the 
fact that although all staff are experiencing an increase in the amount of tutorial 
work required of them, the more junior staff, in terms of years at the institution 
and rank, are being required or feel obliged to spend proportionately more time on 
tutorials. It may also be the case that although all staff are expected to contribute 
to the RAE the 'high fliers' in terms of research contribution, readers and 
professors, are being given more time in which to make their contributions. It is 
also possible, and this may be at odds with the previous point, that professors are 
becoming so involved in administration that they have less time available for 
teaching (and research). 
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The differences at departmental level are more readily explained. There has been 
a greater increase in the numbers of Humanities and Social Science students than 
of Science students and if, as is claimed in the interviews with senior staff 
(chapter 8), the quality of students for all groups has fallen, there will be a greater 
need for additional tutorial support in the Humanities and Social Sciences 
compared to other groups unless standards are to be allowed to fall. 
The reason for these changes in perception of time spent on seminars may be 
similar to that for tutorials: that is, that the need for seminars has risen more in 
those departments where student numbers have increased most - Humanities and 
Social Sciences. 
The findings for lecturing are a little at odds with the above comments. We might 
have expected that the time spent on lecturing would have risen more within the 
Social Science and Humanities departmental groups for the same reasons that they 
have for tutorials and seminars. In fact, the greatest perception of increase is 
within the Pure Science group and, as we noted, more staff in the Humanities and 
Applied Science perceive a fall in the amount of time that they spend on lectures. 
It is possible that within the Pure Science group that lecturing is being substituted 
for tutorial and seminar support. This, our evidence suggests, is not the case for 
Applied Science since the responses indicate no greater change in tutorial and 
seminar support within this group, if anything rather the reverse for tutorials. 
Within the Humanities group there may have been a change in the method of 
teaching, a change which may include giving lectures to much larger groups than 
formerly. Unfortunately, we can only speculate about the changes to the methods 
of teaching employed across the sub-groups because we did not specifically 
address this question in our questionnaires or the interviews with senior staff. 
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The pattern of changes to teaching by level of course indicates an increase for all 
groups. This is explained by the overall increase in student recruitment reported 
in chapter 6 and 8. The one noticeable difference was that Humanities staff 
perceived less change than other staff in the numbers of research students. This 
may be accounted for by the fact that it is more difficult for students in 
Humanities to obtain external financial support than in other faculties. Another 
possible explanation, which may be complementary to the previous one, is that 
Humanities staff are so overwhelmed with the increase in undergraduate and 
masters students that they have less time to take on more research students. 
Teaching: Similarities and Differences Within Universities 
University B 
The same procedure will be followed as for University A in that we will present 
the responses to the questions relating to teaching load and the quality of teaching 
to discover whether they differ within the sub-groups. The sub-groups are gender, 
year of appointment, rank and department. 
1. 	 Time Spent on Tutorials by Sub-Group 
Perception of change: There were no significant differences in the gender sub-
group. When classified according to year of appointment the Pearson test was 
significant (p =0.039). Oddly, the more recent appointments perceived more of a 
change than their colleagues, 88 percent as opposed to 69 percent. For the sub-
group defined by rank there was no significant difference. Although not 
significant there was a difference in that more of the junior staff, senior lecturers 
and lecturers perceived there to have been a change in time spent on tutorials. 
Respectively, for professors, readers, senior lecturers and lecturers the percentages 
perceiving change were 63, 33, 80 and 81. The departmental subgroup also 
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revealed significant changes ( p=0.028). It appeared that Humanities and Social 
Science staff perceived there to have been much more change than the Science 
staff. 
Direction of change: There were no significant differences within any of the 
subgroups. All sub-groups perceived time spent on tutorials to have increased by 
60 percent or more. 
2. Time Spent on Seminars 
Perception of change: There were no significant differences between males and 
females or between professors, readers senior lecturers and lecturers in their 
perception of change in time spent on seminars. However, there was a significant 
difference between departments (p= 0.005) Within the departmental subgroup 
more Social Scientists considered there to have been change than staff in other 
departments. There was also a significant difference by year of appointment 
(p=0.006). 56 percent of new appointments as opposed to 24 percent of older 
appointments considered there to have been change. 
Direction of change: There were no significant differences within any of the 
subgroups as to the direction of change. The majority of those who perceived 
there to have been a change thought that the number of seminars they taught had 
risen. 
3. Time Spent on Lectures 
Perception of change: For all subgroups there was a perception that time spent 
on lectures had changed. Although not quite significant (p=0.057) it appeared that 
more of the recently appointed staff perceived there to have been a change, 84 
and 64 percent respectively for newer and older appointments. 
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Direction of change: There was a significant difference between males and 
females (p=0.024). 84 percent of men considered themselves to be doing either 
more or much more lecturing. By contrast 54 percent of women thought that they 
were doing more lecturing. There was no significant difference between newer 
and more recent appointments. Indeed, the pattern of response was almost 
identical with more than 75 percent saying that they were doing more lecturing. 
However, as we showed above, a greater percentage of newer appointments are 
perceiving there to have been a change in the time that they spend on lectures. 
There was no significant difference within the subgroup defined by rank. All in 
the group considered that their lecturing load had increased. However, although 
not statistically significant a higher proportion of lecturers and senior lecturers 
than professors perceived their lecturing load to have risen, respectively 86, 80 
and 55 percent. (Only two readers responded and both said that their load had 
risen). Within the departmental sub-group there were also no significant 
differences: in all departments more than 80 percent perceived lecturing load to 
have risen. 
4. 	 Change by Type of Student 
All subgroups perceived that teaching at undergraduate, masters and research 
level had either risen or remained the same in approximately equal proportions. 
There was only one subgroup in which a significant difference emerged and that 
was for change in teaching research students within the year of appointment 
grouping ( p=0.027). 60 percent of older appointments as contrasted with 15 
percent of more recent appointments considered their work in this area to have 
increased. 
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5. 	 Quality of Teaching. 
Perception of change: Apart from the gender subgroup there were no significant 
differences in perception of changes to the quality of teaching. For the gender 
group there was a significant difference (p=0.03) with proportionately more 
women stating that quality had changed. 
Direction of change: The quality of teaching was considered to have risen by 
both men and women. Although more women than men perceived quality to have 
changed there was no significant difference in the direction of change. There 
were no significant differences found for either the of the rank or departmental 
sub-groups. For the year of appointment sub-group although the Pearson test was 
not significant at the five percent level it was very close (p=0.051). Both new and 
old appointments viewed the quality change to be generally positive. However, 
one third of new appointments perceived quality to have fallen, whereas only 10 
percent of older appointments considered it to have fallen. 
Commentary on Results 
Tutorials 
There were significant differences for three of the subgroups, rank, year of 
appointment and department. We will treat each in turn. Senior staff perceive 
there to be less change than junior staff; Readers reported there to have been no 
change. One explanation for this is that senior staff, though perceiving changes 
to have occurred, are not being required to do as much of the additional teaching 
as the junior staff. The notion that junior staff are being required to do 
proportionately more teaching is supported by the perceived changes when 
analysed by year of appointment. More recent appointments will generally be 
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junior staff and it is not surprising that they also have experienced a greater 
change than their older colleagues. What is noteworthy is that this group has only 
been appointed in the seven years since the funding change and yet are very 
clearly experiencing what appears to be a fairly dramatic change in the 
requirements of their job. 
The fact that Humanities and Social Science staff, as in University A appear to 
have experienced a greater change in their tutorial work is probably explained by 
the fact that they have had proportionately greater increases in the number of 
students and that if these students are less able, as our questionnaire results 
suggest they are, they require more of this type of support. These results whilst 
indicating that staff are generally providing more tutorial support than formerly do 
not mean that the tutorial support for each student has increased. 
Seminars 
It is not clear why staff in the Social Sciences should have significantly different 
perceptions of the change in time spent on seminars to other staff in the university. 
No mention was made in the interviews or questionnaire of changes in teaching 
method which could account for the difference, but we could speculate that they 
are putting more effort into lectures and tutorials. The explanation for the 
difference between newer and older appointments is probably the same as that for 
tutorials in that newer appointments will normally hold more junior positions and 
the burden of teaching, though increasing for all staff, is falling more heavily on 
junior staff. (The relationship between position and year of appointment is 
explored in a later section of this chapter). The perception of most staff in all sub-
groups of time spent on seminars increasing is accounted for by the increase in 
the student:staff ratio in University B. 
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Lecturing 
The fact that more recent appointments considered there to have been more 
change than older appointments may be explained as above: they are bearing a 
slightly greater burden of the lecturing than their older and usually more senior 
colleagues. The difference between males and females in the extent to which their 
time on lecturing has increased may be partly explained by the fact that women 
may be spending more time on research than men. Our earlier analysis shows that 
it is not explained by the fact that women are doing more tutorial and seminar 
work than men. We could speculate that in the past men were able to spend more 
time doing research, whilst women did more of the teaching but, with the dramatic 
increase in student numbers the teaching burden had to be shared more equally. 
And, with the advent of the RAE, women had to be given more time to do 
research if they were to be included in the exercise. In the next chapter where we 
report our interviews it is suggested that all staff are encouraged to research and 
publish and are given support to do this. 
There was only one sub-group, year of appointment, within which there was a 
significant difference with respect to changes in perception of the time spent on 
teaching research students. Older appointments were four times more likely than 
more recent appointments to have seen a rise in their work in this area. This result 
is no surprise if, as is likely, more experienced staff are more prepared and 
expected to take on research supervision, are more likely to be asked to do so by 
students and are more likely to hold research grants and contracts into which 
research students can be placed (University B is a technological university and 
this last point is therefore particularly pertinent). It is perhaps surprising that for 
the same reasons a significant difference was not found for the sub-group defined 
by rank. We will examine the relationship between these two groups later. 
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Quality of Teaching 
There was only one sub-group for which there was a significant difference in the 
perception of change in the quality of teaching: more women than men perceived 
the quality to have changed. Both men and women who consider quality to have 
changed perceived it to have risen. Further speculations of reasons for differences 
between the sexes are given in the later discussion. With respect to the direction 
of change in teaching quality, differences of perceptions within the year of 
appointment group were very close to significance. One explanation is that more 
recent appointments have a heavier teaching load and because of this cannot give 
as much time either to preparation or to individual students and this affects their 
views as to teaching quality. Again the issue arises of why this result is not 
similar for the sub-group for rank, an issue we address at the end of the chapter. 
Research: Similarities and Differences Within Universities 
We will follow the same procedure as for teaching. That is we will first consider 
University A and then University B. Each of the answers to the research 
questions will be presented in turn, with the perception of change being 
considered and then the direction of change. General discussion of the results will 
follow. 
University A 
1. 	 Time Spent on Research. 
Perception of change: For only one subgroup was there any significant 
difference. Within the subgroup defined by year of appointment there was a 
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highly significant difference (p = 0.009). More of the older appointments 
perceived there to have been a change, 63% as opposed to 32%. 
Direction of change: There were no significant differences between males and 
females. Both sexes considered that the amount of time spent on research had 
fallen, although slightly more so for males than females, 26 percent as opposed to 
19 percent, considered that research time had risen. No significant differences 
were found in either the year of appointment or departmental group; for both 
groups over 70 percent saw time spent on research as having fallen. In contrast to 
other sub- groups, that for rank did show a significant difference (p=0.038). 
Although all ranks perceived time spent on research to have declined, over 70 
percent for all ranks, professors and senior lectures now regarded themselves as 
spending much less time on research than previously, respectively 43 percent and 
37 percent, whereas the percentages for lecturers and readers was somewhat 
lower, respectively 19 percent and 17 percent. 
2. 	 Change in Type of Research 
Perception of change: Within two of the subgroups, gender and department there 
were no significant differences. There were significant differences according to 
rank (p=0.047) and according to year of appointment (p=0.05). Within the rank 
sub-group 52 percent of senior lecturers perceived there have to have been change, 
whereas amongst other staff the highest percentage was 28 percent. Within the 
year of appointment group, older appointments perceived far more change than 
more recent appointments, respectively 79 percent and 53 percent. 
Direction of change: There were no significant differences within any of the sub-
groups in their view of the direction of change in the type of research: most staff 
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considered there had been a move in the direction of more applied research. This 
may be a little surprising for Humanities staff. 
3. 	 Quality of Research 
Perception of change: There were no significant differences within any of the 
subgroups. In all subgroups fifty percent perceived change and 50 percent 
perceived no change. 
Direction of change: There were no significant differences in the gender, year of 
appointment or rank sub-groups. The general perception was that the quality of 
research had risen. Although not significant within the rank sub-group, more 
lecturers and, particularly, Readers rather than professors or senior lecturers 
perceived quality to have fallen. Within the departmental subgroup there was a 
significant difference (p=0.006). 90 percent of Social Scientists considered quality 
to have risen, whereas the next highest percentage, for Applied Science was 20 
percent less, at 70 percent. For both Humanities and Pure Science it was a little 
less than 60 percent. 
Comment on Results 
Time on Research 
The year of appointment group was the only sub-group for which there was a 
significant difference in the perception of change, with this perception being 
greater for older than for more recent appointments. One possible explanation for 
this difference is that more recent appointments (post-1986 and many after 1990) 
were entering a university that had already made some changes as a result of the 
changes in the funding method. Yet 70 percent still perceived there to have been 
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change in the time that they spent on research. It is a little surprising that a similar 
finding was not found for the rank sub-group where the result was not significant. 
We explore possible reasons for this later. 
The one significant difference in direction of change in time spent on research was 
within the rank sub-group where senior staff perceived a more dramatic reduction 
in time that they could spend on research than junior staff. The explanation for 
this may be as we suggest above that these staff have witnessed more changes 
merely because they have been in the university longer; our open ended question 
results certainly indicate that their time available for research may have been 
reduced because of their increased administration responsibilities on top of their 
increased teaching load. As with the result above it is a little surprising that a 
similar result was not found for year of appointment since one would envisage 
considerable overlap between the two groups. It is possible that the reason for the 
difference between the two groups is that the rank group is more influenced by 
administration responsibilities and the year of appointment group by the growth in 
teaching responsibilities. Differences between the two groups are explored later. 
Change in Type of Research 
For this question there was a similar perception for the sub-groups defined by year 
of appointment and by rank. Within the rank sub-group the greatest change was 
for senior lecturers. One reason for the difference may lie in the fact that lecturers 
did not need to change the type of research because they were already working in 
the applied areas of research. Readers and professors may not have needed to 
change if they were already established in their fields and did not need change to 
obtain advancement, for they had already achieved it. Senior lecturers, however, 
may have felt more pressure to adapt to the new culture of more applied and 
strategic research in order to improve their prospects of obtaining grants and 
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promotion. If, as proves to be the case, many of the senior lecturers have been in 
University A for more than seven years, a similar explanation will apply to the 
differences found in the year of appointment sub-group. 
Quality of Research 
The only significant difference found was for the departmental sub-group; Social 
Science staff perceived quality to have risen more than other staff. We do not 
have any obvious explanation for this difference. 
Research: Similarities and Differences Within Universities 
University B 
1. Time Spent on Research 
Perception of change: There were no significant differences within any of the 
sub-groups 
Direction of change: There were no significant differences in the sub-groups 
defined according to year of appointment, rank or department, with most staff 
perceiving time spent on research to have fallen. There was however a significant 
difference between males and females perceptions of the direction in which time 
spent on research had altered ((p=0.002). Over 70 percent of women considered 
that they were spending more time on research. Only 20 percent of men shared 
this perception. 
2. Type of Research 
Perception of change: For the subgroups defined by department, year of 
appointment and rank the chi-square tests were insignificant. For the gender sub- 
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group it was close to being significant (p=0.052). More men than women 
perceived there to have been change in type of research. 
Direction of change: There was no significant difference within any of the sub-
groups as to the changes in the type of research: most staff considered that where 
there had been a change it had been towards more applied and strategic research. 
As with University A this also appeared to be the case for Humanities staff. 
3. 	 Quality of Research 
Perception of change: There was very little difference between the subgroups for 
gender, rank and department: the differences within them were not significant and 
65 percent of each sub-group perceived there to have been change. The result for 
the sub-group for year of appointment were almost significant (p=0.056) with the 
newer appointments perceiving there to have been more change than older 
appointments (78 percent as opposed to 57 percent). 
Direction of change: There was no significant difference for gender sub-group, 
both sexes perceived quality to have risen (over 75 percent). There were also no 
significant changes in the other sub-groups, although for the year of appointment 
sub-group the result was almost significant (p=0.052) with more of the new 
appointments perceiving quality to have fallen (30 as opposed to 10 percent) 
Comment on Results 
Time on Research 
There was a significant difference between men and women in their perception of 
the direction of change in time spent on research, with more women considering 
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they were doing more research. This may be related to the point made earlier that 
men are now being required to take on a larger share of the teaching load than 
previously. In addition, proportionately more men are in senior positions so the 
reasons given earlier, the increase in the administrative burden for senior as 
opposed to junior staff, may also help to explain the difference between men and 
women. Further speculations are made in the next section. 
Type of Research 
None of the results was significant with respect to this question. All sub-groups 
perceptions of both change and its direction are similar: respondents generally 
perceived there to have been a shift from basic and personal research towards 
more applied research. 
Quality of Research 
The only results close to significance were those for the appointments sub-group 
with more of the recent appointments perceiving there to have been change and 
more of them perceiving quality to have fallen. These results are almost certainly 
related to each other since if one group is perceiving more change in the direction 
that quality has moved this will be reflected in the overall perception of change. 
Again, it is of interest that the sub-group defined according to rank shows no 
significant difference for either perception of change in research quality or its 
direction. Although we explore the question of whether the groups are from 
statistically similar populations later we could speculate that the group identified 
by rank were appointed when the university was a CAT, or when the CAT culture 
still prevailed, whereas the more recent appointments, irrespective of rank, were 
recruited from universities with more traditional standards of research quality 
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which they perceive to have fallen. This issue is explored at the end of the 
chapter. 
Similarities and Differences Between University A and University 
B 
The first analysis of our data (Chapter 6) considered general differences and 
similarities between the two universities. In this chapter we have examined 
differences within each institution with respect to gender, year of appointment, 
rank and department. Here we shall take the final step and enquire whether 
gender, year of appointment, rank or department play a different role in the two 
institutions with respect to perception of changes in teaching and research. We 
shall examine the differences in the order in which they have been analysed 
earlier, that is gender, year of appointment. 
Gender 
Teaching: There were only two differences between the staff of the universities 
with respect to teaching. The first was with respect to lectures where the men in 
University B significantly differed from the women in that more of them 
considered the amount of time that they spent lecturing to have risen. The second 
difference concerned the quality of teaching where, again in University B, there 
was a significant difference in that more of the female staff considered the quality 
of teaching to have risen. 
Research: The only difference between the universities was that in University B 
there was a significant difference between men and women in their perception of 
the direction of change in the time spent on research. More women considered 
they were spending more time on research. 
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Comment 
The sub-group gender appears to be more important in University B with respect 
to the differences in time spent on lecturing and research. It appears that there 
may be a trade off between them. Women may be able to spend more time on 
research because they are not having to do as much of the increased lecturing as 
their male colleagues. Whether this is deliberate policy of the management in 
University B we were unable to ascertain. It is also possible that women may be 
more research orientated as in order to compete with men they may feel that more 
is expected of them. It is also possible that there is greater selection among 
women than men for academic posts. As to womens' perception of more 
improvement in the quality of teaching. The question called for a general answer 
about the quality of teaching in the institution. Why women thought it had 
improved more than the men may be because their own teaching relative to the 
men's was better prepared and they may have thought (mistakenly) that the same 
change was occurring in the men's teaching (as a consequence of the funding 
changes). Hence the differences in perception between the men and women. 
These cautious speculations are on the basis of differential selectivity of men and 
women for academic posts. This could be the result of both demand side factors 
(institutional selection criteria) and supply side factors (women entering academe 
have special qualities). Our interviews with senior staff did not shed any light on 
these issues. 
Year of Appointment 
Teaching: Differences between the universities were found to be significant 
again within the University B sub-group. Within University B more recent 
appointments perceived more change than older appointments in time spent on 
tutorials and seminars. It was very close to being significant for lectures, too 
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(p=0.057). There was also a significant difference with those appointed longer 
stating that were doing more postgraduate research teaching. 
Research: There were a number of differences between the two universities. 
With respect to changes to the amount of time spent on research and changes to 
the type of research. In University A older appointees perceived more change in 
time spent on research than more recent appointments - they were spending less 
time on research. There were no differences in University B. As to the quality of 
research more recent appointments in University B saw more change than older 
appointments and, again in the same university, more recent appointments 
perceived quality to have fallen. 
Comment 
It appears that there have been changes to teaching in University B which have 
affected more recent appointments more than older appointments. There have, as 
our interviews will reveal, been big changes to teaching in University B with 
semester teaching and modularisation being introduced. There have not been the 
same changes to teaching in University A. 
If we turn to the results for research those for University A could be explained by 
the fact that older appointments were used to having a good deal of time to pursue 
their research interests and that they could pursue the research in areas in which 
they were interested. University B, at least as judged by the RAEs has never been 
strong in research activity and certainly not in the areas highly valued by the 
research panels. However, being an ex-CAT much of its research was applied and 
in the 'wealth creating' arena and therefore the recent emphasis on this type of 
research would not have altered the general orientation of its research in the 
engineering and science areas. The effect on the humanities and social sciences 
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staff, being relatively small within the university, would tend to be dwarfed by the 
results from the rest of the staff in the university. The fact that in University B the 
more recent appointments had different perceptions relative to other 'older' 
appointments as to the change in research quality may be explained by the fact 
that they have come from other universities with different research 'cultures'. By 
this we mean they have different notions as to what counts as good research. In 
University A as compared to University B there was a much stronger orientation 
to 'basic' research and thus the recent emphasis by the Government and research 
councils on 'wealth creating' and applied research would have been more marked 
for older appointments. 
Rank 
Teaching: There were no significant differences between the universities with 
respect to teaching. 
Research: The only significant differences are to be found in University A. Here 
the professors and senior lecturers saw significant changes, reductions, in the time 
that they had available for research. In the same university the senior lecturers 
perceived there to have been more change to the type of research that they 
undertook; relative to other ranks senior lecturers appear to be more involved in 
applied research. 
Comment 
It is no surprise that in this elite type of university, staff would have considered 
that they had less time for research than previously. Professors in the past had far 
less administrative responsibilities and teaching duties. Senior lecturers might 
have expected in the past to have more time for research to further their careers, 
but are now being required to do more teaching than previously. If, and this is 
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speculation, they want to advance their careers through research and publication 
more research money is available in applied areas (see previous chapter) and thus 
this group, whatever its previous research interests were, has to become more 
involved in applied research. 
Departments 
Teaching: In University B the perception of change was greater in the Social 
Sciences and Humanities than in the Applied and Pure Sciences. In University A 
the direction of change was perceived as greater in the Applied Sciences and 
Social Sciences where there had been more of a reduction in the number of 
tutorials. As for lectures, in University A Social Science and Humanities both 
perceived there to be significantly more lecturing than other departmental 
groupings. Also in University A one departmental group, Social Science, saw 
quality to have fallen. 
Research: There was only one difference between the universities and that was 
with respect to research quality where Social Sciences in Unversity A perceived a 
greater rise than other departments. 
Comment 
The changes in perception of tutorial work in University B may well be associated 
with the need for additional support for weaker students now being recruited (see 
Chapters 6 and 8). In University A the direction of change for Social Science may 
be due to the increase in number of students being recruited and one might expect 
a similar result for Humanities. The increase in Applied Science may be for a 
similar reason. The reduction in teaching quality perceived by staff in University 
A may well be related to increased student numbers with no commensurate 
increase in staff and the reduction in the number of tutorials. The greater rise in 
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the quality of research perceived in University A's Social Science departments 
may be explained by a trade off between quality of teaching and investment in 
research activity. It is of interest that in both universities Humanities and Social 
Science staff were more likely to perceive a change in the amount of teaching and 
that in University B both departments saw a greater increase in lectures than other 
departments. 
General Conclusion 
We have now analysed our disaggregated data to find out whether there were any 
significant differences within and between sub-groups in their perceptions of 
changes to teaching and research. We have also compared the responses from the 
two universities in our sample. In order to see the overall pattern of the results 
they are presented in two tables. The first table presents the pattern for teaching 
and the second for research, support services and the quality of students. We have 
already commented on those cases where there was significant difference within 
sub-groups and we have examined those cases in which the response from the 
universities was different . In this concluding section we will briefly comment on 
the overall pattern of the results. 
To take teaching first Table 1 shows that for each sub-group the pattern of 
responses within each of the universities was similar. If we discount those cases 
where the differences were close to significance for University A there are only 
three out of 40 cells where the differences were significant within a sub-group -
7.5 per cent of the cells. For University B there were seven cells where the 
differences within a sub-group were significantly different - 20 per cent of the 
cells. These results indicate that in both institutions the majority of staff share a 
common perceptions of the changes that have taken place within teaching. 
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Gender 
Year of 
Appt 
Rank 
Dept 
Indeed, in University A the only significant differences are to be found within the 
departmental sub-group. However, there is less uniformity of perception of 
change in University B. We have already considered possible reasons for these 
Table: Teaching 
Key: P = Perception of change 	 D = Direction of change 
A = University A 
	 B = University B 
3 = No significant change 	 X = A significant difference 
within sub-group 
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Table: Research 
Key: P = Perception of change 	 D = Direction of change 
A = University A 
	
B = University B 
3 = No significant change 	 X = A significant difference 
within sub-group 
differences and they appear to result from differences between the histories, 
culture, status and finances of University B as compared to University A. If we 
turn to Table 2, which represents the responses with respect to research, support 
services and student quality, and examine each university in turn again we find 
that overall the pattern of responses in the two universities is similar. However, 
although generally similar, the table does reveal some differences: in this case 
there is a greater perception of change within University A than within University 
B. In University A significant differences within sub-groups are found in 15 per 
cent of the cells (6 out of 40), whereas in University B differences are shown in 
only 2.5 per cent of cells (1 out of 40). It would appear from these results for 
research that funding changes are having a greater effect on University A's staff 
than staff in University B. The differences occur with respect to the Year of 
Appointment and Rank sub-groups (5 of the significant difference are within 
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these groups). As we argue earlier we would expect the results for these two 
groups to be related to each other in University A, though not to the same extent 
in University B. Our results confirm this to be the case. 
However, there remains the question of why the research results are so different 
between the two universities. One possible reason is that University B has 
always, given its history and culture, been more concerned with applied research 
than the more traditional University A. Thus the change to research policy by 
Government and research councils, encouraging more generic and wealth creating 
research, to which we allude in Chapter 6 will force changes on University A's 
staff, whilst merely reinforcing existing research activity in University B. These 
changes in research direction will be more obvious to staff who have been in 
University A longer and, as we have shown, these will also usually be in more 
senior posts. Although the correlation between rank and year of appointment is 
not so close in University B it is noteworthy that the only sub-group within which 
there is a significant difference is that defined by year of appointment. We discuss 
the reasons for this difference in the note at the end of this chapter (see Footnote 
1). 
If we turn to the quality of student and support services . There was only one 
significant difference. Most staff perceived there to have been change and the 
change had generally been a decline in student quality. The case for which there 
was a significant difference was in University A where more of the older 
appointments perceived there to have been a change in student quality (p=0.006). 
If there has been change in recent years one would expect older appointments to 
be more aware of any change than more recent appointments who may have been 
at the university for too short a time to have noticed change to the same degree. 
There was a general perception that support services had declined and a 
perception reinforced in the interviews reported in the next chapter. 
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It would appear that the factors affecting university behaviour are pushing 
institutions and their staff in a similar direction. And the major factor that is 
causing this we argue is the funding method. However, although the general 
pattern of response is similar there are some important differences between the 
universities. Funding changes do have an homogenising effect, as our model 
predicts, but differences between the universities prior to these funding changes 
mean that there will be some difference in the degree to which their behaviour is 
changed. Perception of the importance of these differences will depend largely on 
who is evaluating them. The funding agent has changed funding method in order 
to change university behaviour and, perhaps, to alter the shape of the university 
sector. Their views of the desirability of the changes taking place will almost 
certainly have a different perception to that of university managers, university 
staff and, indeed, to researchers. More important, perhaps, is whether the 
differences are only temporary, disappearing in the longer term as all universities 
are forced by the funding changes to follow similar paths, or whether they are 
permanent, with the gap between the elite universities, such as University A, and 
the rest becoming greater as the universities follow different routes to deal with 
the changes to the funding method employed by the funding council. This issue is 
addressed at greater length in our concluding chapter. 
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Footnote to Chapter 7 
One issue that arises in our results is that on a number of occasions there is a 
significant difference between the results for staff categorised by rank and staff 
categorised by year of appointment. Intuitively one might expect the results for 
the two groups to be closely correlated since older appointments might also be 
more senior in rank. We explore this apparent contradiction in our results below. 
Differences between rank and appointment in University A and University B. 
Although the response to most questions are similar for both rank and year of 
appointment there are a number of occasions when the response by rank and year 
of appointment differ significantly. We have noted these in the text. This 
difference is more pronounced for University B. We would expect the results to 
be similar because we would assume that there to be a close relationship between 
year of appointment and promotion: staff who have been in the university longer 
are also more likely to hold senior positions. If, however, there is not a close 
relationship between the two groups then differences in their responses may 
readily occur because we are dealing with separate, but overlapping, populations. 
To discover the relationship between the two group we conducted two tests. In 
the first we tested for correlation between the groups and in the second we carried 
out a chi-square test. For the first test we recoded the year of appointment group 
into five groups, under seven years, the second 8-14 years, the third 15-21 years, 
the fourth 22- 28 years and the fifth 29 years and upwards. We thus had rather 
better interval data for the analysis than under the previous coding scheme in 
which the sample was divided into only two groups. We recognise that the group 
defined according to rank does not provide continuous data that is desirable for 
correlation analysis, but the coding does provide us with discrete variables that 
provide a measure of scale. 
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Results 
University A 
Test 1: The correlation coefficient was - 0. 47 and the level of significance was 
0.001. The correlation is of the expected sign, it is not very high, but it is highly 
significant. These results would suggest that we should expect the responses from 
the two groups to be similar, but not necessarily the same. This is very much the 
picture revealed in our analysis. 
Test 2: The Pearson test of significance revealed the same level of significance as 
Test 1. This does suggest again that we would expect the results to be similar for 
the two groups. Inspection of the table presenting the data shows that only two 
cells are empty and also that a significant number of senior staff, readers and 
professors, have been appointed in the last seven years (nearly 20 percent). (A 
possible reason is head-hunting by the university in preparation for the RAE). 
The hypothesis of a very close relationship between the two groups is not entirely 
supported by these results and thus some variation in response can be expected. 
This is the pattern of responses that we described earlier. 
University B 
Test 1: The correlation coefficient was -0.054 and the level of significance 0.621. 
This result indicates that there is no correlation between the two groups and that 
any differences in the response to questions can be explained by the fact that the 
populations are different. 
Test 2: The Pearson test revealed a significant difference (p=0.03) which 
indicates that there may well be similar responses from the two groups. However, 
inspection of the table of our results, in which there were only three empty cells, 
202 
shows the pattern of relationship between lecturers and year of appointment to be 
remarkably close to that for professors. In 60 percent of the cells the difference 
was less than one percent and the largest difference between cells was only six 
percent. It is therefore not surprising that the responses from the two groups, rank 
and year of appointment, are sometimes significantly different. 
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Chapter 8: The Interviews 
Introduction 
In this chapter we present and discuss the results from our interviews with senior 
management in the two universities in our study. We have already described the 
way in which the sample for interview was selected in Chapter 5. In this chapter 
we begin by describing the characteristics of the sample of staff interviewed and 
then proceed to examine their responses to the questions in our interview 
schedules. In presenting our findings we shall explore differences in response 
between interviewees, between disciplines and between the universities. We shall 
examine the relationship between the responses in the interviews and those from 
our questionnaire which we described in the previous chapter. As stated in our 
chapter on research design both the institutions and staff included in our study 
were guaranteed anonymity. Those staff interviewed were asked whether their 
comments could be quoted. In one case only, an interviewee from University A, 
were asked not to quote one part of an answer. All other staff interviewed agreed 
that we could quote them. 
Characteristics of our Interviewees 
At University A we interviewed eight members of senior management, in the case 
of one interviewee at pro-vice chancellor level. He was the contact at this 
university with whom we discussed our sample requirements and the choice of 
appropriate senior members of relevant committees and departments. We agreed 
and organised details of the sample to whom our questionnaire was to be 
distributed, and who were the best people to interview. Three of the people 
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interviewed were at pro-vice chancellor level and also head of a department. The 
latter were professors in psychology, physics and engineering. Four of the other 
interviewees were professors also heading departments, in languages, history, 
English and physics (a different branch of physics from the pro-vice chancellor). 
We thus achieved a balance across the range of disciplines which we described 
and justified in the chapter presenting the research design. In addition, we 
interviewed a senior administrator responsible for developing and implementing 
the internal resource allocation model at the university. 
At University B we also interviewed seven senior staff and, as with the person 
facilitating our arrangements at University A, our facilitator at University B was 
interviewed on a number of occasions. (Originally we were scheduled to 
interview eight senior staff but due to illness one, an engineer, was unable to 
attend the interview). Of the seven interviewed two were at pro-vice chancellor 
level, one responsible for administration and the other was also the head of an 
engineering department. The remaining five interviewees were all professors and 
heads of departments. The range of disciplines was similar to the sample in 
University A in that they were in the fields of English, languages, sociology, 
sciences and engineering (2). The fact that the balance of subjects is so similar 
will enable us to investigate whether differences exist across subjects as well as 
between institutions. 
Organisation and Length of Interviews 
In the case of University A after agreeing the numbers to be interviewed and the 
range of areas to be covered with our contact, we arranged the time of the 
interviews with the individuals themselves. The interviews took place over a 
period of four weeks, apart from the interview with the administrator which took 
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place some months earlier. The length of the interviews ranged from eighty 
minutes to two hours. In the case of University B, after agreeing the sample with 
our facilitator at the institution, the interviews were arranged by him to take place 
over a three day period. In the event one of the interviews was cancelled because 
of ill health and it was not possible to find a replacement in the time available. 
The cancellation did not bias our results because he was an engineer and we 
already had two engineers in the study. In the interviews with the engineers in our 
sample we were assured that the responses that we would have received in the 
cancelled appointment would not have differed markedly from those they gave. 
The length of the interviews varied from 65 minutes to a little over two hours. In 
all interviews we asked if we could return if necessary to clarify or elaborate any 
points of confusion or detail that might arise in our writing up. In the event there 
was no need to return since the only minor points that arose were answered over 
the telephone. 
In describing and discussing the interviews we will separate the interview with the 
administrators from those with academic staff. The questions asked of the 
administration staff concerned details of the internal allocation procedures and the 
reasons that such arrangements had been introduced. While academics also 
commented on reasons for policy in our interviews with them the focus was more 
on the effect of policy on their departmental activities and on the institution as a 
whole, and whether the policy was institutionally or governmentally determined. 
Interview With Administrators 
The questions asked are given in Appendix 4. 
At University A three people were interviewed who were explicitly concerned 
with institutional policy. They all stated categorically that the way in which 
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resources were allocated was designed to try to maximise the income that the 
university received from the funding council, subject to this not clashing with any 
powerful political or academic interest. One example of such a clash was one 
department, whose work was seen as important to the prestige of the university, 
and which was supported over and above its "rightful" entitlement under the 
internal allocation formula, the Resource Centre Model (RCM). However, this 
type of support was exceptional and the only other occasion on which there was 
deviation from the formula was where a department/cost centre could demonstrate 
that such support would only be temporary. An example of this would be the 
appointing of a professor who, although placing the department temporarily in 
debt, was expected to bring in large research contracts and research students in the 
near future. The university had pursued this policy on a number of occasions. 
With respect to the allocation formula, the RCM, we were told that it had not been 
introduced until three years after the first RAE. But, although it had not been 
introduced earlier, the management of the university had from 1986 been 
allocating resources, including encouraging early retirement and blocking 
recruitment, in accordance with their perceptions of how the funding council's 
formula was operating. Since the new model of allocating resources was 
introduced there have been minor adjustments, principally to 'fine tune' the model 
to ensure that it 'apes' (the administrator's phrase) even more effectively the 
funding council's model. This fine tuning continued as the council's model 
changed and as management understood the model better. 
The intention of University A was to continue with an allocation model based on a 
system of reward and punishment that forces departments and their staff to pursue 
activities with respect to student recruitment, teaching and research that will 
maximise the university's income from the funding council. With respect to the 
university's expectation that funding will be increasingly tied to teaching quality, 
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as well as research quality and student numbers, it recently (1992) established a 
Teaching Committee chaired by a senior vice-provost. This committee is 
concerned to ensure that the university not only satisfies the current needs of the 
quality assurance and audit bodies but also promotes 'good teaching'. Two ways 
in which teaching quality is to be promoted is first through the establishment of a 
Centre for Higher Education Development which was set up to coordinate all 
student support schemes, for example, through providing teaching aids and 
developing electronic support for library users. The second example of how 
teaching quality is to be improved is through the development of teaching 
assessment procedures. Peer observation is to be used. The 'observers' are 
volunteers who have attended an internal course on teacher observation and 
through 'informed interaction between observer and observed' quality will be 
enhanced. All these quality developments have taken place to ensure that the 
university will have no department whose funding is threatened because it is 
deemed 'unsatisfactory' in any teaching quality assessment exercise and because 
of the opportunity, if deemed 'excellent', to receive additional funding to 
disseminate 'good practice' to other institutions. 
In the longer term the university expects teaching quality (TQ) to be more 
systematically linked to funding and when it is the procedures now being set in 
place should guarantee that the university will be highly rated and well funded. 
(One issue that the university might consider is how much the administration of 
this scheme is to cost and how this relates to its benefits, whether measured in 
terms of educational quality or finance (increased grant). The costs are not only 
direct, the monetary costs of setting up these procedures, but also indirect since 
the resources could otherwise have been used to support research and teaching 
had they not been allocated to support teaching audit and assessment. This 
`opportunity cost' was certainly noted by many of the staff in their questionnaire 
responses when they expressed concern at the huge growth of administration, 
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much of it to do with quality assurance and much, in their view, involving the use 
of scarce research time with little benefit to teaching.) 
The situation in University B was somewhat different from that of University A. 
At this university I spoke to two staff who were central to determining and 
implementing internal allocation procedures. They said that the university had 
only introduced an allocation formula explicitly based on the funding council's 
formula in 1992. The slow pace of change was put down to two causes. The first 
was that the university was still, in the mid eighties, adjusting to the massive cuts 
in grant imposed in the 1981 expenditure review by the UGC. Under this exercise 
the institution had experienced a cut of some 30 percent in council income and 
this required restructuring of activities, organisation and staff. This took up most 
of senior management's time into the mid-eighties and beyond. The second cause 
of delay in responding to the changed funding method was changes in top 
management, where the vice chancellor was replaced and concomitant changes in 
the senior management personnel and structure occurred. Some of these changes, 
however, were informed by the perceived need to adjust to the change in funding 
method used by the funding council. In addition to the above causes of delay, 
discussions of mergers with other institutions were initiated in the late eighties and 
culminated in a merger taking place in the nineties. This merger was also in 
response to the perceived vulnerability of the institution to the changes in funding 
and to the increasing competition within the university sector. 
Although an internal allocation formula modelled on the funding council's was 
not introduced until the early nineties staff at University B, particularly 
administrative and senior staff, had been informed at committees and general 
meetings of the two major ways that the institution could increase income from 
the funding council: raising its research rating and/or recruiting more students. 
Staff had been told that they were expected to contribute to both. The university 
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had also taken other action. To improve its research rating, promotions and 
appointments were more specifically related to the proven and potential ability of 
staff to attract research income and to publish. Academics were encouraged to 
move towards research council type research rather than towards industrial based 
contracts which were perceived as of lower value in the research ratings, even 
though the government and council rhetoric was about 'wealth creating' research. 
In the event this switch in emphasis proved largely unsuccessful because both 
staff and the university infrastructure were more relevant to local industry and 
commercial needs. Although no compulsory redundancies were made at 
University B, staff who were seen as not contributing to either research or 
teaching and student recruitment were targeted for voluntary redundancy and early 
retirement. As a result of this policy and the previously reported reaction to the 
cuts in the early eighties, over 40 percent of staff left in the eighties. Where new 
staff were appointed they were usually recruited to different areas from those who 
had left; areas considered to be likely to generate research income and/or student 
recruitment. 
Another policy pursued by University B was to attempt to boost student numbers. 
Student recruitment was promoted by increased marketing efforts by the 
university as a whole and by individual departments. To encourage departments 
to recruit more students the departmental grant was more closely related to student 
numbers than hitherto. (Unfortunately, the staff interviewed were not 
prepared/able to give me documentary evidence of the actual changes). Another 
policy change dictated by the need to improve research rating in the next RAE 
(1996) was a complete restructuring of the research base at the university through 
the introduction of research institutes to which the university allocated the 'active' 
researchers in the university. (In the event this policy appears to have been 
successful in terms of the university's ratings as they were much higher in the 
recent 1996 RAE than in previous RAEs.). 
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Although University B did not introduce an internal allocation model based on 
that of the research council's until the beginning of the nineties we were assured 
in the interviews with the senior administrator and senior staff that internal 
policies towards departmental allocation and staffing had been dominated by 
management's perception of the working of the funding council's allocation 
formula. This view was reinforced, as we showed earlier in chapter 6, in the 
responses staff made to the open-ended questions in our questionnaire and in the 
responses in the interviews reported below. 
Interviews With Senior Academics 
In this section we will examine the views of senior academic staff. We will 
proceed in two stages. In the first we will use the data collected in the interviews 
to see how they relate to the results from the questionnaires given to staff at the 
two universities. The questionnaires showed how research and teaching were 
perceived by staff to have changed. The interviews will reveal whether these 
perceptions are shared by senior staff and will also help to explain the reason for 
the changes described. In the second stage we will address the particular 
questions asked in the interview schedule. This analysis will necessarily overlap 
at some points with the earlier analysis and where this is the case the discussion 
will be brief. In both stages of this section the analysis will also be concerned 
with any differences that there may be between senior staff and, if such 
differences do emerge, discussion of possible reasons will be offered. We will 
consider University A and then University B. Differences /similarities between 
the universities will be commented on at the end of each of the stages. 
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Questionnaire Results 
The questionnaire elicited information from respondents about changes to 
research, teaching, support services and the quality of students. (The 
questionnaire is given in Appendix 3). In the interviews with senior staff we 
asked their perception of changes to the university and their department and what 
were the reasons for these changes. We also asked whether the results from the 
analysis of the questionnaire returns accorded with their own experience. We 
were thus provided with an opportunity to cross check our results and also to gain 
insights into the reasons for the changes that had taken place. We were also able 
to obtain information about subtler changes that had taken place; changes that 
could not be obtained through the questionnaire. We shall discuss the results of 
our interviews in the order in which the questions were asked in the questionnaire 
and we shall consider University A and then University B. 
Research 
The first question about research asked respondents whether the amount of time 
they spent on research had changed. Our questionnaire results for University A 
revealed that most staff considered that they were spending less time on research 
and that where this was the case it was because they had more teaching 
responsibilities and administrative responsibilities. However, none of the 
interviewees stated that there had been either a decline in their own research or in 
that of their staff. Indeed, all emphasised that they were pursuing policies to 
recruit staff active in research and that they were adopting policies that would 
support existing staff in their research endeavours through making more time 
available for them to do research. The policies to support research included 
encouraging staff to take sabbaticals to do research and produce publishable 
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articles, putting pressure on staff to produce publications; 'reducing the teaching 
burden on the best researchers'; and the establishment of teams under group 
leaders to support collaborative research and to assist those whose research record 
is 'weak'. 
All those interviewed commented on the increase in student numbers and the 
increase in the student:staff ratio. All also commented on the huge increase in 
administration. A mixture of reasons was given for the increase in administration, 
but common to all were the following: more students to look after with a decline 
in support staff to help; increase in form filling for the central administration, both 
for research and teaching and for teaching 'quality' exercises; a greater burden of 
completing research applications (with an increased probability of rejection) and 
helping junior staff with their research applications. 
At University B all the senior staff interviewed stated that the time available for 
research had fallen. This is consistent with our questionnaire results in which 57 
percent considered time spent on research to have fallen, with only 21 percent 
perceiving it to have risen. The least dramatic comment on the change in time 
available for research was made by the professor of English who said that the time 
for research was a 'bit squeezed'. The rest all regarded time for research as falling 
as teaching and administration responsibilities rose. 
The second research question concerned changes to the type of research that staff 
were undertaking. The questionnaire results showed that 31 percent of staff in 
University A perceived there to have been a change in the type of research that 
they undertook and where there had been change it had been towards more applied 
research at the expense of basic, and what we have labelled 'personal' research. 
Of the six professors interviewed only one, a humanities professor, said there had 
been no change. All research in his subject, history, was basic. This is not a 
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surprising statement given the nature of historical research, but it was perhaps 
unexpected that both the social scientist and the language professors did perceive 
a shift in the type of research in their fields and, for the social scientist, it was in 
the same direction and for the same reasons as those given by the engineering and 
science professors. The shift they argued was towards applied work in accordance 
with Government and research council promotion and support for 'wealth 
creating' and 'generic' research. 
For the language professor the shift in the type of research undertaken was rather 
more invidious in that he perceived there to have been a change in terms of 
quality. The need to satisfy the requirements of the RAE and the time constraints 
resulting from the increased teaching and administration load had together 
adversely affected the quality of research and publications. The absence of 
adequate time meant that 'the life of the mind' was suffering and there was no 
time to talk to colleagues. As a consequence of both, the quality of thinking and 
writing was adversely affected, he avered. The need to satisfy the requirements of 
the RAE meant that staff were writing 'meta papers' rather than the long and 
thoroughly researched tomes more familiar in the humanities. 'Little papers are 
not appropriate in the Arts' and, more worrying, the work being encouraged is 
`early functionalism rather than well thought through ideas'. These are similar 
comments to some of the views discussed in chapter 4. If these views do indeed 
reflect the changes being forced on the nature of research and publishing in the 
Arts then the policy makers have to decide whether this is desirable or not. If not, 
then consideration would have to be given to designing research assessment 
procedures for the arts that are different from those for the sciences. The fact that 
none of the scientists or social scientists made this point indicates that, although 
they may have reservations about the RAE, they do not see it as distorting and 
damaging research in such a fundamental fashion as in the Arts. 
214 
At University B, 34 percent of questionnaire respondents stated that the type of 
research they undertook had changed since 1986. Of those interviewed, three said 
that the type of research that they undertook had not changed as a result of 
changes to the university funding method, or since 1986. The Modern Languages 
professor, however, did express some concern and for similar reasons to the 
language professor in University A. He stated that the RAE discouraged long 
term projects and that he would not now be prepared to embark on a seven year 
research project as he had six years previously. He also felt that the exercise was 
distorting the way that research was being disseminated: short articles rather than 
books and that this resulted in less fully developed work. Again a similar point to 
some made in chapter 4. The two engineering professors both considered that the 
RAE was affecting the type of research undertaken, though with slight differences 
in emphasis. The first commented on the fact that the more prestigious research 
was seen by RAE panels as research council research and this had the effect of 
moving away from industry-based research for which his university was 
particularly suited. The second professor endorsed this view with the comment 
that although applied research was being encouraged by the funding council there 
was 'inadequate recognition of industry based research'. Clearly both professors 
were pointing to an apparent contradiction in the policy of encouraging 'wealth 
creating' research: applied research was good, but industry based applied research 
was less well regarded by research panels than other forms of applied research. 
The final research question concerned staff perceptions of changes to the quality 
of research. The analysis of the staff questionnaire results for University A 
revealed that only 18 percent of respondents perceived the quality of research to 
have fallen, despite the reduction in time that was available to do research. The 
interviewees were for the most part less sanguine. Their views on the quality of 
research can be divided into the positive, which are principally concerned with 
staff changes, and negative, which are to do with the effect on research of teaching 
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and administrative responsibilities. The staffing change that was said to have led 
to enhancement of quality was that non-productive academics had been 
encouraged to leave through early retirement or voluntary redundancy and they 
were replaced, for the most part, with younger, more enthusiastic research active 
staff. Although the new appointments may have the potential to be more 
productive researchers, with the quality of research at the university consequently 
rising, this may not necessarily occur because 'young staff are under so much 
pressure to secure research grants, to publish, to satisfy the quality assurance 
procedures, to teach increasing numbers of students, that 'scholarship' has 
certainly suffered'. The attitude to 'non-productive' academics is encapsulated in 
quotes such as 'shouldn't reward a dead horse by flogging it' and 'can't rescue 
non-productive researchers'. (This interviewee, a pro-Vice Chancellor and 
engineering professor, did not define 'non-productive', but, as other interviewees 
claim, clearly some were being 'rescued' by the support of team leaders and 
provision of study leave). The justification for encouraging the departure of the 
less productive researchers was the RAE exercise itself- 'through research 
exercise in 1992 we got rid of dead wood'. However, not all staff deemed to be 
research - inactive left the university. 'Weak' staff were sometimes kept on and 
redeployed as 'safety' officers, careers officers or assistants to these posts. In this 
way they could continue to teach, but were not counted as inactive researchers in 
the RAE. By understanding the rules of the RAE such cost centres could include 
in their submissions for the exercise all, or nearly all, of their academic staff in the 
exercise. 
The picture from the questionnaires at University B was that 43 percent thought 
that research quality had risen and only 13 percent that it had fallen. The 
responses from the professors interviewed was more mixed, with the majority of 
professors considering that the quality of research may have fallen, or was in 
imminent danger of doing so. Some of the reasons given for concern about 
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research quality were the same as in University A, with particular emphasis being 
given to the pressure to teach leaving less time available to devote to research with 
deleterious effects on its quality. The one professor (of Sociology) who thought 
that the quality of research had not fallen said it was because 'we're all working 
barmy hours'. He still had some misgivings about the future quality of research 
because of the increased division between teaching and research. This division 
was being encouraged internally at University B by the establishment of research 
centres separate from teaching departments and externally through the RAE, 
which increasingly redistributed research money to a limited number of 
institutions and cost centres. If, as he believed, research and teaching are 
complementary, any separation of the two would adversely affect both. This same 
point was made by two other professors who also added that as a result of the 
planned merger with a tertiary college which did very little research, this 
distinction between staff doing research and teaching would be reinforced to the 
detriment of both. The merger itself was taking place so that the university was 
more secure financially. It would appear that funding, though this time it was as 
much to with the quantity as with the method of funding, was the factor 
determining university behaviour. 
At the same time as expressing concern about the influences that were seen as 
detrimental to research comment was also made about countervailing pressures 
that were seen as raising research quality. For example, the establishment of 
research centres, in order to improve rating in the RAE, was said to enhance 
research because it would now be 'more focused' and the centres provided a 
`critical mass' that was not previously available in many departments. 
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Teaching 
In this section we will discuss what interviewees said about teaching, support 
services and the quality of students. 
The first question on teaching asked respondents about the time that they spent on 
it. At University A the questionnaires revealed that most staff perceived time 
spent on teaching to have risen or, at best, to have remained the same. The 
percentage of staff perceiving time spent on tutorials, seminars and lectures to 
have risen were respectively 53 percent, 35 percent and 49 percent. The 
percentage perceiving a fall were respectively 18 percent, nine percent and 15 
percent. All the senior staff interviewed stated that all types of teaching had 
increased in recent years. The main reason given for this was the increase in 
student numbers which, coupled with little or no increase in staff numbers, had 
resulted in a decline in the staff:student ratio. The increase in student numbers 
meant staff had to spend more time preparing, marking and then delivering 
through tutorials, seminars and lectures. The other main reason for the increased 
teaching load, mentioned by three of those interviewed, was the greater need for 
remedial teaching (and this from an elite university!). It was also claimed that 
many of the students now being recruited did not have the same academic skills as 
formerly and in consequence required additional tutorial support 'more small 
group teaching for remedial students'. One interviewee, an engineer, stated that 
an increase in the duration of the engineering course from three to four years was 
partly in response to the need to provide less qualified students with additional 
teaching support. Interestingly, neither of the humanities professors seemed as 
concerned about the quality of students, perhaps because demand for their courses 
was more buoyant and they could still select high calibre A level students. 
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All of the staff interviewed at University B stated that their teaching load had 
increased for all types and levels of teaching. This is similar to the questionnaire 
returns which showed that for tutorials, seminars and lectures 59, 18 and 57 
percent respectively thought that there had been an increase. The respective 
figures for a decline were 17, 11 and 15 percent. The principal reasons given for 
the increase were the same as University A: a large increase in student numbers 
without any increase in staffing. In absolute terms the greatest increase in student 
numbers was said to be at undergraduate level, with staff claiming that it had gone 
up four or even fivefold since 1986. 
The next question on teaching concerned staff perceptions of changes in the 
quality of teaching. Despite the decline in staff:student ratios our questionnaire 
revealed that 45 percent of staff in University A thought that the quality of 
teaching had risen, whereas only 20 percent considered that it had fallen. Three of 
the interviewees commented on the quality of teaching. The first, an engineer, 
thought that quality may have suffered because of the difficulties created by 
having much greater teaching loads than previously, although staff 'were making 
heroic efforts to prevent this (decline in standards)'. The second, a scientist, 
merely commented that although assessment mechanisms had been introduced 
and appeared to indicate a rise in quality, they were really 'too coarse a measure' 
to indicate anything about quality. His own view was that the quality of some 
courses may have been adversely affected by the large increase in student 
numbers. Another interviewee, from the humanities, commented on quality 
within a more general university context: 'everybody feels more political and 
harder pressed and unable to deliver the same quality of support' (to colleagues 
and students). 
The views above contrast with those expressed by the fifth interviewee (from 
science) who stated that the procedures developed to improve quality had 
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definitely had a positive effect. (His view may not be entirely impartial as this 
professor was responsible for teaching quality at the university!). Measures taken 
to enhance teaching quality included: setting up activities to support the 
development of communication skills, using 'observers' to assess teachers and 
then through 'informed interaction between observer and observed' to promote 
good practice (though he did concede that the time available to do this was very 
limited), the establishment of a Teaching Committee in every department and the 
development of student questionnaires to assess teaching. Other interviewees 
stated that they never analysed the student questionnaires, 'no time', and 
`consigned them to the bin' and that the Teaching Committees were merely 
window dressing that diverted attention from research and meaningful interactions 
between staff. On the basis of these divergent views one can only conclude that 
the picture concerning quality is unclear, as is so often the case with attempts to 
assess and audit teaching. 
At University B similar percentages of questionnaire respondents to those in 
University A perceived teaching quality to have risen, remained the same and to 
have fallen: respectively 44, 39 and 17 percent. However the pattern of responses 
from senior staff interviewed was somewhat different: the quality of teaching was 
perceived by three to have fallen. The sociology professor said 'teaching 
standards are down' and that there was now less tutorial work with students. 
Tutorials had, in part, been substituted by 'student centred learning' a 'buzz' 
phrase to describe students having to work on their own because there were not 
enough staff to provide adequate teaching support. This professor also 
commented on the detrimental effect of the semester arrangements 'it does not 
make pedagogical sense to have four weeks off just before the end of a semester'. 
This concern with the adverse effect of semesterisation (and modularisation) was 
echoed by three other professors. The electronics engineer professor did consider 
that some benefits had derived from the semestered/modularised courses in that 
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they were now better organised and there was more and better documentation but 
`there is still over-teaching'. 
Another, perhaps subtler concern about teaching and how it had changed was 
made by the senior engineer who said that 'the real area that has suffered is small 
group work' and as a result the 'British system was losing its distinctive feature 
and one which encouraged a high retention rate'. If this is indeed the case it 
means that our university system may be becoming more like the continental and 
North American systems and it may mean that the cost per graduate will rise, as 
many may now not complete as quickly as before, if at all. It may also mean that 
in the competition for overseas students two advantages that the UK was 
perceived to have, individual attention to students and high completion rates, is 
lost and this may well have an adverse effect on overseas recruitment. If this is the 
case then not only will institutional finances suffer but so will the economy, 
education and culture generally if, as has been argued by Williams (1981) and 
Mace (1987), there is a net positive gain from having overseas students studying 
in the UK. 
The questionnaire also asked staff whether the changes in teaching affected all 
levels of course. The questionnaire results for University A reveal that most staff 
perceived teaching of all courses from undergraduate to postgraduate to have 
risen. This is hardly surprising given the increase in recruitment of students. All 
of the staff interviewed confirmed that this was indeed the case. Two of them 
stated that new courses had been designed to attract more students; both of these 
changes were at the masters level. Only one professor said that there had been 
any change in teaching method, and that had been the introduction of a modular 
course to cater for students who were being seconded from industry for limited 
periods of time. 
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At University B all the professors except the biologist commented on the change 
in teaching method/organisation: the move to a modularised system and to 
semesters. We comment above on the effect that this is said to have on teaching 
quality. Semesters had also affected the vacation time available to staff for 
research and leisure. The professor of Modern Languages said modularisation had 
resulted in more teaching, preparation and marking, even though individual 
assignments were shorter, which also encroached on the vacation time available 
for research. It is of interest that two of the professors, (Sociology and Modern 
Languages), commented that the changes in teaching method were designed to 
attract more students to the universities. The Modern Languages professor said 
that this followed from the fact that modularisation enabled standardisation of 
courses and transfer between HE institutions. However, this change in teaching 
arrangements did not affect the 'elite' institutions according to the Sociologist 
because 'they did not need to bugger about with their teaching to attract students'. 
Bernstein, anticipated that this type of difference between elite and other 
universities would develop (Bernstein 1996). 
Research and teaching are both affected by the availability of support services and 
the questionnaire asks staff to comment on any changes to support services. At 
University A, 73 percent of staff perceived the quality of support, particularly 
library services, to have fallen. The three interviewees who commented on the 
quality of support all considered it to have fallen. One, an engineer, also 
commented on the decline in the quality of laboratory support, in terms of both the 
technical staff available and the equipment, a decline which he considered would 
eventually jeopardise the UK's position as an international leader in engineering 
research. 
At University B every professor interviewed commented on the decline in support 
services, both for academics and for students. This is very much in line with the 
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questionnaire results which revealed that some three-quarters of staff considered 
there to have been a decline in support services. Particular concern was expressed 
on the decline in library facilities which adversely affected research, particularly 
in the Humanities and Social Sciences as 'the library is our laboratory' claimed 
the Sociologist. Science was also adversely affected for according to the 
Electronics professor 'the hidden infrastructure has now gone' and he has now to 
build his own equipment for experiments. There was general agreement that the 
amount of pastoral support for students had declined because of the huge increase 
in student numbers. This was happening at the same time as there was a 
perception of student quality falling (see below) which would probably mean that 
more attention was needed by students. 
The final question concerned changes in the quality of student intake. At 
University A the quality of student intake was perceived to have fallen by 35 
percent and to have risen by 12 percent of respondents to our questionnaire. The 
remainder perceived there to have been no change. Four of our interviewees 
commented on the decline in the quality of student. We have already mentioned 
above how that has affected teaching load and, in certain cases, the length of 
courses. Two of the professors commented on the decline in student quality as the 
result of a need to attract more students, even if grades were not as high as 
formerly, 'to get out of financial trouble'. Students now are 'less intellectually 
secure' and do require additional support. One interviewee, an engineer, 
expressed concern about the quality of new courses being offered in schools as 
well as concern about a change in the 'A' level curriculum - 'students did not have 
the depth of understanding as in the past'. The new courses he was most 
concerned about were those offered as part of the GNVQ that purported to provide 
technician skills needed by industry today. He pointed out that the narrow 
emphasis on 'skills' meant that when the skills became obsolete, possibly in as 
`little as five years', these trainees would become unemployed or require 
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retraining. This professor was unwittingly reaffirming the views expressed thirty 
years ago in Philip Foster's seminal paper "The vocational schooling fallacy' in 
which Foster argues that the education system's relationship to the economy (and 
society) makes schools an inappropriate vehicle for the transmission of narrowly 
based vocational skills (Foster 1966). 
At University B an even lower percentage of respondents than at University A 
perceived student quality to have risen (four percent) with 29 percent perceiving it 
to have fallen. Five of the senior staff interviewed said it had fallen and the 
English professor thought quality had remained the same. He added that students 
were often older than in previous years. The reason student quality was 
maintained in his department was said to be the existence of buoyant demand 
because of the good reputation of the English department and the courses it 
offered. In contrast the Sociology professor thought that students' articulation of 
ideas was dreadful' and 'their use of sentences and grammar had worsened and 
will continue to do so'. The explanation for this decline was said to be a 
worsening of education in schools, coupled with the need for the university to 
recruit more students (because the university needed the funding they brought) 
which meant accepting students with lower A level grades. The Science 
professor's comments were similar, 'A level scores are down because I've had to 
recruit more students'. He also remarked that if teaching was measured by 'value 
added' this might mean that University B is doing a better job than some other 
universities who appear to get better degree results. (This point is supported to 
some extent by the Johnes and Taylor study (1990) cited earlier). 
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Summary of Results and Similarities and Differences Within and 
Between Universities 
Research 
Research time: There was general agreement between responses to the 
questionnaire for University B staff and the responses from the senior staff 
interviewed: most perceived the time that they spent on research to have fallen. 
Similar findings emerged from the crosstabs analysis. In University A, although 
there was general agreement, as at University B, that the time available for 
research had fallen because of the increase in teaching and administrative loads, 
none of the senior staff interviewed specifically stated that the amount of time 
that they or their staff spent on research had fallen. This contrasts with both the 
general analysis of the questionnaire results and with the crosstab results. It is also 
different from the response from University B, although this might be partly 
accounted for by the greater proportionate growth in teaching load there compared 
to University A. It may also, in part, be explained by the lower ratings in the RAE 
at University B which could mean that they have less resources available to 
support research. 
It is, however, difficult to account for the discrepancy between the questionnaire 
results from University A and the interviews with senior staff at the university. 
One possible explanation for differences may be that although the senior staff 
interviewed consider that they are making more time available for staff to do 
research, as they claimed in the interviews, that all this is doing is ameliorating the 
situation. It may not actually alter the fact that time available for research and 
with it time spent on research has fallen for most staff. It is more difficult to 
reconcile the interview of staff results with those from the crosstab analysis. The 
crosstab analysis showed that over 70 percent of professors perceived time spent 
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on research to have fallen, with 43 percent of these seeing themselves as spending 
`much less' time on research. It is possible, although it would be a remarkable 
coincidence, that our interviewees were from the 30 percent of staff who did not 
think that the time spent on research had either fallen, or remained the same. 
Type of research: At both universities senior staff considered that there had been 
a shift towards more applied research. This result is consistent with our overall 
findings from the analysis of the questionnaires and with the crosstab results. 
There was however a difference in the emphasis given to this change. At 
University A more senior staff commented on the change in type of research. This 
difference in emphasis could stem from the historical differences between the two 
universities. Perhaps another reason might be that University A was an elite 
institution with more of its staff engaged in theoretical and basic research that in 
University B, which as a former CAT had been more involved with applied and 
industry-based research. 
Another difference between the universities was that at University B, comment 
was made about the type of applied research, applied but not industry-based 
applied research, that was being supported and valued by the research councils 
and RAE panels. No such comment was made at University A, perhaps because it 
is staff from the elite institutions that dominate the research councils and panels 
and reward the type of research in which they are themselves engaged. A point 
made in some of the papers reviewed in chapter 4, particularly Harley and Lee 
(1996). At both universities concern was expressed about the effect that the RAE 
was having on the short term nature of research, principally through its influence 
on the type of publication that it encouraged. In both institutions this concern 
appeared to worry Humanities staff rather more than the Science and Engineering 
staff. 
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Research quality: Our crosstab analysis and general findings from the 
questionnaire indicated that very few staff perceived research quality to have 
fallen. However, senior staff at both universities tended to be a little more 
concerned about how the quality of research was being threatened, particularly by 
the increased teaching and administrative load on academics. In both universities, 
but particularly in University A, the changes to staff through new recruitment and 
retirements were said to have enhanced research quality. This small difference 
between the universities with respect to how staffing changes may have enhanced 
the quality of research could arise because University A, being financially sounder 
than University B, had been able to fund more retirements of staff deemed to be 
poor at research and it could also afford to pay for the recruitment of 'high fliers' 
in research. The questionnaire results, however, suggested that although the 
university may be recruiting 'high fliers' in research they were requiring these 
same staff to bear a greater teaching burden than formerly and this would surely 
reduce the amount of research that they could undertake. 
Senior staff at both universities gave as reasons for concern about quality the 
increase in teaching and administration loads and the decline in support services 
available. There was one significant difference: at University B most of those 
interviewed considered that research and teaching were complementary activities 
and with the increasing separation of research from teaching that was taking place 
at the university, research quality would suffer. No mention of the separation of 
teaching and research and its effect on quality was mentioned at University A. 
This might be because staff did not see teaching and research as complementary 
activities, although most of them did express the view that good researchers were 
also good teachers. A more plausible reason is that at University A teaching and 
research staff were not being separated: all academic staff were expected to teach, 
research and publish. If this is the case then it may be that funding changes are 
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increasingly bringing about a differentiation of staff within non-elite institutions 
that is not taking place within elite universities. 
Teaching 
Time on teaching: The interviews at both universities confirmed the 
questionnaire results in that all the senior staff interviewed commented on the 
increase in the number of students and their increased teaching load. Although the 
crosstab analysis showed there to be some differences in staff perceptions of 
changes to the amount of tutorials, seminars and lectures no significant differences 
of perception were revealed in the interviews. It emerged in the interviews that 
one reason why there had been an increase in tutorials and seminars was the need 
for more remedial support for the less well qualified students that were now being 
recruited. This point was made at both universities and reinforces the comments 
made on a number of the open ended questions in the questionnaire about the need 
for additional support for students who had not received adequate schooling 
and/or the decline in the quality of A levels. One difference between the 
universities with respect to student quality was that at University A concern was 
more about the quality of A levels having fallen, whereas in University B the 
concern with quality stemmed from the fact that they were recruiting more 
students with lower A level grades, or indeed no A levels at all, than formerly. 
The quality of teaching and the method of teaching: The crosstabs and 
questionnaires indicated that most staff perceived quality to have risen, although 
there were a significant number who thought it had fallen. The senior staff in both 
universities were rather more pessimistic about how the quality of teaching had 
changed in that most thought it had fallen. Only one professor at University A 
considered teaching quality to have risen, the rest who commented on quality 
thought it had fallen. The principal cause for the fall in quality was said to be the 
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increase in teaching load on academics, coupled with the decline in support 
services for students and staff. At University B all staff, five, who commented on 
quality thought it had declined. Although they gave similar reasons to University 
A, some staff also considered that the introduction of a modularised and 
semestered degree structure had contributed to the decline in teaching quality. 
The change in the organisation of teaching was a significant difference between 
the universities and is another example of the differentiation that appears to be 
taking place between elite and non-elite universities to which we have already 
alluded. As we argued earlier this differentiation is being driven by the greater 
need of University B to attract and retain students through more flexible teaching 
programmes. 
Support services: All the senior staff interviewed were unequivocal in claiming 
that support in the form of libraries, laboratories and clerical and technical staff 
had fallen. This supports the results from the questionnaires and crosstabs. 
Student quality: We have already mentioned this with respect to the need for 
additional teaching support because students were no longer as well qualified as 
previously. The questionnaire results suggest that in both universities quality of 
student was perceived by more staff to have fallen than to have risen and that the 
differences between the universities were slight. The interviews with the senior 
staff suggest that there is significantly more concern about student quality at 
University B which appears to result from its need to recruit students whether 
adequately qualified or not. Concern about quality also appeared to differ across 
subjects. At University A there appeared to be more concern expressed by the 
science and engineering staff than the social scientist and Humanities professor. 
At University B only one professor, of English, did not think that student quality 
had fallen. 
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Conclusion: Our interviews at the two universities generally support the findings 
from our questionnaires. They also provided some insight into the reasons for our 
questionnaire results: the results for the most part have been caused either directly 
or indirectly by recent funding changes, and particularly the development of the 
RAE. The interviews also suggested that the effect of the changes to funding, 
though in many ways having similar effects on the two universities, may at the 
same time be bringing about increased differentiation between them with respect 
to the time available to do research and the quality of research and teaching. For 
all three more adverse effects seemed to be experienced at University B than 
University A. 
Senior Academic Staff: Response to the Interview Schedule 
The interview schedule was designed to discover whether senior staff in the two 
universities agreed with the results from our analysis of the questionnaires and 
gain further insights into their perception of the changes that had taken place in 
their universities. (The interview schedule is given in Appendix 4). A fuller 
elaboration of purpose of the interviews is presented in Chapter 5 on research 
design. In presenting the responses to the questions we will give those for 
University A first. As stated at the beginning of this chapter there is some overlap 
with the previous section. 
In response to the first question concerning the major changes departments had 
confronted since 1986 all staff at University A made reference to the increase in 
the numbers of students and the failure of staff numbers to keep pace with this 
rise. Mention was also made by most of those interviewed of the increase in 
administrative responsibilities. The reasons for this increase included the RAE 
and the various QA developments, both for internal and external purposes - 
HEFCE's constant demands for information in order to justify the university's 
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grant'. There were references to the extra administration associated with the 
increase in student numbers. 
One change, mentioned by three of those interviewed, was a change in the type of 
staff at the University. As the social scientist put it, 'unproductive' members of 
staff had left to be replaced by better teachers and researchers. The reason for staff 
leaving was claimed as staff 'becoming more introspective'. This introspection 
lead to them recognising that they were making an inadequate contribution to the 
department and that therefore they should leave, with a generous redundancy 
package. The same professor claimed that there had been no pressure on staff to 
leave, either from him 'no pressure from me' or the university. However, 
although this may have been the case in his department it did not appear to be the 
position in other departments. One of the Physics professors interviewed, as noted 
earlier, stated that 'the RAE had provided an opportunity to 'get rid of dead 
wood'. This indicated a rather more active role in encouraging the early departure 
of staff. The social science professor claimed that as a result of the changes to 
staff in his department there had been a change in 'ethos' within the department. 
All staff were now working towards similar goals: 'providing good teaching and 
being active in research and publishing'. 
At University B senior staff also claimed that there had been a significant increase 
in student numbers without a commensurate increase in the number of staff and 
that generally both the staff:student ratio has declined as had the unit of resource 
per student. In one department, Modern Languages, the student:staff ratio had 
declined from 10:1 in 1986 to 30:1 in 1995/6. In another department, electronic 
engineering, the number of staff had been cut from 40 to 20 in the last eight years 
whilst the number of students had remained the same. There was also comment 
on the funding changes and the effect this had on policy toward student 
recruitment and the attitude towards research, which was seen as even more 
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critical to advancement than prior to the funding changes. One major difference 
between the universities was that staff at University B also noted the change in 
teaching that had occurred as a result of modularisation and semestering of 
teaching. Although these are not intrinsically or logically related to each other the 
fact that they had occurred at the same time in the University appeared to result in 
staff treating them as one and the same in their effects on teaching at the 
university. One other difference between the universities was that staff at 
University B referred to the development of research centres at their university. 
These research centres were to become the focus of research and would recruit the 
`best researchers' from departments so as to provide a 'critical mass' for research 
activity a point commented on earlier. 
When senior staff at University A were asked about the cause of the changes all 
the interviewees stated that the reason for the change were to do with funding 
changes. Some stated that it was to do with the internal allocation formula, the 
Resource Centre Model (RCM). (This model is based on the funding council's 
funding model.). Other senior staff said that it was to do with maintaining the 
(financiap`viability' of the department or ensuring that their department secured a 
five in the next RAE. The professor of German summarised the reasons in such 
phrases as 'we're being monitored (RAE and QA) into the bloody ground'. The 
results of monitoring determined departmental income, hence the need to research 
and publish and to recruit students 'students are recruited to get out of financial 
trouble'. If these responses reflect the general perception of staff at the university 
they support our central hypothesis that it is the changes to the funding method 
that is the principal factor explaining changes to institutional and individual 
behaviour. These changes include changes: to internal allocation procedures, to 
the number and quality of students recruited, the teaching load on staff, the 
administrative load on staff, the research activity of staff and the way in which the 
research is disseminated. 
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All senior staff interviewed in University B stated that the principal influence 
bringing about these changes was funding and the RAE. The modern languages 
professor encapsulated this view when he stated that funding is 'driving 
everything'. Professors differed in their views as to the most important effects of 
funding changes. For example, the Modern Languages professor thought the 
major influence was the coming RAE (and previous RAEs?). When he stated that 
`Everything is focused on March 1996'. This meant that all policy, whether to do 
with recruitment, research, publication or sacking was being determined by how 
they would affect cost centres/research centres rating. Other effects such as 
modularisation and semestering were also a matter of comment. The fact that 
neither change to the way teaching is organised had taken place at University A 
suggests an important difference between the universities in their response to 
funding changes. Another difference was the importance of the 'market' for 
students and its effect on policy. For University B staff the competition in the 
market for students was said to be the 'new' universities which was one reason for 
the introduction of modularisation. At University A, although partly concerned 
with attracting students, the 'market' with which they were principally interested 
in was in research: the competition with other elite institutions to attain high 
ratings in the RAE. University B staff, though concerned with the RAE as the 
development of the research centres indicates, gave rather more emphasis to 
attracting students and the funding that follows, than to research which was 
perceived by a number of staff as becoming marginalised. (See earlier discussion 
p163). 
When asked whether the changes had been beneficial, all staff interviewed at 
University A perceived some benefits from the changes, the two most common 
being the effect on teaching and research and the greater understanding of how 
resources were allocated. Research and teaching were said to be more 'focused' 
than previously, 'laxity' in the system had been reduced, post-graduate teaching 
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has been 'too casual before'. With respect to understanding how resources are 
allocated, all those interviewed claimed that there was now 'more transparency' in 
the system of resource allocation within the university (through the RCM). This 
enabled departments to recognise and react to perceived inequities in their 
treatment and to behave in ways that would increase their allocations. 
There was general concern, however, that teaching and research might suffer as 
the teaching and the administrative load increased. The latter point was 
emphasised much more than the former as damaging to the life of the university. 
As the professor of History stated, administration 'obtrudes much more in our 
lives' and the universal picture is one in which we spend more time on 
administration than teaching, research, or our own work'. The same professor was 
also concerned about the `disempowerment of staff' as a result of the necessity of 
complying with the requirements to do more teaching, engage in a particular type 
of research (based on a science, rather than a humanities model), and to fill in all 
the forms associated with the RAE and QA, both externally and internally 
generated. 
We have mentioned earlier the concern that University staff expressed about the 
type of research that they were now forced to do and the adverse effects, 
particularly in the Humanities, that this was said to have on the nature of research 
being undertaken and on the way it is disseminated. We have also discussed the 
effect that the changes to funding may have had on teaching. One view, again 
expressed succinctly by the History professor and quoted earlier was that 
`Everybody feels more political and harder pressed and unable to deliver the same 
quality of support (to students and colleagues) as formerly'. The picture from the 
analysis of the questionnaires, though generally indicating that respondents 
considered quality to have risen, also showed that a significant minority thought 
quality had fallen. 
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The views of staff at University B about the changes to teaching that had taken 
place were generally less favourable than at University A. The modularisation 
programme was generally seen as inimical to good teaching. The 'indiscriminate' 
loss of staff to satisfy financial imperatives often undermined both teaching and 
research according to the Modern Languages professor. The reduction in 
staff:student ratios meant that less attention could be given to individual students. 
At the same time the huge increase in student numbers reduced the time available 
for research. The pressure on time available for research was increased by the 
increase in administration associated with more students, QA and RAE. As the 
Sociology professor put it the only way to maintain your research is to do it in 
your spare time' which meant 'doing research at night and at weekends'. The 
development of research centres was seen as good for research and for those staff 
in the centres, but bad for other staff whose research would become marginalised. 
The separation of research and teaching was seen by all senior staff as having 
adverse effects on both, and this separation would be exacerbated by the merger 
with the local tertiary college. The most extreme view when describing the 
changes at University B was that they were 'an unmitigated disaster'. Generally 
staff were concerned that the changes taking place were bad for research and 
teaching and that the role of a university, or at least University B, as a place 'to 
create and disseminate knowledge' was under threat. There appeared to be more 
concern at University B than the 'elite' university A, about the threat to the nature 
of the university's research and teaching. 
When asked more specifically to comment on the changes for teaching, research 
and administration, all staff at University A remarked on the huge increase in 
teaching load. There was less agreement among the senior staff about the changes 
in the quality of teaching, with as many perceiving it to have risen as to have 
fallen. In contrast to University B there was general agreement that there had 
been no significant change to the methods of teaching the traditional 
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undergraduate or masters courses. Although the amount of tutorial help was said 
to have risen by one scientist and one Arts professor, both said it was to do with 
the need for some additional support for less well prepared student intake 
When asked about the effects of the funding changes on research all the 
interviewees at University A commented on the greatly increased pressure to do 
research and publish. This pressure was largely attributed to the RAE, although it 
was also claimed by most of the professors that to 'get on' at University A staff 
had always been required to research and publish. We have already commented 
on the views of staff that the quality of research had been maintained, but that 
with the increasing pressures of teaching and administration, coupled in 
engineering with a decline in support services and equipment, that quality was 
likely to be adversely affected in the longer term. We have already quoted the 
History professor comments on the pernicious effect of the RAE panels who 
wanted 'technical and narrow minded research' and that their need for a number 
of publications rather than 'one great book was resulting in chapters in books 
being turned into articles, with the book itself being put on the 'back burner', 
probably never to be finished'. The same professor also commented on the 
growth of administrative load and how it 'obtrudes much more in our lives'. This 
was affecting teaching and research: 'The universal picture is one in which we 
spend more time on administration than teaching or research or our own work'. 
This view of the intrusion of administration was commented on by the engineers 
and scientists also, with one engineering professor describing how QA had 
required him distribute and collect 5000 student questionnaires (for different 
courses), each with 10 questions on them. He had inadequate time to process 
them 'they were not machine readable' and the results were therefore never 
analysed the 'whole time consuming exercise was purposeless'. 
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At University B there was unanimous agreement that there had been enormous 
increases in both administration and teaching and that the increase in both was 
making it very difficult to maintain research output as previously. We have 
already commented on the effect that changes were said to have on the quality of 
teaching and research so we will only briefly repeat them. The general view was 
that the quality of teaching was being adversely affected and that these adverse 
effects may not be reflected in changes in the degree results. As one professor of 
Engineering said, 'courses are tailored down to student ability' and that 'there has 
been a decline in the quality of firsts'. If this is indeed the case then the present 
and previous governments' concern about degree standards may be justified. 
Views about research in University B were that it was being adversely affected 
because of the pressure on staff time. The only way to maintain research output 
was to work longer hours. Different views were expressed as to whether the type 
of research undertaken had changed as a result of funding changing; the science 
and engineering professors appear to be more conscious of the pressure to change. 
The one development that was felt likely to enhance research was the 
development of research centres which provided a 'critical mass' of researchers 
and moreover by being bigger, research units were likely to result in higher 
research ratings. As one of the engineering professors stated 'there is a strong 
correlation between size and rating in the RAE' - a point made in some of the 
critiques of the exercise discussed in Chapter 4. 
The response to the question as to the effects on staffing has already received 
some attention earlier. However, a number of additional points to those already 
reported were also made in response to this question. The most influential factors 
affecting staffing policy, recruitment, promotion and retention, was claimed to be 
the RAE and, to a lesser extent, the QA. Mention was also made of the effect of 
the changes to internal allocation procedures (the RCM), themselves a result of 
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the RAE, and the changes in the university funding formula. However, there did 
appear to be departmental differences in the pace and pressure placed on staff to 
leave. The History professor stated that in his department the less productive staff 
who had not responded to the additional internal support to assist them in their 
writing and research would be targeted before the next RAE. The other 
interviewees seemed to have been already active in 'disposing' of or redeploying 
`inactive' staff. In one science department instead of forcing staff to leave, 
particularly those who were 'good teachers', they had transferred them to 
administrative positions, such as Safety Officer, where they could contribute to 
the teaching of the department, but would not be included in the RAE. This 
policy, as we stated earlier, enabled the department to appear to have a higher 
proportion of research active staff than would otherwise have been the case! 
The view, made explicit in a number of the interviews, was that University A 
needed good researchers and that this did not present any problem for teaching as 
`staff who are good are good at both teaching and research'. However, it was also 
made clear that where there was any possibility of conflict between the interests of 
teaching and research, research would win. As the social science professor 
admitted, when the university made a recent professorial appointment in his 
department it was merely fortuitous that 'he also happened to be an excellent 
teacher'. There was some evidence that the university had actively head hunted in 
both the sciences and social science areas. The university had also lost staff who 
had been head hunted, particularly by Cambridge University, another elite 
institution. 
At University B there were some differences from University A in how senior 
staff perceived staffing to have changed. One difference, noted by three of the 
professors (Sociology, Languages and Engineering ) was that more work was 
now being undertaken by staff who were part-time and on temporary contracts. 
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As the Sociology professor, who again provided the most quotable response, said, 
`a second academic workforce is being created whose employment is contingent 
on demand. These 'ghettoised workers' have no commitment to subject, 
department or institution and are less available to students', all of which adversely 
affects teaching. This point is somewhat similar to that made by Waigh when he 
refers to a 'caste' system developing. All said that there was now more careful 
targeting of recruits with research potential. This was given particular emphasis 
by the Science professor who stated that the University needed staff with a proven 
`track record in research', 'gone are the days when we can recruit for potential' 
and, to emphasis the point, 'post docs now have nil chance of recruitment'. This 
recruitment policy helps to explain the somewhat skewed age distribution of staff 
at the university. This is also partly explained by the fact that staff in some, but 
not all, departments had been encouraged to take early retirement if they were not 
research active. Although the Modern Languages professor said, 'there is no 
room for passengers any more' there was a problem pointed out by one of the 
Engineering professors, who also held a very senior management position: funds 
were so limited that the University could not always afford to get rid of staff that 
were 'research inactive' and, by the same token, was limited in its ability to 
`headhunt'. This funding constraint clearly did not affect all departments equally 
since the Science professor said that he had successfully headhunted one professor 
and two lecturers. 
Staff at both universities were also asked their expectations of the future shape of 
their university and whether they regarded this future as an improvement on the 
previous situation. At University A all of the interviewees expected the current 
trends affecting the shape of the university to continue in the near future. That is, 
the changes to administrative, teaching and research described above were 
perceived as being continued and reinforced in the next few years. The view 
shared by all was that there had been 'slack' in the system prior to the reforms and 
239 
that the changes that had taken place had reduced this 'slack'. They also all 
seemed to support, though not necessarily for the same reason, the greater 
transparency, through the RCM, of internal allocation procedures. Most saw one 
advantage of this new transparency as now knowing how to increase funding, 
either through increased teaching or increased research, or both. Another 
advantage, mentioned by the Humanities professors was that they now knew how 
biased towards the sciences the formula was and that they could now attempt to 
redress this bias. 
However, the University A professors interviewed were by no means unanimous 
as to whether the continuation of current policy was going to benefit the university 
or not. Only one person, the professor in charge of teaching developments was 
convinced that the emphasis on QA would result in teaching standards rising. 
Although there was some recognition that there may be benefits to quality from 
QA, four of other professors interviewed considered that the countervailing 
pressures of increased student numbers, space constraints at the university, 
increased administration, inadequate support services and, especially in 
engineering and science, obsolete equipment meant that overall the quality of 
teaching would suffer. The recent HEFCE report quoted in The Times of 22nd, 
September 1997 draws attention to the general concern about university 
equipment. The point is also forcibly made in the Dearing Report. The same 
factors adversely affecting teaching quality, inadequate support, shortage of time, 
increased teaching load were also said to be adversely affecting research. 
There was rather more uncertainty at University B about its future shape, because 
of the uncertainty about the effects of the merger with the tertiary college. All of 
those interviewed expressed concern about the merger making the university more 
like an American university, becoming more of a 'teaching factory' and less like a 
traditional English university with most staff actively engaged in research. 
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Everybody thought that such a development, although seen as necessary for the 
survival of the institution, was unwelcome, particularly because of its effect on 
research. The establishment of the research centres was, as we said above, viewed 
with mixed feelings because, although seen as beneficial for research, it would 
have the effect of downgrading departments and creating an underclass of non-
research active staff. It was feared that it would be very difficult to move into the 
research centres so the effect on the future of academics not in the centres would 
be permanent. 
Departmental Policy 
Since much of this has been covered above this section, and the next, will be very 
brief. 
The first question concerned the effect on departmental policy of the university 
internal allocation formula. As we have already said the senior staff at both of the 
universities saw the allocation formula as central in the determination of 
departmental policy towards student recruitment and staffing policy. Although, 
every interviewee preferred the greater transparency of the current allocation 
formula to that previously used, it was not without its critics. For example, the 
language professor pointed out that the rigidity of the model and its transparency 
had the effect of 'truncating debate' about doing things that used resources, but 
were not 'rewarded' under the RCM. (This is also the case with the funding 
council formula where only universities in the black are able to pursue policies 
that are not funded through the formula). 
There was universal recognition of the basis of the internal allocation formula at 
both universities. As the senior Engineering professor at University B pointed 
out, 'the allocation formula is meant to match the HEFCE model as closely as 
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possible' to 'encourage the same activities' as those rewarded under it. However, 
although the formula was understood this did not mean that it was accepted as the 
basis for departmental funding. For example, the professor of Mechanical 
Engineering at University B said even though the formula makes clear the options 
`Since most of our money is tied up in posts and there is no money to pay for 
redundancy or early retirement our hands are tied'. It was also noted that if a 
department was over funded they had to shed staff and/or recruit students, whether 
or not this unbalanced the departmental portfolio. 
We asked what senior staff were doing to raise their department's grade in the 
next RAE and it was no surprise that all staff said that this was departmental 
policy. At University A all interviewees claimed they were doing everything in 
their power to improve their grade in the next exercise. The policies pursued 
included all those concerned with staffing described above. In addition, every 
department was pursuing staff development plans to help the weaker staff in their 
department. Such policies included mentoring, reducing teaching load and in some 
cases providing sabbaticals, establishing research teams under an experienced 
researcher. Because Q is to be more important in the next RAE (1996) more 
emphasis will be given to ensuring that articles are published in the 'right' places 
in contrast to the most recent RAE (1992) where the policy was to get as much 
published as possible, even if it was not in the most prestigious journal. This 
point was also made in the papers discussed in chapter 4. 
All staff interviewed at University B said they were attempting to get the highest 
grade possible. This was being achieved by putting pressure on staff to publish, 
headhunt and, in some cases providing staff with time off to complete pieces of 
research. As the Engineer pointed out 'there is no point in just getting a 2 or 3 as 
good staff and overseas students will only go to departments graded 4 or 5'. One 
professor said it was no longer the concern of departments but of the recently 
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formed research centres who were certainly doing everything in their power to 
achieve the highest grade possible. However, with this one exception, those 
interviewed seemed to make no distinction between policies that intended to 
improve departmental or research centre grades. 
Two of the final questions asked concerned the validity of our research 
distinctions and whether our research findings from the questionnaire accorded 
with their own views. With respect to the first question all staff at both 
universities accepted their validity. In one or two cases additional comments were 
added. At University A, for example, the two Humanities professors both stated 
that although valid the distinctions were more relevant to the sciences than their 
subjects because most Humanities research was either basic or personal. 
All interviewees were asked to comment on our findings and all thought our 
questionnaire results accorded with their own experience that they were largely 
the result of the funding council's method of funding universities. We asked 
finally whether interviewees would like to add any further comment. In 
answering this question, interviewees at both universities ranged over a number of 
issues, some of which were not directly related to our research question but were 
perceived as of concern to universities now and in the future. Most raised other 
issues related to changes taking place in their university. One of the engineering 
professors at University A suggested that the 'hit rate on research proposals is 
significantly lower now' and that the research councils are in danger of collapse 
as they become 'overwhelmed with the vetting of research proposals'. ( He was 
heavily involved in the refereeing of proposals.). 
The effect on morale and health of the pressures of academic life was commented 
on by three of the interviewees at University A and four of the senior staff 
interviewed at University B. 'At the end of term my colleagues are near an 
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hysterical state' the History professor at University A claimed. He also 
commented that 'university had become less autonomous' and, more worryingly, 
that 'academic purpose has been lost' as a consequence of the increased demands 
on staff and the new management system. Both changes were, he argued, the 
consequence of the needs of the RAE and the imperative of recruiting more 
students to stay solvent. The language professor certainly agreed with the first 
point 'If you want to continue as a real department you must get a high rating in 
research'. He also pointed out that because the RAE discounted course books the 
new universities would be particularly disadvantaged as this was what so many of 
them produced. The same point was made by the Sociologist at University B. 
This point was also made by Jenkins (see Chapter 4). 
As we found in the questionnaire results, some of the senior staff commented on 
the influence of the research councils on the type of research undertaken at 
universities. This was commented on by all the engineers at University B. The 
social science professor at University A was also concerned that research panels 
and their members tended not to give adequate attention to novel developments, 
for example in the development of computer use, particularly if the innovations 
were cross-disciplinary. One of the science professors said that staff would 
become increasingly demoralised as the difficulties in getting papers published 
increased. He also provided an additional reason for the increased administrative 
load; the new UCCA form which allows students to apply to eight rather than five 
universities. He also warned that as quality assurance develops and everything 
has to be double or treble checked the burden on staff will rise. 'If ever money is 
tied to quality assurance the admin. work will increase to even more absurd 
levels'. 
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Similarities and Differences Between Universities 
The answers to the first question, which concerned the main departmental changes 
experienced by senior staff since 1986, revealed considerable similarity in the 
views of the staff at the two universities. All commented on the increase in 
student numbers and the worsening of staff: student ratios, the increase in 
administration and the increased pressure to do research and publish. Although 
there were these similarities, at University A more emphasis was placed on 
changes to the academic staff, especially as a result of redundancy or early 
retirement. Presumably this difference of emphasis was because this university 
had been more pro-active in encouraging 'research inactive' staff to leave. At 
both universities all new recruitment seemed dominated by the need to get good 
researchers in order to improve or maintain research rating. 
One important difference between the universities was in teaching: at University 
B the structure of teaching had been altered by the introduction of semesters and 
modularisation in order to attract more students. At University A no major 
changes in teaching were reported, presumably because the university was 
sufficiently prestigious to attract students without either cosmetic or substantive 
changes to the organisation of its teaching. It was significant that some staff at 
University B saw the change to teaching was having a deleterious effect on the 
quality of teaching. 
Another difference between the universities was in the organisation of research. 
At University B special research centres were being established in order to 
improve prospects in the RAE. At University A activities to encourage staff to 
research and publish were taking place within the existing departmental structures. 
This may be another example of the way in which changes to funding are 
encouraging or compelling differentiation between universities. 
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All the senior staff interviewed gave the main reason for the changes they 
described as the result of funding. Some put more emphasis on the internal 
allocation models used at their university, others on the RAE, but all agreed that it 
was the way that universities were funded by the funding council that was 
determining university and departmental policy. At both universities the internal 
allocation system was based on management's understanding of funding council 
formula, with the internal allocation model being designed to introduce the same 
penalties and rewards for departments as for universities so that they would pursue 
policies that would maximise funding council income. To some extent this meant 
that the management at both universities was attempting to second guess the 
council and the RAE panels over such issues as whether it is better to have larger 
academic groupings and what the trade off was between getting a 5* with fewer 
staff entered and getting a 5 with more staff included in the submission. If the 
funding council was to alter its policies over the funding of research and teaching 
it may prove disastrous for those universities which have altered their 
infrastructure, staffing and management practices to suit an obsolete funding 
model. This has important implications for policy makers at institutional and 
funding council level. If institutional planning is to proceed in a rational and 
efficient way there needs to be some assurance that the 'rules' according to which 
resources are allocated are not going to be changed dramatically and at short 
notice. This is a similar point to that made by Williams when discussing the 
establishment of Interdisciplinary Research Centres (IRC): universities found it 
very frustrating and expensive to bid for IRC money when the funders were 
constantly 'moving the goal posts' (Williams, 1992). 
When asked whether the changes described above had been for the better some 
staff at University A alluded to gains in teaching quality and improvements in 
research as better staff were recruited and less able staff left. Most thought that 
there had been 'slack' in the system and that had now been removed. All senior 
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staff were concerned that if the pressure of teaching and administration continued, 
or grew, it would damage both teaching and research. 
At University B there was only one positive comment in response to the same 
question and this concerned the newly established research centres. It was felt by 
most senior staff that their establishment would probably strengthen research at 
the university. Though there was concern that this development would break the 
links between teaching and research and would undermine departments. Although 
not mentioned explicitly the increasing centralising of control that the 
establishment of the centres represented would also undermine the power of 
professors as, indeed, had the changes to internal allocation procedures described 
earlier. All the other changes in teaching and administrative load, teaching 
organisation, the separation of teaching and research were seen as damaging to 
research and teaching quality. Staff at University B appeared to have experienced 
more change than staff in University A and they perceived these changes as more 
damaging to the fabric of university life. 
As to the effects on staffing, at both universities senior staff all believed that as a 
consequence of their university's policy of early retirement and more focused 
recruitment the quality of staff had risen. However, at University B comment 
was also made about the development of an underclass of teaching staff who were 
on part-time and temporary contracts who were generally not active in research 
and whose morale and commitment to the university and students may be 
questionable. No such concern was expressed at University A and this may be 
another way in which differentiation between elite and non-elite universities may 
be developing. There were differences in the perception of the staff of the 
universities with respect to the future shape of the university. At University A the 
pressures on the university and its staff were expected to continue and it was 
claimed that if they grew they would undermine teaching and research. At 
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University B the shape of the university was expected to change with it becoming 
much more like a teaching factory. This was seen as being bad for both teaching 
and research and for the quality of life at the university. 
The staff at both universities share the view that the allocation formula was more 
transparent than previously and absolutely central to all departmental decisions 
about student recruitment and staffing policies. There is no doubt that if 
universities do understand the funding policy of the council they are going to 
force departments through their internal allocation models to pursue policies that 
should maximise funding council grant. To a considerable extent this policy is 
being pursued whether or not it is seen as 'good' for the advance of scholarship, 
research and teaching in the short, medium or long term. Universities appear to be 
confirming that 'he who pays the piper calls the tune,' irrespective of whether it is 
melodious or not. 
With respect to staffing we have already described how policy towards staffing is 
determined by the internal allocation model. In both universities departments 
responded in much the same way because in both the internal allocation models 
were similar in that they mimicked the funding council model. It was no surprise 
to learn that all departments in University A are attempting, mainly through the 
staffing policies described, to improve or, if they have already the highest grade, 
to maintain it. At University B the establishment of research centres was intended 
to optimise the use of staff who were considered to have research potential or 
were already proven researchers. As we pointed out earlier this may be one of the 
more important differences between the universities resulting in University B an 
elite group of research active staff developing with other staff being primarily, if 
not solely, concerned with teaching. No such staffing distinctions seemed likely to 
develop in University A. 
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All staff interviewed said that our research definitions were valid, although some 
of the non-science professors said that only basic or personal research was 
relevant to their subject. All staff at both universities agreed that the findings from 
out questionnaire were generally consistent with their experience. 
Concluding Comment 
There appears to be considerable agreement among senior staff at both universities 
that funding changes have been central in bringing about the changes that have 
taken place at their institution. The principal changes they have in common 
concern changes to staffing policy, teaching load, pressure to research and 
publish, increased administration load, changes to internal allocation formula and, 
particularly at University B, the increased centralising of control. However, the 
interviews also revealed that within these commonly shared perceptions of 
changes there were important differences developing between the two universities. 
These differences include the separation from departments of research activity at 
University B, changes in the discourse and organisation of teaching, and the 
development of an 'underclass' of teachers, again at University B. Funding does 
appear to have different effects on different universities. In the longer term this 
differentiation may result in doubts as to whether University B may any longer be 
considered to be a university in the traditional sense. Perhaps the question of what 
a university is in the current climate and whether current funding policies are 
supporting this type of university needs to be addressed by the funding council 
and the government. 
In Chapter 5 we explained why we considered it essential that we interviewed a 
number of senior staff at the two universities in our case study. Analysis on the 
interviews shows our arguments to have been justified. The interviews provided 
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us with a fuller and more revealing understanding of our questionnaire results than 
would otherwise have been possible, even with the open-ended questions. In 
addition, the interviews illuminated differences between disciplines and 
universities in their relation to the changes in funding. We were also able to 
discover and explore organisational differences, with respect to management, 
teaching and research. Finally, we obtained evidence of differences between 
academics and administrators in their views of the changes to funding and their 
effects on universities. 
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Footnote to Chapter 8 
The problem here, as I see it, and one not apparently fully appreciated in either of 
the universities, is that the HEFCE has a tendency to somewhat arbitrarily change 
the rules, both for the funding of teaching and research activities. Witness the 
recent change to teaching and the way in which students in different subjects are 
now to be funded, and in research the changes to the number of publications 
required in each RAE and also the change in the allocation between subject group. 
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PART III: Summary Of Main Findings And Their 
Implications 
This final part of the thesis is divided into two chapters. The first, Chapter 9, 
summarises and discusses our findings. In the final concluding chapter, chapter 
10, we first examine the implications of these findings for 'economic' models of 
funding. We then consider some of the implications for policy makers, and we 
end by considering possible future research in this area. 
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Chapter 9: Discussion of Main Findings 
Introduction 
This chapter will present and discuss the main findings from this case study of 
two universities' responses to changes in the way that they are funded by the 
Funding Council. The chapter will be divided into three sections. In the first we 
will consider possible sources of bias in our results. We then examine the major 
findings of our research and particularly the effects on teaching and research. In 
the third we will consider differences that are related to gender, rank, department 
and year of appointment. In both of these sections our discussion will be 
informed by the questionnaire results and the interviews with senior staff. 
Possible Sources of Bias 
In the previous chapters we have presented our empirical findings. These findings 
were based on two sources of data: the analysis of questionnaires returned by 250 
academic staff at the two universities in the study and interviews with senior 
academic and administrative staff at the universities. We discussed our results and 
qualifications to our conclusions in the relevant chapters. In this section we 
discuss more generally factors that might bias our results. 
Funding Changes 
A crucial question concerns the ascription of our findings to changes in funding 
method. Over the period examined, 1986 onwards, universities' behaviour may 
well have been affected by other influences such as the Jarratt Report (1985) (with 
its advocacy of management changes), the numerous new research initiatives such 
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as the development of Interdisciplinary Research Centres, and the recent pressure 
from government to force universities to expand student numbers and reduce the 
unit of resource. Other factors that may also have influenced university behaviour 
include changes to overseas student fee policy, changes in home and European 
Community members' fee levels, growing uncertainties about grant allocations 
and so on. It is impossible for our results not to be contaminated to some extent 
by these other factors, but to a large degree we can isolate these effects through 
the following: specifying a date relevant to the funding change we are examining 
but not to other changes affecting universities; interviewing senior staff to obtain 
their views of our results and of internal management changes; and by the cross-
checking of institutions to see if the effects of funding changes are similar. 
Perhaps the most important is interviewing senior staff who have been involved in 
determining and implementing university policy. As the interviews reported in 
Chapter 9 show, all senior staff considered that the main factor affecting 
universities and their teaching and research has been the changes to university 
funding. Quotes such as 'everything is focused on March 1996' are examples of 
how important the RAE is seen in determining institutional policy towards 
staffing and organisation, including, in University B, completing restructuring the 
university research base by placing selected staff in newly established research 
centres in order to improve the university's research ratings. It should be noted 
that many of those interviewed were part of the universities' decision making 
management team and therefore knew why, as well as what, policies were 
introduced. 
The reasons given by senior staff for the changes in the type of research 
undertaken and the changes to the way that it is disseminated, particularly in the 
Humanities, are also supported by the response to the open-ended questions; 
without prompting the changes are attributed to the demands of the RAE, the 
funding method. Further support for the importance of changed funding methods 
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and their influence on university behaviour is provided by Williams. Williams 
argues that the funding changes of 1986 pushed universities into adopting new 
teaching, research and management change, 'the new funding scheme gave 
universities an incentive to adopt some of the Jarratt Committee proposals' 
(Williams 1991:87). Other evidence lending support to our claim that it is the 
funding mechanism, and particularly the RAE that is altering the behaviour of 
universities is provided by Higson et. al. (1998) and McNay (1998). Higson 
describes the funding model developed in the University of Aston's Business 
School. In this model research is assessed in a way designed to mimic that of the 
RAE. 
"The choice of units in which to measure research mirrors the priorities of 
the HEFCE Research Assessment Exercise. For example refereed journals 
and research grants are heavily weighted because these are regarded as 
most prestigious in the Research Assessment Exercise" (p29). 
Clearly the internal funding methodology is being driven by the external model. 
Higson also reports how it has affected the type of output produced and how it is 
disseminated, essentially through journal articles - a result supported by our 
evidence. They also report a rather more negative effect in that staff are unwilling 
to engage in activities not rewarded by the model. McNay's study is much 
broader in scope, covering 30 institutions. He also says that the RAE plays a 
dominant role affecting the type of research, mode of research, quality and output 
of research, organisation of units and universities and internal allocation 
procedures. Again his findings support our own. 
Some tangential support for the importance of funding method in education, 
though in this case it is the further education sector, is provided by Barrow (1997) 
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Retrospective Data 
Another issue concerns the reliability of retrospective data. One of the problems 
associated with this type of data is that staff perceptions of change over a number 
of years may be clouded by their current preoccupations. This is certainly a 
problem that bedevils any study that examines perception of change through time. 
Another possibly related problem is the 'halo' effect, where respondents 
emphasise what they perceive as 'good', e.g. doing more teaching or doing more 
basic research. Three points can be made about these potential problems. First, 
are staff memories likely to be suspect over a period as short as seven years, the 
time period between the change in funding method and the collection of data in 
this study? Second, if there is bias is it likely to be in one direction only? If not, 
can we assume it will balance out? Third, the results can, to a large extent, be 
cross-checked by interviews with staff and examination of internal and public 
documents. Such data tend to corroborate the findings from the questionnaires. 
For example, the claim that staff are now spending more time teaching appears to 
be supported by the significant decline in staff: student ratio reported later. 
Staff Composition - Differences Between the Universities 
The staff composition of universities A and B might affect the balance of research 
and teaching activities in the universities, with the university with more senior 
staff, University A, undertaking more research and attracting more research 
money. The interesting fact is that there is little difference generally in the 
response of the universities, perhaps indicating that funding method tends to 
override the influence of other factors. Note too that we are not looking at 
absolute measures of the changes to teaching and research, but the direction of 
change since the new funding method was introduced. 
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The fact that such a large percentage of our sample had been appointed in the 
previous five years and that we are concerned with the effects on teachers and 
research resulting from funding changes begun seven years ago, may be another 
possible source of bias. However, this may not be so since basically the same 
university funding policies have been followed and reinforced since 1986. We 
might therefore expect similar teaching and research pressures on both new and 
old appointments. Pressures would increase for all appointments as internal 
management adjusts to the funding changes. However, although the pressures are 
on all staff there may be some difference between newer and older staff in their 
perception of the change. 
To discover whether there were differences between recent and old appointments 
in their perceptions we divided the sample into two groups, those appointed six 
years or less ago and those appointed before. The results of chi-squared tests 
indicate no significant difference between staff in their perceptions of the direction 
of change in teaching and research. However, in university A there was a 
significant difference between older and more recent appointments in their 
perceptions of the time they spent on research; more older appointments 
considered that there had been a change in the amount of time they spent on 
research (p = 0.009). These results and other possible differences related to 
department, rank and gender were explored in Chapter 8 and revealed that there 
were remarkably few differences within these groups and between the universities. 
University Type 
The fact that one university is an old multi-faculty institution and the other an ex-
CAT may influence our results; with the older, well-established university 
concentrating more on research and the ex-CAT concentrating more on teaching. 
However, our results show that, irrespective of the base, there is very little 
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difference between university staff perceptions of change. This reinforces the 
view that factor(s) other than university type are causing the teaching and research 
changes we have described. However, as the interviews with senior staff showed 
although the changes to teaching and research are in the same direction there may 
be other related changes in the universities that are different and, in part, related to 
their differences in background. 
Type of Research 
A number of questions arise from these results which indicated a decline in basic 
research and an increase in applied research. It may be claimed that staff are 
insufficiently aware of the research distinctions given in the appendix to the 
questionnaire and also that their research may not fit neatly into any of the 
categories. In fact only two in our sample of 250 stated that their research did not 
fall into our categories. A further possible issue of interpretation is that the results 
are not a consequence of changes in funding methods, but arise from the 
availability of funds for different types of research. It must be borne in mind that 
the research assessment method used by the funding council's assessment panels 
generally rewards cost centres (and universities) if they receive research grants 
and contracts, irrespective of the purpose of the research. Thus, if funds, whether 
from industry or research councils, are more available for applied research than 
other types of research, this will effect the areas that university staff will apply for 
if they are to ensure that their cost centres are rated highly in the research 
selectivity exercise and to sustain or improve their internal allocations of 
resources. Internal allocation of resources methods have adjusted to the changed 
funding methods, reinforcing the pressures to respond to funding council policy. 
The above discussion indicates that our results may not be affected by the factors 
that we consider above. However, there may be other factors that affect the 
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confidence that we can have in our interpretation of the results; for example, with 
respect to quality changes and overall output changes in the universities. These 
concerns are addressed in the final section on further research. 
Main Findings of Effects of Funding Change on Research and 
Teaching 
Having argued that there are good grounds for accepting that our results are 
caused by the changes to the method by which universities are funded, in this 
section we present and discuss our main findings. As in the earlier chapters we 
will first discuss the effects on research and then those on teaching. 
Research 
Research time: The questionnaire responses suggest a clear picture in which the 
majority of staff in both universities are finding that the time that they spent on 
research had been squeezed. In University A, 61 percent of staff stated that the 
time they spent on research had fallen, with only 20 percent saying that they were 
doing more research. In University B the figures were respectively 57 and 21 
percent. As our results show, the reduction in time spent on research is spread 
across all categories of staff. In our interviews with senior staff at University B all 
staff stated that the time they had to spend on research was being adversely 
affected by the increase in teaching and administrative load. At University A the 
interviewees all said that their teaching and administrative loads had risen but did 
not say that the time that they spend on research had declined. We have already 
discussed the possible reasons for this discrepancy; a discrepancy that is 
reinforced by the crosstab results in which 70 percent of professors perceived the 
time spent on research had fallen. 
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Apart from the reasons already suggested it may be that in the interviews we did 
not specifically ask whether the time spent on research had fallen but asked them 
to describe the major changes that had taken place to their university and the 
reasons for these changes. So, although they did not state that the time spent on 
research had fallen, for the majority it may have been implied by their comments 
on the enormous increase in other duties to do with administration and teaching. 
Support for this view is provided in the answer to our question concerning our 
results. All concurred with our findings that most staff in the university spent less 
time on research than formerly. 
The open-ended questions provided reasons for these changes to time spent on 
research. These were essentially the same as those given above, with 76 percent 
of staff in University A saying that it was due to increased teaching and 
administration. There was a similar response in University B, though with an 
even higher percentage of 87 percent. It may not be immediately apparent that the 
increase in teaching and administration are due to funding, the central contention 
of this thesis. As we have said, however, the senior staff interviewed did say that 
the major influence on departmental and university activities was the method of 
funding. They also stated, and this was given more emphasis in University B, that 
more students had to be recruited in order to satisfy internal allocation 
requirements, which were themselves framed around the funding council's 
formula. These additional students require more teaching and increased the 
administrative load. The administrative load was also increased for all staff, but 
particularly senior staff, because of the need to put in applications for research 
grants, to administer research projects and to supervise and encourage colleagues 
in their research activities. The necessity of doing well in the RAE and ensuring 
as many staff as possible are 'research active,' though very important at both 
universities , assumed even greater importance at University A, the 'elite' 
university, than at University B. 
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One question that arises from these responses, and one that we explore later, is 
whether staff in responding to this question are reporting a change in their 
perception of time spent on research relative to other activities, such as teaching 
and administration, or whether they are reporting an absolute change in the time 
that they spend on research. When we report the change in type of research a 
greater percentage report an increase than a decrease in research activity. 
Although the base from which these changes are not asked these results may be 
seen as prima facie evidence of an increase in research. The only way that this 
result could be reconciled with the increase in teaching and administration 
reported earlier is that staff are spending more time on university activities than 
previously. This would mean that their research output could have risen at the 
same time as the time they spend on other activities has also risen. 
Concomitantly, they may also be making more effective use of their time than 
formerly. 
Research type: The majority of staff in both universities indicated that the type of 
research that they undertook had not changed: 69 percent in University A and 66 
percent in University B. Our questionnaire did not ask what their current research 
was because we were interested in changes that had resulted from the move to a 
different method of funding. In retrospect, it would have been of interest to know 
the research respondents were previously engaged in for this would have put the 
changes that we discovered into clearer perspective. For the majority of those for 
whom there had been change the shift had been from basic and personal research 
to applied and strategic research. The reasons given for this change, both in the 
questionnaires and interviews, was that money was needed for research and, 
subsequently, publishing, to satisfy the RAE and that more money was available 
for 'wealth creating' research than for other types of research. A possible further 
incentive to do applied research was that publishable results were more certain, 
and likely to be available in a shorter time and thus would fit better the 
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requirements of the RAE for a certain number of publications every four, or in the 
case of the Arts, five years. 
If our results do reflect a shift in type of research then (over 30% in each 
university said it had changed) it is of concern for a number of reasons. Does the 
Government want the development of applied research at the expense of basic and 
personal research. Basic research, as one of the interviewees pointed out, is the 
foundation on which all research ultimately depends. If this foundation is 
systematically eroded then there may be implications in the longer term for what 
strategic and applied research is possible. Of course, the Government may not be 
too concerned if the required basic research is taking place in other countries and 
they are prepared to share it via papers, books, conferences and, now, the Internet. 
If not, then the consequences for Britain may be that we lose our position as a 
significant world player in basic research and that applied research may also be 
limited. To some extent these consequences will be reinforced by the decline in 
support, particularly expensive infrastructural support, for research in universities. 
If equipment is obsolete and inadequately maintained then British academics will 
be unable to carry out certain types of basic and applied research with the same 
adverse effects on their standing in the international scholarly community. 
A further concern relates to the type of research that staff now undertake and its 
relation to the requirements of the RAE for 'quick' publications. This may result 
in papers being published that have not been as carefully prepared as formerly. In 
addition, a particular section of the academic community, the Humanities staff, 
may now be forced to engage in a different type of research than previously and to 
disseminate this research in a different way. This differential effect on the 
Humanities staff, mentioned by all the humanities staff interviewed, though not 
always given the same emphasis, is one of the most important results of this study 
and is one that policy makers may want to consider if there is to be another RAE. 
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It may be that it is the intention of policy to change the nature of research and 
scholarship in universities, but the fact that so much concern was expressed about 
its effect on the Humanities may indicate that further thought needs to be given to 
the way research in that area is assessed. This point is also related to the quality 
of research that we discuss in the next section. 
Another result of the method of assessment is the proliferation of journals it has 
encouraged and the increase in the number of articles treating applied subjects. 
This may well have a longer term effect, for if there continues to be a growth in 
applied work and publications reflect this then this will inevitably feed back into 
teaching, reinforcing the move towards more applied work. Again, this danger 
may be slightly exaggerated because we do not know the extent of the absolute 
shift from basic to applied research. And, as we said this change may well be the 
intention of policy makers. 
The Quality of Research 
Our questionnaire results indicate that quality is perceived by most staff in both 
universities as having risen. Only one group, recent appointments at University B, 
appeared to be concerned about the quality of research falling. We provide 
possible reasons for their views in our discussion in Chapter -. The interviews 
with senior staff at the universities revealed some concern about the future quality 
of research, but most staff did not consider that the quality had fallen so far. The 
evidence from the RAEs conducted by the funding councils indicates that in both 
of the universities the quality of research has been rising since 1986 - the research 
ratings have risen in both universities. Not only has the quality of research 
apparently risen so too has the quantity of research, if the number of journals 
available and the articles published per academic is a measure of research output. 
It would appear that the principal university performance indicator, the RAE, has 
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achieved the funding council's stated objective of making universities more 
accountable and raising the amount and quality of research. 
Although the evidence appears to point in this direction, that quality and amount 
of research has risen, a number of caveats need to be made. The first concerns 
the type of publication that is being recognised in the RAE. As our interviews 
with senior staff in the Humanities show it may be that more articles suitable for 
journal publication are being produced, but this is affecting the production of 
longer, perhaps more carefully explored, publications. Some of the senior staff 
interviewed considered that fulfilling the requirements of the RAE, and their 
university's internal research allocation models, was resulting in a change in the 
nature of research in their subjects and a diminution in its quality. Another 
concern that was raised concerned the ability of the 'vetting' agencies, referees for 
journals and research councils, to cope with the enormous increase in articles 
submitted for publication and submissions for research grants. There is a limited 
pool of referees, usually unpaid and certainly not taken into account in the RAE, 
that is being required to evaluate more and more submissions of articles and 
research applications. Although many are prepared to work long hours and 
weekends it seems unlikely that they can continue to provide the detailed 
evaluation of work submitted as formerly and at the same time continue to 
research and teach as effectively as previously. Our research is unable to answer 
the question as to what, if anything, is suffering, but the pressures on staff, 
particularly senior staff who are likely to be concerned with refereeing, suggests 
that the quality of refereeing or their other work will be adversely affected. 
Perhaps both will suffer. 
The need of staff to publish so as to be included by their universities as 'research 
active' may also be affecting the quality of articles submitted to journals. There is 
some evidence from journal editors that many articles submitted are not of the 
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same quality, in terms of both content and editing, as formerly (Jenkins 1992). 
We have already referred above to the move towards applied research. A further 
long term concern stems from the increasing separation of research and teaching. 
This does not appear to be as important an issue in University A as in University 
B. In University B our evidence is that research activity is being focused on 
research centres and the staff based in these centres. If research and teaching are 
complementary products, there is a degree of jointness in supply, then the output 
of both will suffer if some staff are only engaged in one of them. This may 
become a greater problem if there is increasing division within the university 
system, with a few universities becoming research centred and most of the rest 
concentrating on teaching and doing very little research. Despite Dearing and 
HEFCE claims that research is not to be confined to a few elite institutions our 
evidence suggests that the funding method may bring this separation about. There 
may be a loss of efficiency if a system develops that prevents able academics from 
undertaking valuable research because the university employing them cannot 
provide the necessary infrastructure for them to do research. This is not to deny 
the undoubted economic reality of resources available for universities being 
limited and that for certain types of expensive research duplication of 
infrastructural support, staff and equipment, would be wasteful. However, if the 
policy of concentrating research continues there will almost certainly be a 
detrimental impact on the total research and teaching output particularly, as we 
state above, if research and teaching are complementary activities. This may also 
lead to rigidities in the academic labour market if staff become institution specific. 
Any developments that encourage segmentation, stratification, of the university 
system and its staff may be detrimental to the long-term health of the system if 
`health' is in part dependent on the mobility of staff between different universities. 
The segmentation of the university system is discussed in chapters 2 and 8. 
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It may be argued that the method of funding research at universities may have 
additional, possibly pernicious effects on research output. Universities and their 
cost centres research is ranked and rewarded according to the number of staff 
deemed to be 'research active' and an evaluation by a research panel of the quality 
of their research. The emphasis is on the individual, but if it is the case that the 
most productive research takes place when there is a critical mass of researchers 
working within the same environment, though not necessarily on precisely the 
same subject, then this method of funding may be inimical to optimising research 
output. Cost centres may exclude people from the RAE because individually they 
feel that they will adversely affect their cost centre's ranking. Indeed, as we found 
in University A management deliberately encouraged staff to take redundancy or 
to accept a shift to an administrative post if they were deemed 'inactive' in 
research. If it is the case that the sum of the whole, in terms of research output, is 
greater than the simple aggregation of individuals output then the method of 
quantifying research output used in the RAE may underestimate research output 
as well encouraging policies that reduce total output. 
Despite these caveats, which are intended to suggest a degree of caution in 
interpreting our findings, it does appear that staff do perceive the quality of 
research to have risen as a result of their increased efforts and by staffing changes, 
all brought about through the changes to the method of funding universities. This 
is all the more remarkable when one considers that at the same time staff are doing 
more teaching and administration. Perhaps there was some slack in the 
universities and this has been reduced because of funding changes. Although 
some of the senior staff interviewed expressed some concern about how the 
quality of research was being affected it should be noted that although a 
substantial number of respondents to our questionnaire considered quality to have 
risen, in both universities the majority of respondents perceived no change or 
some decline in quality. (See table 8). 
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One final point concerning quality needs to be made. We did not define the 
meaning of the term, assuming that respondents would use similar criteria to judge 
quality in their respective fields. It is, however, possible that not all respondents 
used the same criteria to judge quality. It may be that some were adopting similar 
criteria to that used in the RAE whereas others were not. Others may have 
adopted the criteria used by the research councils with the increased emphasis on 
research being 'generic' or 'wealth creating'. As we argue in Chapter 2 the 
performance indicators (PIs) developed for evaluating research in the RAE do not 
meet with universal approval in the university system. This issue of quality 
should have been more systematically addressed in our research. 
Teaching 
We will begin by briefly repeating our results concerning time spent on teaching 
and then discuss our results with respect to teaching quality, support services and 
student quality. 
Teaching load/time: The general pattern of results for both universities was the 
same: for most staff there had been a change in the time spent on teaching and 
whether the question concerned tutorials, seminars or lectures the general 
perception of staff was that time spent had increased. This view was endorsed in 
our interviews with senior staff at the two universities. In fact, it is possible that 
there may have been some differences in what staff were referring to when they 
answered our questions about the increase in their teaching loads. For example, 
there may be differences in the typical size of lectures in separate disciplines 
(departments) and between the universities. One reason why such differences 
might arise is the differences in staff:student ratios between the two universities 
and within the universities differences between departments. Similar differences 
might arise with respect to tutorials and seminars. If these differences do exist 
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they may affect the method and quality of teaching. We did not investigate these 
issues, but will refer to them in our later discussion. 
There may also have been other differences in the attribution of meaning, for 
example with respect to the teaching method used. Is a tutorial distinct from a 
seminar not only with respect to the numbers involved, but also with respect to the 
way that knowledge is disseminated. Are students in seminars giving papers, 
orally or in writing? Is this different from what takes place in tutorials? Are 
lectures merely large seminars or are they distinct in some other way, for example 
they are delivered by staff rather than by students? There are potentially an 
almost unlimited number of possible differences of interpretation and these 
differences would not have been revealed in our interviews. The senior staff may 
have had different perceptions themselves and we would have had no way of 
verifying that their perceptions accorded with those of the staff responding to our 
questionnaire. Perhaps we do not need to dwell on this potential source of 
problems because in one sense it may be irrelevant to interpreting our findings. 
The majority of staff in both universities see time spent on all forms of teaching as 
generally moving in the same direction. There would have been more reasons for 
concern had there been significant differences between the universities. 
The quality of teaching: In both universities the pattern of responses was very 
similar with a relatively small percentage, 20 percent or less, perceiving quality to 
have fallen and nearly 50 percent perceiving quality to have risen. We have also 
presented the reasons why staff considered quality to have risen; these included 
more enthusiastic staff, greater effort/attention and the QA exercise. The 
interviews with senior staff at the two universities revealed a somewhat different 
picture from the questionnaires with only one interviewee, from University A, 
considering quality to have risen. Other staff from University A thought it had 
remained the same or fallen; all but one member of staff at University B 
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considered quality to have fallen. This is the one occasion where there appears to 
be a clear discrepancy between the results of the interviews and those from the 
questionnaires. 
One possible reason for the difference is that different meanings were being 
attached to the term 'quality'. Neither in the interviews nor questionnaire did we 
provide a definition of 'quality'. This was for three reasons: we are not persuaded 
that there is a satisfactory objective definition; we thought that by providing a 
definition of the term we would provoke controversy and quite possibly 
discourage staff from responding to the questionnaire; we were interested in staff 
perceptions of quality, irrespective of whether they use the term in precisely the 
same way. The fact that staff may not use the term 'quality in the same way 
means we cannot quantify the change to quality, but we are able to comment on 
the direction of its change. The only way that we would have been able to make a 
judgement about the absolute change, would be if all staff agreed on the direction 
of its change. If, for example all staff perceived quality to have risen we could be 
confident that it had in fact risen, unless staff perceptions of change are based on 
changing criteria. 
To return to the inconsistency in our results. Our questionnaires indicate that most 
staff who consider quality to have changed believe it to have risen. The crosstab 
analysis reinforces this picture: the results indicate that there is no statistical 
difference between professors, (all the senior staff interviewed were professors), 
and other staff in the perception of change. Inspection of the statistical tables for 
both universities reinforces this view - indeed, of those perceiving change in 
quality to have occurred, proportionately more professors than other staff 
perceive there to have been a rise. But most of those interviewed, particularly in 
University B, suggest that quality, if it has changed, has fallen. These same 
professors also stated that they agreed with the results of our analysis of the 
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questionnaires; one result of which was that teaching quality was perceived by 
those who thought it had changed to have risen. This may indicate that in talking 
about quality the professors are referring to different aspects of quality at different 
times in the interview. 
To elaborate on the above point, one way of reconciling these apparently 
contradictory results is to say that in the interviews senior staff were not asked 
directly to answer questions on quality. Issues of quality arose in response to 
more general questions about changes to their department and university. Thus it 
is possible for those interviewed to point out that support services for students 
have fallen, a result endorsed by the questionnaire returns; that the amount of 
administration and teaching load has risen so that they do not have as much time 
as formerly to spend with individual students; and that, ceteris paribus, the quality 
of teaching will therefore have fallen. However, because of the QA (quality 
assurance procedures) and other pressures on staff, including senior staff, 
conditions may have changed and the ceteris paribus assumption no longer holds 
and that therefore teaching quality may actually have risen. A further possible 
reason for the discrepancy in our results may be that the respondents to our 
questionnaire could have felt that because they were involved in the various 
quality assurance exercises and as they were spending more time than previously 
on teaching, its quality had risen. 
The above discussion shows that our evidence does not provide absolutely clear 
cut evidence about the quality of teaching and the direction in which it has 
changed. It does appear to suggest that for the staff who perceive change to have 
taken place it is because staff are giving more attention and time than previously 
to their teaching. (Our evidence suggests that this has resulted in less time than 
formerly being available for research). For these staff teaching output and its 
quality may have risen. However, if we want to say anything about the quality of 
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teaching received by the average student, and this is almost certainly what the 
senior staff were alluding to, it could have fallen at the same time as staff were 
devoting more time and energy than ever in attempting to enhance teaching 
quality. To put it baldly: staff are now 'better' teachers, but the improvement in 
teaching support has been unable to keep pace with the increase in student 
numbers. To shed more light on students and their experiences we should also 
consider our results concerning support services and student quality. 
With respect to support services our results from the interviews with senior staff 
and from the analysis of the questionnaires is unequivocal - they have declined, 
apart from support for information technology. This is also supported by our 
analysis of library spending per student and per academic. Unless there had been 
massive underutilisation of support services previously this means that support per 
student has fallen. If library support per student has fallen, ceteris paribus, and the 
quality of teaching is associated with such support, then the quality of teaching per 
student will have fallen. The quality of other support in the time that staff can 
spend per student and the availability of support services, whether it is support 
staff or equipment, was also stated in our interviews to have fallen. So far as 
support for students is concerned it does appear from our evidence to have 
declined. Coupled with this decline is the fact that at both universities, though for 
slightly different reasons (see p 159), student quality is also perceived to have 
declined. At the same time the proportion of students passing a degree with a first 
or upper second class honours has risen. If the quality of students has fallen and 
the proportion obtaining better degrees has risen this is prima facie evidence that 
the teaching effectiveness of universities has risen. And this despite the decline in 
support per student and the apparent decline in academic staff time per student. If 
however standards have been allowed to fall this conclusion is undermined; we 
now need to know whether standards have fallen relative to the decline in the 
quality of students. If the quality of entrance qualifications, usually A levels, has 
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fallen then it becomes even more difficult to reach a clear conclusion about 
quality. 
Differences Within and Between Universities 
In addition to analysing the aggregated data for the universities we also tested our 
findings to see if there were differences within and between the universities with 
respect to gender, year of appointment, rank and department. As we stated earlier 
there were very few differences within or between the two universities which may 
be an indication that all groups are being forced to respond to the funding changes 
in similar ways: the changes in funding appear to be permeating all teaching and 
research activities in a fairly uniform way. However, there were some differences 
and we will comment on them here. We will discuss them in the following order: 
gender, year of appointment, rank and department. 
Gender 
We have already commented in Chapter 8 on the significant differences between 
men and women: at University B more men considered the amount of time that 
they spent lecturing had risen. The second difference concerned the quality of 
teaching: more of the female staff perceived the quality of teaching to have risen. 
With respect to research the only difference between the universities was that in 
University B there was a significant difference between men and women in their 
perception of the direction of change in the time spent on research. 
As we noted in the chapter the sub-group gender appears to be more important in 
University B, the less prestigious university. However, we were unable to explain 
these gender differences other than by speculations about possible differences in 
the labour markets, both internal and external, for men and women. The 
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interviews with senior staff, of whom none was female, failed to shed further light 
on this issue. 
Year of Appointment 
As we reported in the earlier discussion the remarkable fact about our results is the 
similarities between the two universities and the fact that for the most part there 
was no significant differences between the more recent and older appointments in 
their perception of change to teaching, research, support services and the quality 
of students. The factors influencing university and academic staff behaviour, and 
we argue it is funding, appear in general not to discriminate between staff, 
whatever the year of appointment. As we will show later this similarity in 
responses is found when staff are distinguished through other means, namely rank 
and department. 
We did discover some differences that do require comment. The first is that the 
differences found in University A only related to research and student quality, 
whereas the differences found in University B only related to teaching. One 
possible reason for this difference is that in University A, the 'elite' university, a 
great deal more research took place than in University B and that in consequence 
any perceived changes to research would loom larger in the perceptions of staff 
there than in University B. Conversely, because teaching is a relatively more 
important activity in University B any changes to teaching might be noticed more 
by University B staff than University A staff. This is not to deny that there have 
been major changes in both teaching and research in both universities, these are 
reported at length earlier, but their relative importance may have been different. 
This difference may have been more obvious to older appointments than to newer 
appointments, hence the differences found between them. 
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If we turn first to the differences between staff in University A they are to be 
found with respect to perceptions of time spent on research, type of research and 
to the quality of student intake. 
Our general contention with respect to research and student quality, presented at 
length earlier in chapter 7, is that although all staff are experiencing change this 
will be more apparent for older appointments than for younger appointments who 
have been in the university a shorter time and therefore will have experienced less 
change in consequence. The reason for differences with respect to type of 
research are also presented earlier in chapter 7 and will not be explored again. 
The differences in University B, where more recent appointments reported a 
greater increase in teaching than older appointments, are also explored earlier and 
will not be reiterated in detail here. The explanation would appear to be that more 
recent appointments are being asked to do more teaching than older appointments. 
It is interesting that if this is the case it does not result in there being a difference 
between the two groups in the amount of time that they spend on research. 
Perhaps more recent appointments now spend more time on university activities 
than their older colleagues. Or, it is possible that the older appointments are 
experiencing the same pressures on research time, but instead of spending a 
proportionately greater time on research they are instead spending it on 
administration. Certainly, our interviews with senior staff at the two universities 
indicated that they had all experienced a massive increase in administrative load. 
One important implication of these results is that both sets of staff are finding that 
the time that they have available for keeping up to date with the literature, this 
could be termed discretionary time, is being constrained. If as a result scholarship 
is being undermined this may adversely affect both research and teaching since it 
will inevitably narrow the perspective that staff bring to their subject. 
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Rank 
Again, we found a remarkable degree of similarity in the results within and 
between the universities. With respect to teaching, both the perception of change 
and the direction of change were the same in the two universities. It would appear 
that although there has been a lesser reduction in staff:student ratios in University 
A than University B the burden of teaching is being shared by all staff irrespective 
of rank. With respect to University B all ranks perceived similar changes to 
research, support services and student quality. However, in University A there 
were significant differences between senior and junior staff in the amount of 
change in time spent on research, with senior staff perceiving a greater reduction 
in the time that they spend on research. There were also differences with respect 
to perceptions of the change in type of research, senior lecturers perceived a 
greater move towards applied research. We explored possible reasons for these 
differences earlier, among them was that these are the staff who have to change 
the orientation of their research to obtain research grants and thereby to enhance 
their career prospects; the reasons were supported by the responses given in the 
open-ended questions and in the interviews with senior staff. One crucial 
implication of the results is that it appears that in the elite university, University 
A, the university senior staff interviewed stated that even more attention is now 
being paid by appointing panels to the research contribution that new staff can 
make, but our results suggest that the teaching load of these is increasing, giving 
them less time to carry out this research. 
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Departments 
It was within this category that the greatest number of significant differences were 
found with respect to teaching, there was only one significant difference for 
research. We will consider this difference first. Within the Social Science group 
in University A significantly more staff than in the other departmental groups 
perceived research quality to have risen. This result may be explained by the fact 
that the biggest department within the social science group, psychology, had been 
more active than other departments in encouraging 'non-productive' staff to leave, 
supporting the remaining staff in research activities and publishing. Perhaps most 
importantly, because of its strong financial position, it had been able to headhunt 
senior staff with proven research records. The above explanation is based on our 
interviews with the head of the department concerned. The interviews with 
senior staff from other departments, though revealing them also to be pursuing 
policies to strengthen research, suggested that they were not pursuing them as 
vigorously. In addition many of these other departments were not as financially 
sound as the social science group and therefore were not as active in 
`headhunting'. 
The explanation for the departmental differences with respect to time spent on 
tutorials, seminars and seminars, appear to be related to the fact that certain 
departments have recruited more students than other departments; demand is 
generally more buoyant in the humanities and social sciences than in engineering 
and the sciences. The greater increase in student numbers in certain departments 
in the humanities and social sciences was confirmed in our interviews with senior 
staff and in the data furnished by the institutions. 
If the explanations for departmental differences suggested before are correct then 
again we are finding that it is funding that is affecting their behaviour. 
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Departments have differential opportunities to recruit additional students and the 
finance attached to them. Despite the differences in their history, culture and 
research ratings again the effects appear similar for the two universities in our case 
study. This is not to say that they are affected to the same degree, but that both 
universities appear to be pushed in the same direction by the funding method. 
Having considered the specific effects of the funding changes within the two 
institutions in the next chapter we will be concerned with a more general 
discussion of the meaning of these results for theory and for policy making. 
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Chapter 10: Implications of Findings 
In the previous chapter we presented and discussed our main findings. In this 
concluding chapter we discuss their wider implications. In turn we consider the 
implications of the findings for the economic models described in chapter 2, their 
possible implications for government policy and, finally, the further research that 
they suggest. 
Implications of our Findings for Economic Models 
In Chapter 2 we critically examined four models developed by economists/social 
scientists to understand university behaviour: Culyer's utility maximising model, 
the human capital model, the 'Clark/ Williams model and the Garvin model. All the 
models were found to be flawed, though some more so than others. Typically, the 
models were flawed on grounds of internal inconsistency, ambiguity and generality 
and, related to this latter point, their inability to generate testable hypotheses. It is 
for these reasons, and the fact that some of the models did not address our research 
interests directly, that we were unable or unwilling to incorporate any 'tests' of 
these models into our research. Nevertheless, our results clearly have some 
implications for the models. 
The most obvious point to arise from our research findings is that any model of 
university behaviour that ignores the method of funding institutions in its analysis 
will be incomplete. All the models, except that of Clark/ Williams, fail to a degree 
in this respect. The 'Utility maximising model,' though it may be said to include 
implicitly funding, as a constraint on stakeholders, is inadequate because unless the 
nature of the constraint, the funding method, is specified there is no way of 
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understanding why an existing position has been reached or predicting what future 
behaviour may occur. The Garvin model is flawed in much the same way as 
Culyer's model in that although it refers to finance and the effect that it has on 
university policy it ignores the effect that different methods of funding may have. It 
is unfortunate that in attempting to develop a purely economic model Garvin has 
excluded from his analysis the contribution to understanding university behaviour 
that is provided by the non-economic models, the collegial, bureaucratic and 
political models, which he dismisses by page five of his book. 
A similar point could be made about the human capital model in that there is no 
explicit discussion of funding. However, human capital theory does appear to have 
some explanatory power insofar as our results show that senior management within 
institutions is clearly motivated by economic gain: their policies towards research, 
teaching, staffing, internal allocation mechanisms and organisational structure are 
dominated by how they will affect the institution's income. This is not a surprising 
result, since it confirms what most people would expect. However, it is satisfying 
to discover that our results are not counter-intuitive, for had that been the case it 
would have cast doubt on the reliability and validity of the other results of this 
study. It would also appear that institutions are producing more graduates and 
research at lower cost. If this is the case then the government has achieved one of 
its objectives for universities - an increase in the quantity of human capital without a 
commensurate increase in university costs. (This point will be explored more fully 
in the next section). 
The only model that gives explicit attention to the method of funding is that of 
Clark/Williams. Our results confirm that their emphasis on the importance of 
funding method is justified. What our results also show, and both Clark and 
Williams will find it no surprise, is that the way in which universities are funded 
has elements of more than one model: it is a hybrid consisting of elements of both 
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the 'bureaucratic' and 'market' models. As we point out in the discussion of the 
models in Chapter 2, it is very difficult to predict the effect different models will 
have on university behaviour even in their pure form; and even more difficult when 
the model is a hybrid. Indeed, our analysis shows that even where the details of the 
method of fUnding are clear, as is the case with university funding in Britain, it is 
impossible to predict with any certainty what its effects may be on a given 
university. Our results show a degree of similarity in the pattern of behaviour in the 
two universities in our case study, but there are also differences in their behaviour 
and also differences within institutions themselves, for example between 
departments. Though these differences appear not to be as important as the 
similarities shared by the universities they are important and may well become more 
important through time. For example, the difference between the 'elite' university, 
with its capacity to develop its research profile through head-hunting and other 
staffing policies, and the 'teaching' university, relatively starved of resources and 
therefore forced to limit the development of its research to a restricted range of areas 
and to a specialist cadre of academics, may well become sharper. 
Conversely, the importance of teaching and recruiting students, particularly at 
undergraduate level, seems certain to become even more important at University B 
than at University A. These differences between the institutions would appear to 
stem from their differences in history, culture and economic well being. Thus it 
would seem that although the Clark/Williams model provides some insights it has 
little predictive power unless the conditions of the institutions are carefully 
specified. This would presumably include a specification of the organisational 
structure and the characteristics of key personnel as these, together with the more 
obvious factors, such as financial viability, prestige and history affect both the type 
of response to funding changes and the speed with which these changes occur. 
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Our results shed further light on other characteristics of the models. In the Culyer 
and Garvin models it is assumed that the actors in the university system are utility 
maximisers. Garvin does not discuss possible conflicts between these actors, for 
example administrators and academics, and how they come to be resolved. Culyer 
does make some attempt to do this in his model. Our evidence indicates that a utility 
maximising model of any sort does not provide a very satisfactory explanation of 
university behaviour, at least of those in our case study. A much more appropriate 
model would appear to be one in which decisions about internal allocation, staffing, 
new programmes and so forth are made by senior management, with the minimum 
of consultation with other members of the university community. These decisions 
seem to be in accordance with how they will affect the universities costs and 
income, which is itself largely determined exogenously by the funding council's 
funding formula. It would appear then that some form of income maximising 
model would have more explanatory power than a utility maximising model. And 
such a model would need to be applied to the university overall and to its constituent 
parts, departments, for the same income maximising behaviour is to be observed at 
this level too. The driving force compelling universities to act as though they are 
income maximisers is the funding method. 
Our results are also of interest in that they shed some light on another aspect of 
Garvin's model. Although in his discussion of the American university system 
Garvin is sometimes a little ambiguous as to whether it operates as a single market 
or not, he finally seems to come to the view that the system may be characterised by 
a number of submarkets. This view of his position is supported by statements such 
as ( the university system of the USA is) 'segmented by geography, quality of 
institution, and highest degree offered'. Although it used to be said of the British 
university system that it was reasonably homogeneous and that students and staff 
could move freely between institutions offering similar products, this would appear 
from our evidence no longer to be true, if it ever was. Universities may be 
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becoming increasingly differentiated from each other with respect to what they can 
offer, to whom it is offered and by whom it is offered. Although we are certainly 
not the first to note this, our evidence lends some support to the claim that some 
universities appear to be increasingly becoming centres of research excellence, 
whereas others appear doomed to become 'teaching factories', concentrating on 
undergraduate work and undertaking very little research. Although it has been 
claimed that all universities have the opportunity to join the research elite, the 
Russell Group (A group of more prestigious research universities, including 
Oxford, Cambridge and certain London colleges that meets regularly to consider 
university policy), and in the recent Dearing Report on universities it was argued 
that all universities should be involved in both research and teaching, it seems a 
similar claim to that made about access to law (and justice) in this country: 'the law, 
like the Ritz, is open to all'. 
It would appear that there are three clear conclusions from this discussion of the 
implications of our evidence for the 'economic' models of university behaviour. 
The first is that no model will be complete without incorporating consideration of 
the method by which the institution is funded. Second, that none of the models 
seems able to explain university behaviour without introducing ad hoc assumptions 
(see our earlier discussion in chapter 2) and this may be because they are based on 
flawed assumptions, such as utility maximising behaviour. Third, each university 
may be sui generis and therefore no simple model will ever capture the complex 
interactions between people and structures, internal and external, that determine 
behaviour. Perhaps greater insights and understanding would result from the 
development of models that incorporate ideas from other social sciences as well as 
those from economics. 
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Implication of Results for Policy Makers 
The changes to the university funding method were introduced at the behest of the 
Conservative government, although the details were decided by the funding council. 
In this section we consider some of the intended and, perhaps, unintended 
consequences of the change to funding. We will consider first the effect on 'value 
for money' from the universities and distinguish between the short and long-term 
effects. We will then examine the development of segmentation within the 
university system, segmentation, or differentiation, of institutions and of staff. 
This development may also have long-term implications for 'value for money'. 
The introduction of a new method of funding universities was motivated by the 
Government's wish to make universities more accountable for the resources that are 
allocated to them through the funding council(s). This policy of increasing 
accountability for public spending was not peculiar to higher education; other areas 
of education, schools and further education colleges, and other publicly supported 
services such as health, were also being 'required' to become more accountable for 
the resources that they received. Behind the move towards accountability was the 
idea that resources were not being used as effectively as they should: the 
Government was not getting 'value for money'. The introduction of markets, or 
quasi-markets, was one mechanism that was intended to increase competition 
between institutions and improve institutional performance. Evidence of the then 
Government's desire to 'improve' the operation of the system is suggested in a 
quote from the Secretary of State for Education at the time, Kenneth Baker: 'they 
(the state schools) don't have much competition now. Ninety- three percent of 
children are in the state system against seven percent in the private. I want a third 
type, grant maintained independent and in a system in which all three types of 
school compete' (The Guardian, May 29, 1987). Or, as Duffy (1990) puts it, 
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`LMS (local management of schools) is about putting schools into the market-place, 
and the hard discipline of the market place is that the weak will go to the wall'. 
The extent to which the market has been introduced into British higher education is 
not the issue for this thesis. There must be doubts about whether or not a market 
has been introduced and, certainly from the perspective of neo-classical economists, 
whether the development of markets in higher education can result in greater 
efficiency. (See chapter 2 and previous section). What is of interest is whether the 
changes introduced by the funding councils on behalf of the Government have 
increased efficiency in higher education. Our results provide some tentative 
answers to this question; they also show how difficult it is to make a categorical 
judgement as to how efficiency has changed. 
In Chapter 1 we discuss the concept of efficiency, distinguishing between three 
types: production efficiency, exchange efficiency and economic efficiency. (We 
gave reasons in the chapter why we reject the education production function method 
for measuring changes to efficiency and will not repeat them here). We will 
consider the implications of our results for each of these types of efficiency. 
Production efficiency is said to have increased when a given output or set of outputs 
is produced at a lower cost, that is, when the unit cost of output falls. Thus if we 
know how the costs has changed at our two case universities and we know how 
output has changed we can speculate about production efficiency changes at these 
universities. As with the rest of the university system the expenditure per student at 
the two universities fell dramatically during the period that we are investigating: by 
some 25 per cent at University A and by over 50 percent at University B (figures 
based on internal documents adjusted for inflation). The expenditure per student is 
a commonly used measure of the resources that are being provided at universities. 
Other measures, such as expenditure per member of staff, could be used, but since 
they all have moved in the same direction the picture of cost changes would be very 
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similar to that for the unit of resource so we will use that measure. We have already 
defined university output as consisting of teaching and of research. In doing so, we 
ignore the other outputs of universities. Universities are said, for example, to act as 
`stores of knowledge', they also provide consultancy services, they are said to help 
to preserve, develop and support national cultures and democracy. If these other 
outputs are produced jointly with research and teaching then our results will tell us 
something about whether these other outputs are also being produced more 
efficiently. If they are not joint products then our results will only tell us something 
about the efficiency with which research and teaching are produced. If these other 
outputs have been affected by the changes to research and teaching overall 
university efficiency may have risen less or more, according to whether these other 
outputs have been negatively or positively affected. It is by no means clear that the 
Tory Government of 1984 had a very clear perception of what a more efficient 
university system would look like but that it was concerned with 'efficiency' and 
`value for money' and that this was one reason for greater selectivity in research 
funding is made very clear in the 1985 Green Paper and the comments in the 
education press at the time. The Green Paper, as quoted in the THES, conceives of 
a situation in which there is 'loss of research funding for departments or even 
universities' (THES 24th May 1985 pl). The pressure from the Government on the 
UGC to change its method of funding universities, and particularly research, to a 
more selective system is recognised in a quote from Swinnerton-Dyer the UGC's 
Chief Executive 
`The pressure (from Government) is too strong to resist, even if we wished 
to' (THES 14th Sept 1984). In the UGC's Advice to the Government in 
1984 it formally announced its intention to introduce selectivity in research 
funding'. 
We have already discussed the effects of the funding changes on teaching and 
research. With respect to teaching there seems little doubt from our evidence and 
publicly available data that the quantity of teaching has risen at universities, in terms 
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of time spent on teaching and numbers of students. We have also argued that 
although the quality of teaching for individual students may have fallen, the quality 
of teaching provided by individual teachers has risen. If this latter claim is valid 
then the quality of teaching per unit of teaching input has risen. Even if the quality 
had remained the same we can be confident that the production efficiency of 
teaching has risen because the same quality is being provided at lower cost. If the 
quality of students, another input, has also fallen, as was claimed at both 
universities, then this assertion of increased efficiency is strengthened if, and it is an 
important if, the quality of output has remained constant - lower quality inputs are 
now being used to produce the same quality product. Recent claims by staff at the 
Thames Valley University that it is `dumbing down' its standards, the current 
HEFCE enquiry by the Quality Assurance Agency into standards at universities (see 
THES, 19th Sept 1997 pl) and the concerns expressed by industry about standards 
(see, for example, Adair Hunter of the CBI's speech to the SRHE conference, 
Hunter, 1997 all give cause for some doubt as to whether standards have remained 
constant. 
Our findings with respect to research are somewhat more ambiguous. Our evidence 
shows that most staff are spending less time on research than formerly, but most 
staff consider that the quality of research has risen. Our interviews indicated that 
the quantity of research output had not fallen, partly because staff are working 
longer hours than formerly, and at weekends. In addition, at both universities the 
results of the RAEs indicate that the research output and its quality have risen. (The 
validity of these exercises has been explored earlier in chapter 3 and 4). If we use 
the same measure of costs, as we did for teaching we can tentatively conclude that 
there has been an increase in the efficiency with which the university research is 
produced. We should add a caveat to this conclusion. As we report earlier there 
has been some change in the type of research output, which means that we are not 
strictly speaking comparing like with like, but instead comparing the perceptions 
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staff had of the quantity of research and its quality, even though the actual type of 
research may have changed. 
In reaching these conclusions about efficiency we have ignored the fact that there 
may have been a significant change in one of the major inputs into the production of 
research and teaching, namely academic staff. Our evidence has suggested that our 
two universities have tried to increase the quality of their staff by more careful 
recruitment practices, providing more in-house support and encouraging 'weaker' 
staff to leave. However, because our concern is with the cost at which the research 
and teaching outputs are produced, production efficiency, this does not present any 
problem for our conclusions. Indeed, it reinforces our conclusion because the 
result of the funding change has had the effect of making management replace 
inferior by superior inputs, at no extra cost. This is one possible explanation of the 
rise in efficiency. Another explanation might be that management has reorganised 
so as to make better use of its capital and labour. Perhaps the most important factor 
enabling efficiency to rise has been a decline in x-inefficiency in the two 
universities. X-efficiency is a term coined by Liebenstein in a seminal article 
(Liebenstein 1966) in which he asserted that incentives, motivation, and other 
organisational characteristics of a firm were viewed as having far greater 
implications for efficiency than the allocation of inputs at the margin ( the usual way 
in which economists analysed efficiency gains). As Levin (1997) has argued with 
respect to schools, if educational institutions are given a clear objective function 
with measurable outcomes; and are provided with incentives linked to the success 
on the objective function; and are also given access to useful information for 
decision making, they are likely to become more x-efficient. The development of a 
new and more transparent funding method for universities may have had just this 
effect. When McNay (1998 p20) reports organisational changes in response to the 
RAE he may be referring to x-efficiency change. 
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Both McNay and Higson (1998) provide some support for our finding that 
efficiency has improved. McNay states that "over 80 percent of heads of units think 
quality has improved" (p20). Higson claims that "the number of journal articles has 
increased, as has the school's overall research rating" (p32). Unfortunately, since 
neither study has effective measures of inputs, we cannot be certain that efficiency 
has increased with respect to the outputs that they consider. 
Although we are able to say something about changes to the efficiency with which 
teaching and research are provided, it is very difficult to do the same for either 
exchange or economic efficiency without making heroic assumptions as to society's 
objective function- the combination of university outputs yielding the greatest utility 
to society. Society is made up of different groups that almost invariably have 
conflicting interests. To take universities themselves, it is extremely unlikely that 
the stakeholders within the system - administrators, researchers, academics and 
students - will want the same combination of outputs as each other, and these again 
are unlikely to coincide with allocation of outputs desired by external interests, such 
as the Government, industry and the local community. What we can say is that if 
the funding agent, the HEFCE, reflects the views of 'society' then our results 
would indicate an increase in both exchange and economic efficiency. 
Although our evidence suggests that there has been some increase in efficiency 
some cautionary comments should be added. The first is that our analysis is based 
upon cross-sectional data and examines only the short term effects on teaching and 
research. Some of our findings suggest that in the longer term there may be more 
deleterious effects of the recent funding changes that may reduce efficiency. The 
first of these is the changes to the nature of the research process and the manner of 
dissemination that we noted earlier (chapter 8): viz the demands of the RAE pushing 
academics into doing short-term work and into writing short pieces suitable for 
journal publishing. This seems particularly to have affected practice in the 
288 
Humanities. If, as we were told in our interviews, this will adversely affect 
research and scholarship then research output and quality will suffer and so will 
production (and probably economic) efficiency. Much the same point was made 
about the shift in the sciences towards more applied research; if all research is 
fundamentally dependent on basic research and this declines to the extent that it 
reduces the potential for applied research, then again research output will suffer and 
efficiency decline. And if research and teaching are complementary, or joint, 
products a decline in one will cause a decline in the other. 
Perhaps even more important in the long-term will be the effect of the funding 
changes on scholarship. In both the interviews and the open-ended answers in the 
questionnaires respondents pointed out the increased workload and the effect this 
was having on their domestic life and on the reduction in time to interact with 
colleagues and to think about their teaching and particularly their research. This 
concern is brilliantly, and amusingly, raised in an article by Marilyn Stathern, a 
Cambridge University anthropologist, when discussing the ways in which 
universities are audited through QA and RAE exercises. Under both 
`Proof of performance and productivity requires outputs that can be 
measurable and thus made visible. This subverts the integral role that time 
with no visible output plays in both teaching and research. In teaching there 
must be a lapse of time - the process is one of absorption and reformulation. 
In research, time must be set aside for all the wasteful and dead-end 
activities that precede the genuine findings. Both require otherwise non-
productive periods. Yet there is almost no language in the audit culture in 
which to talk about productive non-productivity'. 
(Strathern, 1997 p318). 
The effect, if there is one on scholarship, will take time to emerge, but when it does 
it will be damaging to both teaching and research. 
Other effects of the funding changes are already occurring but may also be stronger 
in the longer term. Two of these are the stratification/segmentation of the university 
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system and the differentiation of staff within it. We have already commented on the 
differences between the elite institution, University A, and the non-elite university, 
University B. It is by no means a novel discovery that there is a hierarchy within 
the British university system, or that some universities do rather better out of 
research council grants than others. What is perhaps not so well understood is how 
the funding mechanism is bolstering and reinforcing this hierarchy. The funding 
mechanism, and particularly the RAE, is eroding the ability of low ranked 
universities to undertake research on any significant scale, because they have no 
funds with which to build up a research infrastructure or to attract research 'high 
fliers' (and they are also soon to be denied research students). This means that they 
have to recruit students in increasing numbers if they are to remain financially 
viable. This development may be deliberate policy by the funding council which is 
aware that the pot of research money to be shared amongst the universities is finite. 
However, such a policy may deny research possibilities to able staff confined to the 
non- research universities. It may also undermine the total research output if, as 
some have argued, good research does not depend on large numbers of researchers 
forming a 'critical mass'. And, obviously if there is a complementarity between 
good research and good teaching, any separation of the two undermines both. 
Another development, much more noted at University B than University A, was the 
development of an 'underclass' of academic staff who are on temporary and part-
time contracts. University B employs large numbers of these for financial, not 
educational, reasons: such staff cost less and in the event of financial crisis can be 
easily discarded. More flexibility in the academic labour market may be a good 
thing, but there may be a price to be paid in teaching and research as these staff may 
not have the same commitment to the university, to colleagues and to students. 
Thus what may be seen as an inequity in the academic labour market may potentially 
also lead to some loss of efficiency. 
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Future Research 
Our research has made a significant contribution to an understanding of the effects 
of the change to university funding initiated in 1985. However, in carrying out the 
analysis of our data two further agendas for research emerged. The first arises from 
deficiencies in our research design that should be corrected in any further research 
on this question. The second agenda is to do with further research that could be 
carried out to illuminate issues and questions that emerged in the discussion of our 
findings. 
Improvements to the Original Design 
We justified the method of our research in Chapter 5, however, in our analysis it 
became apparent that we could in a number of cases only draw tentative conclusions 
from our data because certain questions were not sufficiently specific. The general 
problem was that we intended to investigate the direction in which universities were 
being pushed by the funding changes, hence we asked staff questions about 
whether they were doing more or less teaching and research than prior to the 
funding changes. However, such questions do not enable us to say anything 
quantifiable since we do not know either the base from which the answer is given or 
how much more or less is being done. Ignorance of quantitative evidence makes it 
more difficult to say anything about changes to efficiency. To add to the length of 
the questionnaire may have had disadvantages: non-response would almost certainly 
have risen and there may have been an encouragement for respondents to exaggerate 
or, if their memory was flawed, to give inaccurate replies. Perhaps a diary exercise 
would have helped, but it would have told us only what they were doing at that 
point in time (1993) and not, and this was the major concern, how what they were 
doing had changed from 1986. 
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Another problem that emerged concerned the meaning of 'quality' in responses. 
We ask respondents how the quality of research and teaching has changed in their 
subject area at their university. We do not have any means of checking that they 
had sufficient information about what colleagues were doing to answer this 
question, and we do not ask them to provide evidence for their response. We could 
have asked them about the quality of their work, to which they should know the 
answer, but this may again encourage exaggeration on the part of respondents. 
There is also the problem, alluded to above, of the effect on response rate of 
extending questionnaires. 
Our final concern with research design concerns the interviews with senior staff. 
The interview schedule was designed to gain further insights into policy formation 
and the factors affecting policy. This provided an independent set of insights into 
what was influencing university and departmental behaviour. Only at the end of the 
interview did we ask interviewees to comment on the results of our analysis of the 
questionnaires. In retrospect, we should have had the interviews later when all 
questionnaires had been analysed, including the crosstab analysis, and we should 
have spent more time discussing the results and the reasons for them. This would 
have required much longer interviews and extending the data collection period. 
Unfortunately, resource constraints, particularly in the time available to the 
researcher and the interviewees, made this impossible. 
Extension of Research 
There are four main ways in which it would be useful to extend this research: 
increasing the number of universities in the sample, adopting a more 
interdisciplinary approach in data collection and analysis, revisiting the original two 
universities and investigating more fully the development of differentiation between 
and within universities. We will consider each in turn. 
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Our results indicate major changes are taking place in universities as a result of 
funding changes. An obvious, but very important issue is whether the results we 
obtained from our two case studies are sue generis or whether they reflect the 
changes taking place more generally in the university system (of Britain). There are 
at least two ways the research might be usefully extended to answer these 
questions. The first is by extending the number of 'old' universities. As we 
explain in the chapter on research design our research is limited to an 'elite' 
university, covering the traditional subjects, and a 'non-elite' former CAT. It 
would be of interest if the research was extended to cover a wider range of 
universities to see if they have behaved in similar ways to our two universities. 
Since our central proposition is that the method of funding is critical in determining 
universities' policies it would be of interest to see if the 'new' universities, which 
have very different histories from the 'old' universities and were, until 1992, 
funded under an entirely different system, have responded in a similar way as the 
`old' universities. It may well be the case that the data collected in this extended 
research would indicate that detailed predictions of universities responses to 
changed funding policy will be possible only when additional factors are included in 
the analysis. Factors that would need incorporation into the analysis would include 
previous RAE ratings, financial viability, range of subjects taught, curricular 
arrangements, prior organisational structure and leadership styles. 
It is clear from the list of factors that we consider might be included in further 
research that we require an interdisciplinary approach. If the interdisciplinary 
approach did provide fresh insights into understanding university behaviour it 
would have important implications for policy makers attempting to persuade 
universities to behave in a particular way. To take an example, if it were found that 
the funding method alone was the dominant influence on university behaviour then 
to effect the changes that policy makers wanted it would only be necessary for them 
to ensure that the funding method was consistent with their objectives. If, on the 
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other hand, it was found that universities are complex institutions whose response 
to a change in (funding) policy can only be predicted if details about leadership style 
and organisational structure are first understood then this too would considerably 
complicate the policy implications. 
Whilst an extension of the research to other universities and the use of an 
interdisciplinary approach would be valuable, it would also be of interest to return 
to the two universities studied here to discover whether the initial findings are still 
supported. Most of those interviewed, for example, claimed that if the funding 
policy were to be continued in the same way in the near future it would have 
damaging effects on the quality of both research and teaching, and on the quantity 
of research. If this were indeed found to be the case it would mean that policy 
makers would need to weigh this effect against its stated policy of making the 
university system more 'efficient', by which the Government meant cheaper. If it 
was found that staff still did not think that the quality and quantity of research had 
fallen then it would mean that the efficiency gains suggested earlier had been 
maintained. 
Our evidence suggests that the university system may be becoming more 
differentiated; that there is a 'market', but as Garvin claimed to be the case in the 
United States this market is becoming increasingly segmented. This issue of the 
degree of segmentation could be more directly addressed by investigating student 
qualifications, where and why they apply to particular institutions; by examining 
differences in staff characteristics, university mission statements and policy 
documents; through examining research profiles of the universities; and, in addition 
asking senior staff questions about the relative position in the market of their 
university and the reason for this position. Information of this sort would be of 
interest theoretically as education markets are not very well understood at present. 
It would also be of interest to policy makers, both at the institutional and national 
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level. Concurrent with this extension of the research there could be a further 
investigation of the differentiation of staff within universities; an examination of the 
contractual position of staff would show whether there is a developing 'underclass' 
of academics, and whether it is to be found in all universities. It used to be said that 
the contract researchers were the university 'underclass', but interestingly as their 
plight is being addressed (see Harris N (1997) a new 'underclass' may be 
appearing. 
At both universities there was evidence of a 'new' culture developing, perhaps 
some would suggest it is a 'market' culture. This was clearly the intention of the 
Tory Government in its general policy towards education. (For evidence of this 
with respect to school policy see, for example, Whitty 1998 and Ball 1995). There 
was also evidence, particularly from the interviews, that staff morale seems to be 
adversely affected by the development of this 'new' culture and by what appears to 
be an ever increasing demand to do more teaching, research and administration. 
Both the issue of the 'new' culture and the decline of morale need a much more 
intensive investigation at the two universities in our study and the university system 
generally. Such a study would require examination of internal documents, policy 
statements and interviews with staff and management. Policy makers should be 
interested in these results. 
This study has provided a unique insight into the responses of two very different 
universities to the new university funding method introduced in 1985. It has shown 
that the introduction of the RAE, the PI par excellence of the scheme, has 
dramatically affected university organisation, teaching and research. Our results 
show there have been both homogenising and differentiating effects. There has 
been a powerful homogenising influence in that internal allocation procedures, the 
amount of teaching undertaken by staff, the time for and type of research, and the 
general staffing policies have moved in the same direction in both of the very 
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different universities in our case study. Concomitantly, there have been important 
differentiating effects with the elite university, University A, not feeling the need to 
change its teaching methods and organisation and still able to appoint staff to do 
research and teach. At University B, for some staff there appeared to be an 
increasing separation of teaching and research with only the privileged few being 
provided with the support necessary to be active researchers. The research also 
indicated that the RAE may be affecting subjects differentially. Although the 
Science and Engineering staff, and, to a lesser extent, the Social Science staff, were 
able to pursue and disseminate research as they had formerly, this was not the case 
for the Humanities staff for many of them felt that the very nature of the research 
and dissemination process was being changed as a result of the RAE. Our evidence 
reinforces and extends the critique of university performance indicators discussed in 
chapters 3 and 4; it shows how one indicator, the RAE, can distort the 'life' of a 
university and, at a more general level, the shape of the university system itself. 
Our case study points to the importance of a broad based, inter-disciplinary and 
more detailed study of universities. 
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Appendix 1: The Jarratt and Merrison Reports 
The Jarratt Report 
The Jarratt Report was published in 1985. Its title "Report of the Steering 
Committee on Efficiency Studies in Universities", suggests that it was concerned 
with efficiency in universities, but in fact it was concerned with the efficiency of 
management and administrative practices in universities. The Committee identified 
a number of "structural" weaknesses in the management of universities. These 
included the wide range and variety of activity undertaken; the tradition of self-
government which can provide a strong unifying force within the institution; but it 
can also be used to delay or block difficult but necessary decisions; and professional 
loyalties which mean that staff often regard their status as physicists, surgeons, 
lawyers or technicians as being at least as important as their membership of a 
university. This can give rise to divided loyalties and conflicts of interest. The 
Report argued that this division of loyalty added to the task of uniting an institution 
to work to a common purpose and objectives. 
The Jarratt Report went on to claim that resource allocation tended to be fragmented 
and unco-ordinated. It drew attention to inadequate co-ordination between the 
committees involved in the allocation process and the fact that 'co-ordination of 
resource allocation relies far too much on the Vice-Channellor and senior 
administrative officers and on the informal and uncertain device of cross 
membership of committees'. 
The Report came up with 10 constitutional recommendations for universities, and 
approved 9 recommendations on financial management, 13 on purchasing, and 12 
on building and plant management. It recommended that within the next 12 months 
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every university should prepare a programme for implementing its 
recommendations on a basis to be agreed with the UGC, and describe how it 
intended to apply to its own situation the findings of the special studies 
commissioned by the Committee on financial management,T/304 G1G1G1 
The Merrison Report 
The UGC and the Advisory Board of the Research Council (ABRC) approved a 
working party, chaired by Sir Alec Merrison to review arrangements for supporting 
university research. The committee reported in April 1982. Its principal 
recommendations were that universities should channel proportionately more of 
their funds into research, concentrate research funds into selected areas, establish 
mechanisms for choosing research areas and ways of supporting them, take the 
initiative in areas where there was not a viable research base to form associations 
between departments in a university or between universities or other research 
centres, and form stronger links with industry. 
The major mechanisms it proposed for effecting these recommendations was the 
establishment of a research committee which would judge from time to time the 
areas on which the university would be wise to concentrate. After a university 
decision on that, the Committee would ensure that in the internal allocation process 
these areas received adequate funds for research. It would also have at its disposal 
resources to provide "some modest support to bright ideas", including those "which 
may seem at first not only odd but positively perverse and outlandish". 
Had the Merrison recommendations been followed by universities it may well have 
influenced research activity, and possibly teaching too. But as Williams notes the 
case for a Research Committee was almost immediately "weakened by the pressure 
exerted on the universities by the Secretary of State and the UGC to adopt the Jarratt 
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Committee proposals for Planning and Resources Committees to bring planning, 
resource allocation and accountability into one corporate process, and to delegate 
budgets to appropriate centres which would be held responsible for what they 
achieved against their budgets. 
The fact that most universities do now have research committees appears again to 
have been a response to changes in methods of funding rather than to the Merrison 
Report. 
Partly in response to Merrison the ABRC drew up a strategy paper "A Strategy for 
the Science Base". One of its main conclusions was the following: 
"Accordingly, we consider that the future pattern of higher education 
provision appropriate to the needs of research would be for differentiation 
between three types of institutions: 
Type R: Institutions offering undergraduate and postgraduate 
teaching and substantial research activity across the range of fields. 
Type T: Institutions highly competent in undergraduate and MSc 
teaching with staff engaged in the scholarship and research 
necessary to support and develop that teaching, but without 
provision of advanced research facilities. 
Type X: Institutions providing teaching across a broad range of 
fields and engaged in substantial world class research in particular 
fields where they are already pre-eminent or could achieve eminence 
in collaboration with other institutions. 
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The polytechnics and colleges were, presumably, in the Type T category. 
To support its case that teaching would not suffer in Type T institutions the 
report quoted from the Oxburgh Report. 
In fact this policy was never endorsed by the Government of the time, but it may be 
behind present Government policy and point to the future shape of the university 
system. 
ABRC (1983) A Strategy for the Science Base, London, HMSO. 
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Appendix 2: A Short History of PIs in UK 
Universities 
"The government's interest in developing a more rigorous set of 
procedures for evaluating the higher education sector was first highlighted 
in the 1985 Green Paper on The Development of Higher Education into the 
1990s. This pressed for fundamental improvements in the contribution of 
the higher education sector to national economic development. According 
to the Green Paper, the higher education sector's performance was below 
par and needed to be improved. In particular, there is continuing concern 
that higher education does not respond sufficiently to changing needs. 
This may be due in part to disincentives to change within higher 
education, including over-dependence on public funding, and to failures in 
communication between employers and institutions". 
(DES, 1986: p6.) 
Moreover, 
"The Government believes that it is vital for our higher education to 
contribute more effectively to the improvement of the performance of the 
economy". 
(DES, 1985: 3) 
According to the government, the higher education sector could improve its 
efficiency and effectiveness in several ways: 
1. "Higher education should be more responsive to the needs of the 
economy. This will require closer links to be forged between 
higher education and industry. In addition, it will also be 
necessary to switch the subject mix away from the arts and 
humanities towards technical and vocational courses. 
2. Higher education depends far too heavily on public funds and 
greater efforts are needed to raise private funds through applied 
research, consultancy and continuing education. 
3. Greater selectivity is needed in the allocation of research funding 
so that more resources are concentrated in the centres of 
excellence. 
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4. 	 The higher education sector needs to be more cost-conscious and 
should manage its resources more efficiently and more effectively. 
This will require the construction and regular publication of a 
range of performance indicators. These will be used to aid the 
resource allocation process both within and between institutions". 
(DES 1985) Source. 
These recommendations were reiterated in the White Paper (DES 1987b) on 
Higher Education: Meeting the Challenge, which provided a clear statement (in 
broad terms) of the government's main policies for higher education. The 
government's own summary statement of these policies is given in Table 1.1. The 
White Paper also announced that the University Grants Committee (UGC) was to 
be replaced by the Universities Funding Council (UFC) and that Polytechnics and 
Colleges Funding Council (PCFC). These two new bodies became operational in 
April 1989. 
The change from being a grant awarding body to a funding council (in the case of 
the replacement of the UGC by the UFC) is worth noting. The significance of this 
distinction between grants and funding was made crystal clear in a consultative 
document issued by the government in 1987 (DES 1987a). This document was 
important in so far as it gave advance warning of a change in the way the higher 
education sector was to be funded. 
"It proposed that the method of allocating funds to universities should be 
changed from the block grant system to one based upon contractual 
agreements drawn up between each university and the UFC (and similarly 
for the Polytechnics' and colleges' sector)." According to this consultative 
document, universities would be expected to offer and deliver a clearly 
specified range of educational services in return for UFC funding. If 
implemented, this new method of funding would give the UFC and the 
government much greater control over the range and type of courses 
offered by each institution". 
The control of universities is to become more centralised whilst the government 
continues to exhort the advantage and discipline of the market. The only way to 
reconcile this contradiction is if the only consumer is the government, clearly an 
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absurd proposition given the government's stated aim to make universities 
compete for students and industrial support as well as competing for government 
resource and research council awards. 
More recently the DES has released a further consultative document (DES 1989) 
which proposes an amendment to the existing method of funding by suggesting 
that higher education institutions should obtain a greater proportion of their 
income from student fees and correspondingly reduced the funds allocated by the 
two Funding Councils. This proportion of the funding will consequently be 
determined by the Funding Council' views about the quality and cost of the 
educational services delivered by each institution. There will therefore be more 
control from the centre. On the other hand, the sharp increase in the proportion of 
funding emanating from student fees means that consumer demand will play an 
increasing role in determining the distribution of public funds between institutions 
and between courses. Consumer power will therefore become more important. 
The balance between these two opposing determinants of the way in which public 
funds are allocated between institutions (central control v consumer power) will 
ultimately be decided by the government in the light of experience. (Appendix A 
discusses these new funding arrangements in more detail.) 
As suggested earlier, the government's clear unease with the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the university sector gave rise to the setting up of the Jarratt 
Committee by the CVCP. Its purpose was to inquire into the efficiency and 
effectiveness of universities. Among the proposals from the Committee was 
stated earlier: 
"A range of performance indicators should be developed, covering both 
inputs and outputs and designed for use both within individual institutions 
and for making comparisons between institutions". 
(Jarratt 1985 p36) 
309 
The upshot was the development of the PIs critically commented on earlier. 
Apart from the fairly obvious point that if a PI, such as library expenditure per 
FTE member of staff, is used to indicate performance is performance getting 
better or worse if this indicator is rising. If it is to be a useful management tool 
and guide to comparisons between universities questions such as these need to be 
addressed. However, 
"the main problem is that the individual indicators do not compare like 
with like. For example, although it may be interesting to know that 
university A awards a higher proportion of first class degrees than 
university B, this information is of little use per se for evaluation purposes 
since we do not know whether the difference between A and B is a result 
of better teaching in A or a result of A attracting students with more innate 
ability. If indicators of output (or their quality of output) are to be used as 
performance measures it is essential to compare like with like. This can 
be done by taking differences in inputs into account before comparing 
outputs." 
(Johnes & Taylor, 1990, p9). 
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Appendix 3: Questionnaire for University Staff 
(Academic) 
General Information 
Date of birth: 	
 Sex: 
Current post: 	
 Cost Centre/Dept: 
	  
What subject(s) do you teach? (Please specify below) 
Date of appointment to the university: 
Type of contract: 	 (Please ring one number only) 
Permanent full time 	 1 
	
(1) 
Permanent part time 	 2 
Temporary full time 	 3 
Temporary part time 
	 4 
Research 
1. 	 Has the amount of time you spend on research changed since 1986, or since 
you were appointed? (Please ring one number only) 
YES 
	 1 	 (2) 
NO 	 2 
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If 'YES': 
(a) How has it changed? (Please ring one number only) 
I now spend: 	 (3) 
much more time on it 
	 1 
more time 	 2 
less time 	 3 
much less time 	 4 
(b) Why has the time you spend on research changed? (Please write in 
the space below) 
2. 	 Has the type of research* you undertake changed since 1986, or since your 
appointment? (Please ring one number only) 
YES 
	
1 	 (4) 
NO 	 2 
* See appendix for research definitions. If the definitions do not apply to 
your research would you please describe the type of research you do and state 
whether and how the amount of time spent on it has changed and, if so, why. 
Please answer in b) below.) 
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If 'YES' 
(a) In what way? (Please ring appropriate numbers) 
I now undertake: 	 (5) 
more basic research 
	 1 
more strategic research 
	 2 
more applied research 
	 3 
more personal research/scholarship 4 
(b) Why has the type of research you undertake changed? (Please write 
in the space below) 
3. 	 Do you think that the quality of researching in your area in your institution 
has changed since 1986, or since your appointment? (Please ring one,  
number only) 
YES 
	 1 	 (6) 
NO 	 2 
If 'YES' 
(a) 	 How has it changed? (Please ring one number only) 
The quality: 	 (7) 
has improved greatly 
	 1 
has improved somewhat 
	 2 
has declined 	 3 
has declined markedly 
	 4 
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(b) 	 If you think the quality of research has improved or declined, why is 
this? (Please write in the space below) 
Teaching 
1. 	 Has the amount of time you spend on tutorials, including preparation and 
marking, changed since 1986, or since your appointment? (Please ring one 
number only) 
YES 	 1 	 (8) 
NO 	 2 
If 'YES' 
(a) How has it changed? (Please ring one number only) 
much more time 	 1 	 (9) 
more time 	 2 
less time 	 3 
much less time 	 4 
(b) What are the reasons for this change? (Please write in the space 
below) 
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2. 	 Has the amount of time you spend on seminars, including preparations nd 
marking, changed since 1986, or since your appointment? (Please ring one 
number only) 
YES 
	 1 	 (10) 
NO 	 2 
If 'YES' 
(a) How has it changed? (Please ring one number only) 
much more time 	 1 
more time 	 2 
less time 	 3 
much less time 	 4 
(b) What are the reasons for this change? (Please write in the space 
below) 
3. 	 Has the amount of time you spend on lectures, including preparations nd 
marking, changed in the last six years, or since your appointment? (Please 
ring ang number only) 
YES 	 1 	 (12) 
NO 	 2 
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If 'YES' 
(a) How has it changed? (Please ring one number only) 
much more time 	 1 	 (13) 
more time 	 2 
less time 	 3 
much less time 	 4 
(b) What are the reasons for this change? (Please write in the space 
below) 
4. 	 Would you indicate whether there has been an increase, decrease or no 
change, since 1986, in the following categories of work. (Please ring the 
appropriate numbers) 
U/grad PGCE Diploma MA M.Phil/ 
Ph.D 
Same 1 1 1 1 1 (14) 
Increase 2 2 2 2 2 
Decrease 3 3 3 3 3 
5. 	 Do you consider that the quality of teaching in your field/discipline at your 
institution has changed since 1986, or since your appointment? (Please ring 
=number only) 
YES 	 1 	 (15) 
NO 	 2 
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If 'YES' 
(a) How the quality changed? (Please ring one number only) 
much higher 	 1 	 (16) 
higher 	 2 
lower 	 3 
much lower 	 4 
(b) Why do you think this change has occurred? (Please write in the 
space below) 
6. 	 Do you consider that the support service for students (eg library facilities, 
pastoral care) has changed since 1986, or since your appointment? (Please 
ring one number only) 
YES 	 1 	 (17) 
NO 	 2 
If 'YES' 
(a) 	 What has changed? (Please write in the space below) 
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7. 	 Has the type of student recruited to your field/discipline changed since 1986 
or since your appointment? (Please ring one number only) 
YES 
	
1 	 (18) 
NO 	 2 
If 'YES' 
(a) How has it changed? (Please ring one number only) 
much more able 
	
1 	 (19) 
more able 
	
2 
less able 	 3 
much less able 
	
4 
(b) Why do you think this change has occurred? (Please write in the 
space below) 
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Appendix 
•Research Definitions 
* Basic Research 
Experimental or theoretical work undertaken primarily to acquire new knowledge of 
the underlying foundation of phenomena and observable facts. 
* Strategic Research 
Applied research which is in an area which has not yet advanced to the stage where 
eventual applications can be clearly specified. 
* Applied Research 
Research directed primarily towards practical aims or objectives. 
• Personal Research 
Research undertaken to further one's own understanding of Scholarship 
developments in one's field or discipline. 
* The first three research definitions are those used in the Frascati Manual and 
Cabinet Office Annual Review of the Government Funded Research and 
Development 
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Appendix 4: Interview Schedule for Senior 
Management 
General Questions 
1. What have been the major changes your Department has been faced with 
since 1986? 
2. What has brought about these changes? 
3. On the whole for your department would you say the change is for the 
better? And if so, what has improved? What has been more adversely 
affected? What about other departments? 
4. What have been the specific consequences for teaching, including teaching 
method, research and administration? (Any objective data on these? And 
quality?) 
5. Have the changes affected the type of staff you recruit and retain and, if so, 
in what way? (Egs. of targeting for recruitment, redeployment or early 
retirement). 
6. How do you see the general shape of your university changing over the next 
five years? Do you think this is good or bad? 
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Departmental Policy 
7. How important is the internal allocation formula in determining departmental 
policy. Are there other ways in which funding changes affect Salford and 
the department? 
8. What have been the staff changes in your departments, particularly of 
administration, contract researchers, (are these the people doing the 
research?) academic staff and why? Any examples of headhunting in your 
departments, or of targeting staff for redeployment or early retirement and 
grounds for doing so. 
9. Are you going to try to improve research grade in next research exercise? If 
so, how? What, if anything, will be the effect of moving to Q in the next 
research exercise. 
Research Design and Findings 
10. Are our research distinctions valid? 
11. Anything that you can add to help explain our findings? (Preceded by brief 
description of findings). 
321 
University A 
Actual (n = 819) 23 12 21 44 
Sample (n = 145) 28 14 24 33 
University B 
Actual (n = 363) 13.5 4 25.6 56.8 
Sample (n = 106) 17 8 26 48 
Appendix 5: Actual and Sample Distribution of 
Staff in the Institutions (percentages) 
Comment: It appears that at both universities the more senior staff are slightly 
over represented and the lecturer staff under-represented, particularly in University 
A. One possible reason is that junior staff are too busy to fill in our questionnaire. 
Our results certainly indicate that they have experienced a substantial increase in 
their teaching responsibilities. However, our returns also indicated that senior staff 
had greatly increased teaching and administrative loads. Whatever the reason the 
differences in the percentage were not statistically significant and therefore unlikely 
to bias our results. Indeed, had the differences been significant, the fact that there 
was so little differences in the responses to our questions indicates that there would 
have been no bias in our findings even if there was in the sample of staff. (See 
Chapters 6-8). 
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Appendix 6: Significant Tables for Chapter 7. 
Only the ns and significant levels are given. 
Teaching 
University A 
Table 1 Tutorial Times by Department 
Pearson = 0.001 
University A 
Table 2 Change in Lecturing Time by Department 
Pearson = 0.0002 
Where: 	 H = Humanities 	 1 = Much more 
PS = Pure Science 	 2 = More 
SS = Social Science 	 3 = Less 
AS = Applied Science 	 4 = Much less 
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University A 
Table 3 Change in Teaching Quality by Department 
Pearson = 0.002 
University B 
Table 4 Change in Times on Tutorials by Year of Appointment 
Pearson = 0.039 
University B 
Table 5 Time on Seminars by Year of Appointment 
Pearson = 0.006 
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Much More 15 
More 31 
Less 4 
Much Less 5 
38 
4 
1 
University B 
Table 6 Change in Time on Lectures by Gender 
Pearson = 0.024 
University B 
Table 7 Change in MPhil/PhD Work by Year of Appointment 
Pearson = 0.027 
University B 
Table 8 Change in Teaching Quality by Sex 
Pearson = 0.03 
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Much More 5 2 3 
More 5 6 6 1 
Less 11 9 23 9 
Much Less 16 10 7 2 
Research 
University A 
Table 9 Change in Research by Rank 
Pearson = 0.038 
University A 
Table 10 Change in Research Type by Current Post 
Yes 11 17 11 5 
No 28 16 34 15 
Pearson = 0.047 
University A 
Table 11 Quality Change by Department 
Much Higher 2 2 1 5 
Higher 12 3 8 7 
Lower 9 2 1 6 
Much Lower 1 2 2 
Pearson = 0.006 
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University A 
Table 12 Time Spent on Research by Department 
Pearson = 0.05 
University A 
Table 13 Time Spent on Research by Year of Appointment 
7 Years or Less 	 32 
	
14 
More than 7 Years 	 63 	 8 
Pearson = 0.009 
University A 
Table 14 Research Type by Year of Apointment 
7 Years or Less 	 8 
	
36 
More than 7 Years 	 30 
	
41 
Pearson = 0.03 
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University B 
Table 15 Change in Research Time by Sex 
Much Higher 	 6 	 2 
Higher 	 7 	 6 
Lower 	 29 	 2 
Much Lower 	 23 	 1 
Pearson = 0.002 
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